Iran as a nuclear power: War or peace?

There has been much speculation on when Iran will acquire nuclear weapons. US House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence chairman Mike Turner predicted in August that Iran could announce it possessed nuclear weapons by the end of 2024.

In October, amid escalating tensions in the Middle East, 39 Iranian lawmakers jointly called on Iran’s Supreme National Security Council to reassess the country’s nuclear strategy and consider developing nuclear weapons. This followed a May statement by Kamal Kharrazi, an advisor to Iran’s supreme leader, suggesting Iran might be compelled to pursue nuclear weapons if its survival were threatened by Israel. So when will Iran actually acquire nuclear weapons? And would possessing them ultimately benefit or harm the country? This analysis will explore these questions in three parts.

Firstly, Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is aligned with its national regime’s security interests. The Khamenei regime in Iran generally believes that its greatest security concern is political security, which means maintaining the theocratic state structure.

Since the Iranian Islamic Revolution, Western countries have sought to overthrow this regime and restore Iran as a secular state, a goal that also resonates with a segment of Iranian society. The outcry over the “headscarf incident” — the September 2022 death of Mahsa Amini after her arrest by Iran’s morality police for allegedly violating hijab laws, sparking widespread protests against the government — exemplifies this internal pressure. Thus, the regime believes that acquiring nuclear weapons is the ultimate deterrent against external interference and a guarantor of its survival.

Secondly, the military threat from Israel has prompted Iran to recognise the urgency of acquiring nuclear weapons. Israel is widely seen by the international community as a de facto nuclear power, and several Israeli officials have hinted at its nuclear capabilities.

Faced with the nuclear threat from its greatest adversary, Iran feels compelled to consider nuclear armament to counter Israel’s nuclear threat and achieve a balance of power in the region. Israel’s greatest fear is a nuclear-armed Iran, and it has constantly sought to disrupt and delay Iran’s nuclear capabilities to maintain its nuclear advantage.

After all, Iran’s much larger land size — compared to Israel — means that Israel lacks strategic depth, and a nuclear-armed Iran could mean Israel’s annihilation. Thus, nuclear armament for self-preservation becomes Israel’s only choice.

However, Israel’s nuclear arsenal continues to loom over Iran, keeping its national security in a constant state of crisis. Coupled with Western economic sanctions, Iran finds it challenging to develop its economy. Acquiring nuclear weapons to achieve a “balance of terror” with Israel might benefit Iran, as a stabilised regional environment could facilitate economic development and improve living standards.

Thirdly, Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons stems from complete disillusionment with Trump winning the US presidential election, which represented Iran’s worst-case scenario. This outcome, from Iran’s perspective, rendered the revival of the Iran nuclear deal hopeless.

Given this situation, Iran might opt to openly pursue nuclear armament. With Trump in office, there could be greater support for the Israeli government, possibly even backing Israeli military action to eliminate Iran’s nuclear capabilities. However, if Iran fully acquires nuclear weapons, it could deter Israel from taking rash actions. This scenario might align with Trump’s promise to avoid warfare during his tenure, preventing further US entanglement with Israel’s right-wing government.

Fourthly, an alliance between Iran and Russia could drive Iran to decisively develop nuclear weapons. Iran and Russia are set to sign a “comprehensive strategic partnership agreement”. Although Putin does not consider this agreement an alliance treaty, it effectively serves as a mutual protection pact. Unlike Belarus, however, this agreement does not extend a nuclear umbrella to Iran, as it was extended to Belarus based on political integration.

It is challenging for Russia to extend the same benefits to Iran because Iran differs significantly from Russia in terms of politics, ethnicity, religion and culture, making their cooperation less tight-knit than that with Belarus. This situation could encourage Iran to develop nuclear weapons independently.

Due to the precedent set by the Australia-UK-US partnership (AUKUS), Russia might not rule out deep nuclear cooperation with Iran, which could even potentially include assistance in developing nuclear weapons. Such cooperation could also alleviate the political pressure on Russia for not providing a nuclear umbrella to Iran.

The fifth reason is that Iran could emulate North Korea’s “nuclear self-preservation” model. There is no doubt that this model has been successful, and the outcomes of Saddam Hussein’s and Muammar Gaddafi’s decisions to abandon nuclear ambitions are also evident. It is therefore logical for Iran to take a leaf out of North Korea’s book.

South Korea and Japan can even dissuade the US from taking military action against North Korea, as a nuclear-armed North Korea poses significant risks to South Korea’s Seoul economic zone and Japan’s Tokyo economic circle. This has been a key reason for maintaining peace in Northeast Asia.

North Korea cannot compete with the US, South Korea and Japan in terms of conventional forces and defence capabilities. Hence, the best defence is a good offence; in particular, North Korea’s use of nuclear weapons to deter opponents is an excellent defensive strategy as it uses a small force to counter a larger one.

Although the Yoon Suk-yeol government has often professed a desire to take tough action on North Korea, such proclamations are mere bluster; the Yoon administration cannot afford the severe consequences that will result from military confrontation.

North Korea and Iran also have close relations — in the past, Iran even acquired ballistic missile technology from North Korea. If Iran is willing to cooperate with North Korea in the nuclear field, North Korea will be more than happy to oblige.

Finally, Iran’s “nuclearisation approach” could strengthen the “Shia crescent”. While Iran will not provide a nuclear umbrella for the Shia crescent, it will position itself as the stronghold and staunch supporter of the Shia alliance.

Although the Shia crescent will inevitably experience ongoing conflicts with Israel and face disputes with Sunni factions, the security of Iranian territory would be the greatest source of support for other Shia organisations, as long as Israel does not dare to attack Iran directly.

But does Iran have the capability to become a nuclear power? It must be acknowledged here that Iran possesses all the technical capabilities and foundation to develop nuclear weapons. According to reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran is steadily enriching uranium to levels close to those required for making a nuclear bomb, with stockpiles exceeding more than 30 times the limits set by the nuclear agreement Tehran signed in 2015. 

As of 11 May 2024, Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile is approximately 6,201.3 kilograms, with a purity level of up to 60%, pushing towards the roughly 90% level required for weapons-grade material. With further uranium enrichment, Iran would have sufficient foundational material to produce nuclear weapons. Additionally, Iran has at least two domestic uranium mines and vast land area suitable for natural underground nuclear test sites — it is only a matter of time before Iran crosses the nuclear threshold.

What would Iran as a nuclear state mean for the Middle East: peace or war? Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would inevitably trigger a nuclear arms race in the Middle East and lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Israel would increase its nuclear arsenal, and Sunni countries like Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Turkey would pursue nuclear capabilities, making the proliferation of nuclear weapons highly likely. The most alarming scenario is the potential collapse of the global non-proliferation regime as the number of nuclear-armed states increases. 

The first is the risk of initiating a war with Iran to dismantle its nuclear capabilities and potentially overthrow the Khamenei regime, which could ignite large-scale conflict in the Middle East. The second is to accept Iran as a nuclear-armed state, resulting in a balance of terror and conditional peace. Although Iran’s nuclear ambitions align with its interests, they pose a significant threat to the global non-proliferation regime. However, this scenario is not outside the realm of possibility and could very well become a reality.

Moreover, if Iran were to effectively become a nuclear power, Israel and the US would have to face two considerations. One is to take the risk of going to war with Iran to dismantle its nuclear capabilities and overthrow the Khamenei regime. This would inevitably lead to large-scale conflict and war in the Middle East. The other is to accept Iran as a nuclear-armed state, creating a balance of terror and conditional peace.

While Iran’s nuclear ambitions align with its national interests, they undoubtedly deliver a devastating blow to the global non-proliferation regime. However, such a scenario is not beyond the realm of possibility, and could very well become a reality.

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