Taiwan’s failed recall and the uncertain road ahead with China

The first round of the Taiwan recall vote on 26 July was a complete failure, signalling that the second round scheduled for 23 August will likely fail as well. Many observers were surprised, particularly those in the pro-Green camp, who were all extremely optimistic about the results prior to the vote.

The Lai Ching-te government and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) did not immediately take responsibility for the failed first-round vote, hoping to minimise its impact on themselves. This reinforced existing criticisms of their opportunistic behaviour during the recall, further disheartening grassroots recall groups who had already accused the Lai administration and the DPP of insufficient effort in the campaign.

Shortly after the failed recall, polls showed significant drops in both trust and satisfaction levels for Lai. This decline likely stemmed not only from the recall’s failure but also from his perceived opportunism, which may have alienated some recall advocates.

In resisting the recall, cooperation between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) expanded beyond the Legislative Yuan for the first time, shifting from legislative collaboration to voter mobilisation. Their successful effort showcased the strength of this alliance. The failed recall will likely reassure Beijing and may even be overinterpreted as a setback for the “resist China, protect Taiwan” strategy, as observers tend to view it through a polarised pro-China or anti-China lens.

In fact, since the recall movement began, polls consistently showed that more people opposed the effort than supported it. In response to the DPP’s push to recall opposition lawmakers, the KMT launched its own recall campaign against DPP legislators in early 2025. However, these attempts not only failed but were also found to involve opportunistic and illegal actions, raising doubts about the KMT’s voter mobilisation capabilities.

Moreover, Blue voters have generally been less enthusiastic than Green voters about voting. Driven by negative campaigning and animosity towards KMT legislators, the campaign more effectively motivated recall supporters against the KMT than the opponents. This dynamic led to an overestimation of the Green camp’s ability to mobilise voters.

This misconception also reflects the current landscape of public opinion in Taiwan, where the Green camp holds a dominant position over the Blue camp. After more than nine years of DPP rule, the Green camp enjoys greater visibility across both traditional and new media platforms, giving it an advantage in shaping public narratives — including those surrounding the pro-recall movement. This media imbalance has led some to overestimate support for the recalls. The dynamic is somewhat reminiscent of the US media environment, where liberal and progressive voices dominate, leading many to wrongly assume that Donald Trump could not win the presidency.

Reviews of the failed recall have focused on the strategies and efforts of both camps in mobilising supporters, while overlooking the nature of the recall itself. Two specific aspects of the recall also influenced the results.

First, while legislative elections in Taiwan are often seen as central-level contests — largely because they coincide with presidential elections and are influenced by national political trends — they are more heavily shaped by local factors than presidential races. In reality, legislative elections exhibit characteristics of both local and central-level elections, with outcomes shaped by a mix of constituency-level dynamics and island-wide political currents.

The two main demands of the recall movement — “resist China, protect Taiwan” and opposing constitutional violations and administrative disorder — were both island-wide, central-level concerns. However, the movement overlooked an important reality: legislators are not only responsible for participating in national affairs through the Legislative Yuan but also for serving their local constituencies. If voters are more focused on their legislators’ performance within their districts, then slogans centred on broader, central-level issues are likely to have limited persuasive power.

Second, the recall evolved into a radical social movement due to its indiscriminate demands and the social conflicts it incited. This kind of radicalism often triggers strong pushback from society. A comparable example is Taiwan’s earlier movement for same-sex marriage, which, due to its perceived radicalism, provoked a significant backlash from conservative groups, as anti-gay parades and referendums saw high participation from citizens with traditional beliefs.

The Blue camp tends to hold relatively more traditional views than the Green camp, which makes them less receptive to radical demands. This dynamic may have further fuelled public opposition to the indiscriminate nature of the recall. Since many of the targeted districts were strongholds of the Blue camp, the backlash there was particularly intense.

The local and radical nature of the recall also prompts broader reflection. For instance, does its failure signal the failure of the “resist China, protect Taiwan” strategy? If the recall’s outcome was primarily shaped by local dynamics, then any perceived failure of that strategy is also a localised one. In that case, during presidential elections — where central and island-wide issues carry more weight — the “resist China, protect Taiwan” narrative may well regain its power to mobilise voters.

On the radical nature of the recall, while it faced more resistance in the Blue-dominated districts with their more traditional perspectives, it might also garner more support in the Green-dominated districts, where perspectives are more radical. Similarly, in Taiwan-wide elections, it remains uncertain whether traditionalists or radicals will prevail.

This is a reminder to the Blue-White camp and Beijing not to be too optimistic in interpreting the failure of the recall. Objectively, in the short term, the failure of the recall is undoubtedly advantageous to all anti-Green forces. But for Taiwan at large, and looking towards future presidential elections, the balance of power between the Blue, Green and White camps has not changed significantly.

If Blue and White legislators continue to draw public dissatisfaction over central, island-wide issues, voters may not directly punish them in the next legislative election. However, they could channel their frustration toward the KMT and TPP presidential candidates, who are more visibly accountable for national leadership and how Taiwan is represented on core, central-level concerns.

After the failed recall, for the Lai government, challenges from the Blue and White legislators as well as pressure from Trump might increase. For instance, recently, due to trade negotiations with mainland China, Lai was reportedly blocked from transiting in the US during his foreign visits. Meanwhile, dissatisfaction within the DPP may also be brewing. Still, given his political background and reputation for ideological rigidity and an uncompromising style, Lai is unlikely to change his confrontational approach, even amid rising internal and external pressure.

The anti-China, pro-Taiwan grassroots movement that emerged during the recall may be seen by Lai as validation of his efforts to promote the “resist China, protect Taiwan” agenda since taking office. This perceived success could encourage him to further advance the push for “state normalisation”, which would almost certainly deepen Beijing’s dissatisfaction.

Once the China-US trade negotiations end, Beijing might step up pressure on the Lai government and test the Trump administration’s response. At that point, the Trump administration’s stance on Taiwan would become the most unpredictable factor in the next phase of the China-US-Taiwan tussle.

This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as “大罢免失败后的台湾”.

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