Takaichi’s gamble: Can an early election secure Japan’s future?

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has decided to dissolve the Diet this week and hold a general election set for 8 February. The last House of Representatives election in Japan took place just 14 months ago in October 2024, making this an unusually short interval between general elections.

As recent as late December last year, Takaichi had expressed a cautious attitude towards calling an election. Behind this major shift lie both domestic considerations and significant international factors; indeed, the international dimension of this election may be the most influential in recent years in shaping a Japanese prime minister’s decision to dissolve the Diet and call a general election.

In weighing the uncertainty of an election outcome against the need to quickly consolidate her domestic governing base, Takaichi chose the former, believing that this political gamble is the only way to break the current deadlock in both domestic and foreign policies.

While a general election carries clear uncertainties, success would not only strengthen Takaichi’s support within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) but also allow her to accelerate the implementation of strongly conservative policies.

The election entails at least three major uncertainties. First, this is the first time in more than 20 years that the LDP will not cooperate with Komeito. This signals the end of the longstanding “LDP-Komeito electoral cooperation model” and may even result in LDP and Komeito candidates competing against each other in the same constituencies.

Second, the LDP’s money-politics scandals have not been resolved; they have merely been temporarily overshadowed by Takaichi’s high approval ratings. How these issues are handled could provoke a voter backlash.

Third, dissolving the House of Representatives and holding a general election after such a short interval will invite criticism from opposition parties. Takaichi will argue that the large budget required for her “active fiscal policy” needs a popular mandate, but the opposition will accuse her of acting out of self-interest for the LDP and herself as prime minister.

Despite these significant uncertainties, the potential rewards of an electoral victory are equally compelling. Winning without Komeito’s cooperation would markedly enhance Takaichi’s standing within the party.

At present, the LDP and its governing partner, the Japan Innovation Party, hold only a narrow majority in the House of Representatives and have yet to secure a majority in the House of Councillors. In the coalition agreement reached between the LDP and the Japan Innovation Party last year, many conservative policy items — such as those related to foreign residents — are explicitly time-limited through 2026. An election victory would further consolidate the political foundations of this emerging conservative governing alliance.

In the realm of security policy, Japan is expected to revise the “Three Principles on Arms Exports” and the “Three Security Documents” — the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Defense Buildup Program — around 2026. If the election proceeds smoothly, the political resistance to advancing these conservative agendas would be greatly reduced, potentially even laying the groundwork for future constitutional revision.

With the goal of securing long-term rule, Takaichi has made this approach the foundation of her foreign policy, seeking within this framework to reshape China-Japan relations and Japan-US relations, while building a quasi-alliance network of like-minded “middle-power democracies” to respond to the profound changes underway in the international order.

One important external factor behind Takaichi’s decision to dissolve the House of Representatives and call a general election is very likely relations with China. Takaichi’s remarks on Taiwan made in the Diet on 7 November 2025 demonstrated, for the first time, a clear shift from strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity on the Taiwan issue, triggering a strong backlash from China and plunging China-Japan relations into evident difficulty. 

A series of forceful countermeasures by China — notably the 6 January 2026 decision to tighten export controls on dual-use civilian and military goods to Japan — underscored Beijing’s resolve to respond to Japan’s “strategic clarity” with a strategy of its own.

The APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting will take place in Shenzhen this November, with the Japanese prime minister expected to attend as usual. Takaichi hopes to use the occasion to improve China-Japan relations, yet she is unwilling to publicly retract her remarks. She is likely leveraging the general election to consolidate her domestic political position, signalling the prospect of long-term governance. For China, this frames her as a leader it will need to engage with over the long term, letting her 7 November comments gradually recede into the background.

This could pave the way for a soft landing in China-Japan relations ahead of the APEC summit in Shenzhen. Yet, since the episode touches on the core of China’s core interests, such expectations may be overly optimistic.

At the same time, Trump 2.0 is likewise a challenge for Japanese diplomacy. US President Donald Trump has not openly backed Japan on the China-Japan issue. With the possibility of several meetings between the Chinese and US leaders this year, the prospect of high-stakes China-US summit diplomacy remains a persistent concern for the Takaichi administration

Takaichi hopes to consolidate her political base before visiting the US and to present herself to Trump as a strongman leader — a “Shinzo Abe 2.0” — signalling her intent for long-term governance and reinforcing the US-Japan alliance.

From Japan’s perspective, other middle powers are also facing challenges from both the US and China, hence building a horizontal network of alliances among middle powers — especially among US allies — is seen as an effective option. For Europe, as US-Russia relations ease and a sliver of hope for resolving the Ukraine crisis is gradually emerging, Trump’s disdain for Europe has caused unease among regional allies. 

In Japan’s view, South Korea is likewise under US pressure — the lack of progress in easing tensions between the North and South in the Korean peninsula, coupled with close Russia-North Korea ties, also gives both Japan and South Korea a shared sense of crisis. 

Thus, Takaichi is expected to focus on diplomacy that engages medium-sized powers such as European countries and South Korea. On 13 January, South Korean President Lee Jae-myung visited Japan, and in the coming months, the G7 and NATO summits are scheduled in quick succession. Takaichi believes that a general election victory, combined with the image of a long-term governing leader, would provide a strong political foundation to advance her “medium-sized democracies diplomacy” effectively.

However, although Japan-South Korea relations have improved, it is doubtful how solid that foundation truly is. The so‑called medium-sized democracies often adopt an ambiguous stance in the face of major global issues that violate international law — such as the US invasion of Venezuela — making their proclaimed shared values appear relatively fragile.

If she is successful in the general election, Takaichi’s domestic political base would undoubtedly be strengthened — but hoping to leverage this as a panacea may be overly optimistic. 

Until now, among developed countries, Japan has been one where populism is relatively muted, and the socioeconomic order remains stable. However, in last year’s House of Councillors election, populist parties were clearly prominent and xenophobic tendencies were on the rise.

With mainstream politics shifting further to the right and becoming more conservative alongside active fiscal policies built upon a foundation of government debt, all this raises questions as to whether Japan can continue to resist the politicisation of populism.

Takaichi’s high approval ratings reflect voters’ expectations of her leadership rather than an evaluation of her record in office. Even if she wins the election, the durability of her administration would still ultimately be tested by both the markets and the public.

At the same time, in foreign affairs, relying on an electoral victory to smooth over difficulties in China-Japan relations, revive the “Trump-Abe golden era” of US-Japan ties, or position Japan as a leader among a coalition of middle powers is unlikely to be easily realised.

This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as “日本大选与中日美关系”.

Related: Japanese expert: China won’t replicate US Maduro raid | Takaichi is manufacturing a crisis — and rewriting Japan’s security future