Grounded: Taiwan President Lai Ching-te has nowhere to fly

On the eve of his planned visit to Eswatini, Taiwan’s last remaining ally in Africa, President Lai Ching-te abruptly postponed the trip — the first such cancellation of an overseas visit by a Taiwanese president. The episode underscores how Taiwan’s international space under Lai has become even more constrained than during Chen Shui-bian’s era of “foggy diplomacy” (迷雾外交).

Lai last travelled abroad between late November and early December 2024; since then, nearly a year and a half has passed without another overseas trip. Since his inauguration in May 2024, he has spent roughly 700 days in office without transiting through the US — an unusually long stretch for a Taiwanese president.

Taiwan Presidential Office Secretary-General Pan Meng-an held a press conference at 6pm on 21 April, stating that Lai had postponed his visit to Eswatini because Seychelles, Mauritius and Madagascar had unilaterally revoked overflight clearance for the presidential aircraft without prior notice. He added that “the actual reason was intense pressure exerted by Chinese authorities, including economic coercion”.

Reading a Presidential Office statement, Pan asserted that Taipei “strongly” condemns Beijing’s “crude actions”, adding that such internationally “unprecedented” behaviour of “coercing a third country to alter its sovereign decision through intimidation” undermines aviation safety, violates relevant international norms and practices, disrupts the regional status quo and harms the feelings of the Taiwanese people.

An hour later, on the mainland side, Xinwen Lianbo began promptly at 7pm, with the lead story reporting that Chinese President Xi Jinping held a ceremony to welcome Mozambican President Daniel Francisco Chapo on his visit to China. According to a Xinhua release, Chapo said during the talks that he was pleased to be the first African head of state to pay a state visit to China this year, and that Mozambique “unconditionally abides by the one China principle, and supports China in achieving national reunification”.

While Taiwan’s leader is frustrated at being unable to travel, mainland China is calmly hosting visiting dignitaries. The sharp contrast on news screens is a stark reflection of the difference in overall strength on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

During the decade of rule by the Green camp — from Tsai Ing-wen to Lai Ching-te — particularly under Tsai, Taiwan succeeded in “internationalising” its issue, drawing strong dissatisfaction from Beijing. However, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has also paid a diplomatic price by refusing to recognise the 1992 Consensus: Taiwan has lost ten diplomatic allies over the past decade and now has only 12 remaining, with Eswatini being its sole ally in Africa.

In the past, Taiwan's presidential visits to Africa have encountered relatively little resistance, while trips to diplomatic allies in Latin America have been the most challenging, as they require transit through the US. If Taipei’s account is accurate, Beijing’s move to block even Lai’s visit to Africa effectively shuts the door on Taiwan’s international space and its leader’s room to manoeuvre.

On 22 April, in response to a media query, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson stated on its official website: “It’s very clear that there’s no longer a so-called ‘ROC president’ in the world anymore.”

According to Taiwan’s pro-Green camp media, citing national security officials, Beijing pressured Seychelles, Mauritius and Madagascar — countries which Lai’s presidential aircraft was scheduled to fly over — by threatening economic coercion, including withdrawing major debt relief, halting financing, and imposing further economic sanctions. It was said that China had pressed these three countries to revoke the flight permits that would have allowed Lai’s aircraft to pass through their flight information regions.

If Taipei’s account is accurate, then so long as the US does not step in to help, it would be no surprise if Lai ends up as a “Taiwanese president who cannot go abroad” during his term. Beijing’s tactic of using third countries to block Lai’s trips, leveraging overflight permissions and economic tools as pressure, has now been tried and proven to work and would likely be used repeatedly in future. All the more so given China’s considerable influence in Africa, where from 1 May its zero-tariff policy would be rolled out across 53 countries — with Taiwan’s diplomatic ally Eswatini the lone exception.

Taiwan’s other diplomatic allies are scattered across Europe (the Vatican), Oceania (the Marshall Islands, Palau, Tuvalu) and Latin America and the Caribbean (Belize, Guatemala, Haiti, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Paraguay). The US wields significant influence in Latin America and Oceania; if it lends a hand, Lai might still find opportunities to travel.

The more Lai seeks to use overseas visits to chip away at Beijing’s “one China” narrative, the more Beijing leverages its expanding influence to obstruct those trips. In essence, the “internationalisation of the Taiwan issue” and its simultaneous “one-China-isation” form a central paradox at the heart of cross-strait dynamics.

The more the US and its allies, through various forms of strategic ambiguity, treat Taiwan as a sovereign state, the more the mainland squeezes Taiwan’s international space, asserting and reinforcing the one China principle globally. To curb Taiwan independence and the internationalisation of the issue, Beijing steps up military deterrence — yet this, in turn, gives Washington and its partners further grounds to voice support for Taiwan, further internationalising the issue in a self-reinforcing cycle. In this game of “salami-slicing” and “counter salami‑slicing”, regional crisis risks steadily intensify.

When it comes to Taiwan’s diplomatic relations, it is in fact the US and Japan — both of which it has no formal ties with — that are the most important. At present, Beijing’s relations with Tokyo are frozen over Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s remark that “a Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency”, while her offering to Yasukuni Shrine has further angered China. Beijing’s ties with Washington are also delicate — neither side wants a public fallout before a leaders’ summit, but US President Donald Trump claimed that US forces intercepted a Chinese “gift” bound for Iran, while Reuters cited sources that said the vessel was transporting “dual‑use” goods.

With China-US and China-Japan relations on shaky ground, could Beijing’s move to block Lai’s travel reflect an assessment by the Chinese that Washington and Tokyo are unlikely to mount major shows of support for Taiwan in the short term, in turn giving Beijing greater room for strategic manoeuvre? As May approaches, the intensity of tussling between all sides would heighten. If Trump and Xi meet in mid-May, Taiwan would inevitably be a major agenda item. Lai marks his second anniversary in office on 20 May — how would he respond to Beijing then?

Most importantly, how do Taiwanese voters see this? What kind of Taiwan, and what kind of cross-strait relations do most people want? In the run-up to the 2028 presidential election, terms such as the Chinese nation, the 1992 Consensus, international space, war and peace, and US scepticism are bound to anchor an intense campaign of information and cognitive warfare. Sympathy and backlash will intermingle, with layers of non-rational sentiment complicating the picture. It may well be that the race quietly began the moment Lai’s trip was blocked.

This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as “北京要让赖清德坐困台湾”.

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