From exception to rule: Top scientists reshape China’s party leadership

Over the past decade, the world has witnessed China’s “breakneck” technological progress, but few have recognised how this transformation has been propelled by the underlying rise of academicians in China’s key decision-making body.

Since the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2012, the number of top scientists and engineers in the Central Committee (CC) has reached a historic high. Selected from the prestigious Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) and the Chinese Academy of Engineering (CAE), academicians (院士) make up an increasing percentage of the new leadership cohort, offering critical expert insight to guide China’s long-term technological innovation.

The presence of academicians amongst Chinese political elites is not new. Top scientists and engineers have been essential in strategic projects since the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

CAS was established in 1955, with an early focus on national defence and missile technologies. Its leading scientists, such as Qian Xuesen (1911-2009) and Zhu Guangya (1924-2011), played an instrumental role in China’s “Two Bombs and One Satellite Project”（“两弹一星”工程). They both later joined the 9th CC as alternate members in 1969. Qian was a key science and technology adviser for both Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping, and Zhu went on to serve in the CC from 1969 to 1997. Xie Xide (1921-2000), an MIT-educated physicist and former president of Fudan University, also served as a full member of the CC from 1982 to 1992. 

However, Qian, Zhu and Xie were exceptions rather than the norm. Throughout the Mao era, the formal education levels of Chinese leaders were extremely low. Political elite recruitment consistently followed a “red versus expert” approach, favouring revolutionary experience and a pure ideological pedigree over academic expertise.

Very few members of the early CCs held advanced academic degrees: only 23.8% of the 1969 CC completed an undergraduate education, and just over half of the body in 1982 had completed a two-year college education or above. In 1982, no leader with a college education in the fields of science and engineering served as provincial chiefs (party secretaries or governors), and only 2% of members of the CC and the State Council could be considered as “technocrats” (engineers or scientists-turned political leaders). 

In the reform and opening up era, as China’s strategic focus shifted to economic development and innovation, scientific and technical expertise was increasingly valued in political elite selection. Almost 40 years after the founding of the CAS, the honorary title of “academicians” was formalised in 1993 as the most prestigious recognition for top talents in science and technology research. The CAE was formed in the following year to include China’s leading engineers.

Since the 1990s, CAS and CAE combined have awarded no more than 200 academician titles every two years, with lifelong tenure. As of 2025, CAS has a total of 908 academicians, and CAE has 1002 academicians. As technological innovation is increasingly critical to China’s development, academicians are increasingly represented in China’s top political institutions. 

Figure 1 shows the steady increase in the number of academicians within the CC. Made up of 350 plus members, the CC is the key decision-making body that sets policy orientations and elects top party leadership. In the 18th CC (formed in 2012), there were 15 academicians, three as full members and 12 as alternative members, making up 3.5% of the total. The number of academicians almost doubled in the 20th CC (formed in 2022), with seven full members and 22 alternative members, or 7.7% of the total. 

The increasing presence of academicians as CC members suggests that scientific expertise is not only considered vital for advisory roles, but also increasingly influences top-level political decision-making. The seven academicians serving as full members of the 20th CC built their careers primarily in research before moving into senior government roles.

Huai Jinpeng (b. 1962), a CAS academician since 2009 and a two-term CC member, is the current minister of education and was formerly the vice-minister of industry and information technology. As a leading computer scientist and former university president, Huai is well-positioned to be China’s policymaker for industrial upgrading and education reform.

Currently, no academician serves on the Politburo, despite some having distinguished careers in science and engineering. Politburo members such as Chen Jining, Yin Li, Yuan Jiajun, Zhang Guoqing and Li Ganjie all hold advanced degrees in technical fields but are absent from the academicians list.

Before entering the Politburo, they held key positions in areas ranging from environmental governance and public health to aerospace, defence and nuclear development. The fact that these Politburo members do not hold the title of academician underscores the weight of the academician title as a marker of scientific authority, largely independent of political rank.

The composition of academicians in the 20th CC also reflects China’s rising aspirations for “new quality productive forces”. Characterised as “revolutionary technologies” driven primarily by innovation, these technologies (including AI, robotics, aerospace and advanced communication) make up a growing share of the academicians’ expertise. Chen Jie (b.1965), academician of CAE and party secretary of Harbin Institute of Technology, joined the 20th CC as a leading expert on AI and robotics.

Far from being seen as a static group of party functionalists or ideologues portrayed in conventional wisdom overseas, China’s political leadership actively incorporates experts from emerging scientific frontiers, guaranteeing institutional insight into the technologies of tomorrow. 

In addition to the institutional perspective, as members of the CC on an individual level, academicians have diverse career tracks across research, education and government, creating a “revolving door with Chinese characteristics”.

Huang Ru (b. 1969), a CAS academician with expertise in integrated circuit technologies, currently serves as the vice-chairperson of the National Development Reform Commission and an alternative member of the 20th CC. Huang spent most of her career at the prestigious Peking University, rising through the ranks to vice-president. Her current position, at the heart of China’s economic policy, allows her to apply decades of research in integrated circuits to China’s ambition of fostering innovation in its semiconductor industry. 

Hou Jianguo (b. 1959) provides another illustration of the evolving role of scientific elites in China’s political leadership. A semiconductor physicist trained at the University of Science and Technology of China, Hou also spent several years conducting research at the University of California at Berkeley in the US before returning to China.

Unlike many scientists whose careers remain largely within academia, Hou has also held significant leadership positions, including vice-minister of science and technology and deputy party secretary of the Guangxi Autonomous Region. He currently serves as the president of CAS and a full member of the CC. Combining scientific insight and governing experiences, Hou’s career path allows him to integrate science and technology strategies with practical policymaking.

Unlike traditional political elites who rose through government or party ranks, academicians in the CC, most with decades-long careers in science and technology, now form an expanding cohort steering China’s technological trajectory. As a distinct professional group, they exemplify diversified pathways to elite status within China’s leadership hierarchy.

Academicians, like other political elites, are not immune to political scandals or corruption charges. Their continued presence in the CC is subject to increasing scrutiny in both academic integrity and political discipline.

Though still a minority, their numbers have grown steadily over the past decade, mirroring the nation’s strategic pivot to innovation-driven development. This technocratic shift not only accelerates domestic modernisation but can also help enhance China’s geopolitical competitiveness in an era where technological supremacy dictates power and influence on the world stage.

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