No more ‘fence-sitting’: Why India needs to tilt towards the US for security
India needs to rethink its “fence-sitting” approach, says Indian analyst Rahul Jaybhay. As unipolarity diminishes and bipolarity surges, India needs to tilt heavily towards the US and Western democracies to manage its security.
India’s foreign policy is out of sync and misaligned with the structural changes in today’s international system. While India’s approach is presented as flexible — rebalancing priorities and relationships to further its interests — it fails to show the necessary elasticity when circumstances that threaten its security arise.
India’s grand strategy of hedging its bets by relying on all “major powers” or “fence-sitting” is oblivious to India’s security imperatives emanating from China. As unipolarity diminishes and bipolarity surges, India needs to tilt heavily towards the US and Western democracies to manage its security. Such structural recalibration necessitates rethinking existing ties with Russia and China and forging deeper bilateral bonds with the West.
India’s Cold War and post-Cold War behaviour
However, India’s established template for maintaining an independent foreign policy, emphasising “strategic autonomy” and its general distaste for great power competition resist such adaptation, even in the face of structural changes in the international system. While India recognises the security imperatives arising from these changes, its policy formulations to address these conditions remain suboptimal.
The tension between India’s practice of non-alignment and the structural bipolar competition of the US and USSR was particularly evident during the early decades of the Cold War. India, geographically isolated from theatres of competition, avoided bloc politics.
Its policy of non-alignment did yield significant returns. India’s active diplomacy and pragmatic policies, immediately following its independence, prevented it from locking horns with Pakistan — after a brief disruption from Pakistan’s intervention in Kashmir in 1948. Quite tellingly, facilitated by its non-aligned posture, the pulls of great power competition incentivised India to seek military and economic aid from both great powers in the mid- and late 1950s.
The only other time India demonstrated flexibility in response to structural changes was during its challenge to the US unipolarity in the post-Cold War period.
Nehru’s international diplomacy brokered peace between gridlocked great powers during the Korean crisis in 1951 by introducing mediation and reconciliation as an independent third party. By leveraging anti-colonial sentiments, Nehru built stature and prestige, mobilising the voice of post-colonial states against great power competition. His efforts to form a third bloc by forging ties through Afro-Asian conferences were particularly evident.
Pursuing these vital interests became feasible due to the structural dynamics in which great power pressure on South Asia was minimal. This allowed India to act without constraints and exert its strategic autonomy on international issues that New Delhi deemed significant.
But these structural realities changed in the late 1950s with China’s aggression toward Tibet and disturbances along disputed borderlines with India. As China’s threat on the border grew, structural signals — such as the disparagement of the Tibetan uprising and China’s unequivocal stance on border resolution — indicated its intentions to undermine India’s territorial integrity.
While Nehru and others recognised these signals, the policy calibration to counter China never materialised. India’s military preparedness in response to China’s offensive was subpar and, at best, less than optimal. Its internal capability falls short even to defend the status quo.
The only solution to India’s border crisis was to seek external assistance, which it ultimately did, albeit reluctantly, from Washington. India was also ill-prepared for the crisis and lacked alternative plans. This indicates that India’s security interests were given less priority than the Indian leaders’ desire to showcase independence in their foreign policy posture.
The only other time India demonstrated flexibility in response to structural changes was during its challenge to the US unipolarity in the post-Cold War period. Washington’s dominance worried various states, including India, prompting responses like the formation of the Russia-India-China grouping, BRICS and other soft balancing mechanisms to constrain the US power. However, Washington emerged as a benign superpower, which also made India shift gears and reap benefits, which was evident with the signing of the nuclear deal in 2008.
The current global structure is seen as facilitating this goal, and multi-alignment is regarded as the most effective strategy in these changing circumstances.
India’s implementation of multi-alignment strategy
India is, once again, facing an evolving global structure that is not matched by the changes in its foreign policy directives. The Russia-Ukraine crisis has embroiled Europe and destabilised the continent. China’s rise and aggressive Indo-Pacific policies have altered the power balance by outpacing its military expenditure vis-à-vis other countries. The US’s waning unipolarity, coupled with Beijing’s ascendance fuelled by economic growth, has transitioned the international system towards bipolarity. And China, one of the emerging poles, sits geographically adjacent to India, which is adversarial to its border and strategic interests.
In this evolving international situation, Indian policymakers believe that conditions are ripe to exploit “global contradictions” — including instability, polarisation, regional conflicts and a “less appealing” liberal international order — which are symptoms underpinned by the changing power structure. It has prompted them to craft a “multi-alignment” strategy, to engage with all “major powers” without selective favourites.
For India, this policy serves to protect its long-term interest in becoming a “leading power” within the system. The current global structure is seen as facilitating this goal, and multi-alignment is regarded as the most effective strategy in these changing circumstances.
However, these goals overlook India’s security challenges, which should be a vital priority for Indian policymakers. When India’s security interests are considered within the international structure, China’s irreconcilable stance on the border highlights the limitations of India’s multi-alignment strategy. Border talks, confidence-building measures, and diplomatic efforts have historically failed to address Delhi’s concerns or shift China’s territorial position, despite recent signs of thawing.
India can only rely on external balancing measures as a viable policy option to bridge the power deficit in the interim period before it can balance China. However, the willingness to make alliance-like arrangements is absent in India’s foreign policy discourse.
India-China dynamics and the global geopolitics
China’s power balance vis-à-vis India has overtly favoured Beijing.
In 2022, India spent US$81.4 billion on military expenditure compared to China’s US$ 292 billion. China is consolidating its hold in the border regions, especially the eastern sector, by upgrading “dual-use and military infrastructure” even after the Galwan crisis.
India responded by prioritising deterrence measures and moving closer to the US. It also recently launched an SSBN (ballistic missile submarine) to checkmate China’s gestures to counter China’s asymmetric challenges in the Indian Ocean, should it become aggressive along the borders.
These efforts are in the right direction, but India’s power deficit is still significant. India can only rely on external balancing measures as a viable policy option to bridge the power deficit in the interim period before it can balance China. However, the willingness to make alliance-like arrangements is absent in India’s foreign policy discourse.
Washington remains India’s primary policy option for addressing the prospects of countering Beijing if tensions arise over borders that threaten India’s territorial integrity.
India’s reliance on Russia as a precautionary measure to counter China is at odds with structural realities, as the two countries have become significantly closer than ever. Prime Minister Modi’s recent visit to Moscow highlighted the diminishing role of Russia in India’s strategic calculations — an undeniable fact that diplomatic posturing cannot reverse. This visit yielded no significant outcomes, raising concerns among US policymakers and fostering the perception that India is taking the US for granted.
In response to Western concerns, India planned Modi’s visits to Poland and Ukraine to reassure Europe amid its outreach to Moscow. Consequently, India must be more receptive to emerging structural pathways. It should reconsider its reliance on old partners and seek to strengthen bilateral and military ties with the West. Washington remains India’s primary policy option for addressing the prospects of countering Beijing if tensions arise over borders that threaten India’s territorial integrity.
Alliance arrangements vex New Delhi, but deeper military cooperation with Washington is essential for preparing for contingencies at the border and deterring Chinese provocations. Therefore, India needs to be more aware of the global structural changes that impact its security and adapt its approach to address the challenges posed by Beijing more effectively.
