Japanese academic: Takaichi’s China policy misread
Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s approach mirrors predecessors, but timing and misunderstandings over Taiwan remarks have fuelled debate and Beijing concern, says Japanese academic Shin Kawashima.
Before her administration was inaugurated in Japan, China already had a very negative view of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi. As a conservative lawmaker, she had long advocated for cooperation with Taiwan, cultivated a close relationship with Taiwan President Lai Ching-te, and frequently criticised China. Furthermore, when Takaichi became the president of the Liberal Democratic Party and was subsequently elected prime minister, Lai sent a congratulatory message, which China likely viewed as unacceptable.
Continuity and caution: Takaichi’s China strategy
However, as was the case with former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Japanese prime ministers tend to focus on presenting themselves as fitting their role, rather than on implementing policies consistent with their pre-premiership rhetoric.
... she called for continued candid dialogue between Japanese and Chinese leaders — a clear sign that her administration would continue the China policies of the Fumio Kishida and Shigeru Ishiba administrations.
Takaichi appears to be following in the footsteps of Abe. Like the former leader, she stated that she would not visit the Yasukuni Shrine as prime minister — at least not this fall. While Abe had regularly visited the shrine before taking office and after leaving it, he had done so only once during his term in December 2013.
Furthermore, in her policy speech on 24 October 2025, Takaichi stated, “It is necessary for Japan to build a constructive and stable relationship with China, an important neighbour for Japan… We will promote a mutually beneficial relationship.”
While acknowledging security concerns between the two countries, she called for continued candid dialogue between Japanese and Chinese leaders — a clear sign that her administration would continue the China policies of the Fumio Kishida and Shigeru Ishiba administrations.
Japanese media speculated that Beijing did not send a congratulatory telegram following the formation of the new Takaichi administration. The real focus, however, was whether the new Japanese prime minister would have a phone call or an in-person meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping. In May 2018, the first phone conversation between then Prime Minister Abe and President Xi marked a notable improvement in Japan–China relations.
Similar phone conversations occurred after the establishment of the Yoshihide Suga and Kishida administrations, while a direct meeting took place in Lima, Peru, following the Ishiba administration. As a result, attention focused on whether the new Takaichi administration would hold a call or in-person meeting with China, which ultimately led to a Japan–China summit at the APEC meeting in South Korea, reflecting the pattern seen during Ishiba’s tenure.
China signals sensitivity over Japan–Taiwan engagement
While not uncommon, the minutes from the Japan–China summit on 31 October, released by the Japanese and Chinese ministries of foreign affairs, differ significantly. On the one hand, both ministries stated that the two leaders reaffirmed the “broad direction of Japan–China relations”, aiming to “comprehensively promote a ‘mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests’ and build ‘constructive and stable Japan–China relations.’”
The timing of Takaichi’s post — immediately following her meeting with President Xi — may also be problematic. Yet, if the question is whether it would have been acceptable before the meeting with President Xi, the answer is still likely no.
On the other hand, the two countries’ records differ on historical issues. Chinese records indicate that President Xi called on Prime Minister Takaichi to adhere to the Murayama Statement — Japan’s 1995 official apology for its wartime aggression and colonial rule. Meanwhile, Japanese records indicate that Takaichi raised a number of issues, including the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and the rare earths issue.
In any case, the existing framework for Japan–China relations has been confirmed, and communication between the two countries will continue. Indeed, it appears that Beijing intends to keep its relationship with Japan largely unchanged under Takaichi.
However, after meeting with Lin Hsin-i, former vice-premier of the Executive Yuan, representing Taiwan at APEC, Takaichi posted on social media that she hoped the “practical cooperation between Japan and Taiwan will deepen”, to which China expressed strong displeasure. China’s sensitive reaction may also be in response to President Lai Ching-te’s congratulatory message regarding Takaichi’s election as Liberal Democratic Party president and prime minister.
However, meetings between the Japanese prime minister and Taiwanese representatives at APEC, as well as Japan–Taiwan ministerial meetings, are frequent. China’s protest merely serves to reinforce its stated “bottom line”.
The timing of Takaichi’s post — immediately following her meeting with President Xi — may also be problematic. Yet, if the question is whether it would have been acceptable before the meeting with President Xi, the answer is still likely no.
Interpretation of Takaichi’s controversial remark
A few days after the APEC summit, Takaichi made remarks in the Diet regarding a “survival-threatening situation” concerning collective self-defence, specifically mentioning a Taiwan emergency. While her remarks did not deviate from the legal definition of a “survival-threatening situation” in the context of collective self-defence, it was rare for a prime minister to cite a specific hypothetical case. The comments have sparked misunderstandings, polarised debate within Japan, and created tensions in Japan–China relations.
Although Takaichi has not retracted her statement, she has since repeatedly stated that she will not answer questions about specific hypothetical cases — such as a potential Taiwan emergency — and will adhere to the Japan–China Joint Communiqué.
However, media and public discourse have been rife with misunderstandings about the legal term “survival-threatening situation” in the context of collective self-defence. Many fail to grasp the fundamental point: this right applies specifically in relation to the US. In other words, even if a Taiwan emergency triggered Japan’s collective self-defence, it would be exercised solely between the Japan Self-Defense Forces and the US military.
Going forward, the Japanese government will need to explain the intention and meaning of Takaichi’s remarks to various parties. Although Takaichi has not retracted her statement, she has since repeatedly stated that she will not answer questions about specific hypothetical cases — such as a potential Taiwan emergency — and will adhere to the Japan–China Joint Communiqué. This suggests that she is continuing Abe’s approach — maintaining a distinction between her role as a lawmaker and her responsibilities as prime minister.
It is unclear how the Chinese side will respond to this, but it will be necessary for them to interpret Takaichi’s words and actions in accordance with the original context and in a comprehensive manner.
