What will 2026 bring for the Taiwan Strait?

As 2026 dawns, what is on your mind? Calm, joy, anticipation?  Restlessness, uncertainty, worry? Or perhaps a little of all of these?

For those in the Asia-Pacific, beyond our direct lived experiences and personal feelings, it is hard not to feel the impact of shifting geopolitics and major events. Last November’s deadly fire at Wang Fuk Court in Hong Kong made many people realise, in an instant, the fragility and impermanence of life. The fatal terrorist attack at Bondi Beach in Australia was another stark reminder that danger is never far away. And while the tragedy happened two weeks ago, the New Year’s Eve fireworks over Harbour Bridge could not fully dispel the lingering sadness.

But what caused even greater unease in 2025 was the shadow of US tariff threats and actions. As global supply chains are reconfigured and the international economic and trade order teeters on the brink of fragmentation, this long-term trend has carried over into the new year. Some Southeast Asian countries are also grappling with political instability and large-scale public protests; clashes have flared up again along the Thai-Cambodian border; and North Korea’s missile tests continue to raise concerns. Beyond all this, the steadily escalating tensions across the Taiwan Strait remain a latent threat to peace in the Asia-Pacific. Now intertwined with the reshaping of China-Japan and China-US relations, these developments have deepened public anxiety over the possibility of war.

The biggest piece of news in Northeast Asia at the end of 2025 was undoubtedly the two-day encirclement military exercise around Taiwan launched without prior warning by the Chinese mainland’s People’s Liberation Army on 29 December 2025. The so-called “no prior warning” meant that the exercise began on the very day it was announced, with no advance notice. More significantly, it also suggested that Taiwan and the US and Japan may not have had prior intelligence, as their senior officials did not issue immediate proactive responses, which only heightened alarm.

US President Donald Trump, when asked by reporters, downplayed the situation by saying he was not worried. The Japanese government did not respond until 31 December, when a spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Japan had conveyed its concerns to Beijing and criticised the move as “actions that increase tensions across the Taiwan Strait”. By contrast, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and Defence Minister Shinjiro Koizumi have both remained silent. This may be Takaichi’s way of demonstrating through action that she was indeed “reflecting” on her earlier remarks on Taiwan, which some observers have described as the “Taiwan contingency” narrative losing credibility.

After the PLA exercises concluded, the EU, along with the UK, France, Germany, Australia, the Philippines and other US allies, began to express concern. Such reactions amount to pressure by public opinion, but the changes they can bring are limited. The reality is that the mainland has pushed the scope of its military exercises closer toward Taiwan than before — the closest ever to the island itself. In the mainland’s own words, the “chain is being tightened”.

Taiwan’s military has also confirmed that all five of the PLA’s designated exercise zones encompassed Taiwan’s 24-nautical-mile contiguous zone as well as the 12-nautical-mile territorial sea baselines. During the drills, 15 mainland naval vessels and coast guard ships entered waters within 24 nautical miles of Taiwan’s main island.

In the live-fire exercises, ten rockets launched by the PLA from Quanzhou landed in the area between Taiwan’s 24-nautical-mile contiguous zone and its 12-nautical-mile territorial waters. Taiwan’s military described this as a strong political signal that the mainland is “treating the Taiwan Strait as its internal waters”, and as a move aimed at testing Taiwan’s bottom line.

Beijing is undoubtedly stepping up military pressure on Taiwan by exploiting its clear military superiority, while also flexing its muscles in front of the US and Japan. However, unable to drive out intruding mainland warships or bear the cost of war, Taiwan’s armed forces can only let them push deep inside — effectively enabling Beijing to treat the Taiwan Strait as internal waters under mainland jurisdiction. Meanwhile, the international support Taiwan so desperately hopes for is proving increasingly limited in effect.

In the past, Taiwan sought to secure backup from “like-minded” Western countries by presenting itself proudly as a member of the international democratic community. Under Trump, however, the US’s outlook has changed markedly: while Taiwan’s democratic credentials still carry weight in elite discourse, they have become increasingly irrelevant in leaders’ actual decision-making. While Taiwan’s location along the first island chain continues to hold significant strategic value for the US, this is a different matter from “like-mindedness”. Unlike shared values, other forms of strategic value come with a price.

However, this does not mean that a forceful reunification by the mainland will take place within the year, nor does it mean that the status quo can be maintained. On the contrary, mainland military drills encircling Taiwan will continue, becoming more field-based, closer to actual combat conditions and conducted ever nearer to the island, with the aim of demonstrating that the PLA can at any time seize control of the surrounding waters and advance on Taiwan’s main island.

Some mainland analysts privately argue that, as long as this momentum is maintained, there is no urgency to resort to force — it does not matter even if Taiwan were to claim it had “long been independent, as no one internationally recognises it anyway”.

In 2026, the mainland will itself face a heavy load of economic and political tasks, with many challenges ahead. Over the past month or two, China’s economy appears to have shown signs of bottoming out, yet public confidence remains weak, and negative sentiment among the masses continues to be tightly managed within the sphere of public discourse. 

Beyond economic pressures, 2026 is just a year away from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s 21st Party Congress. This year will see intensive reshuffling of key central and local officials as part of the preliminary personnel arrangements for the congress. Anti-corruption efforts within the military have also not abated. None of this is conducive to going to war. 

Moreover, as aforementioned, so long as the mainland maintains a clear military advantage over Taiwan and “Taiwan independence” lacks US backing, Beijing has no urgency to resolve cross-strait issues by military means, regardless of changes within Taiwan itself.

In the year ahead, there is a notable date on the mainland: August 2026, the centenary of the birth of former third-generation CCP leader Jiang Zemin. In China, assessments of past leaders are highly sensitive, as they convey an assessment of political ideas and realities while also needing to take social reactions into account.

How Jiang’s centenary will be commemorated, whether the CCP will hold a formal memorial symposium — as it has for Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun — and what kind of public response it may generate will be a major focus of political and social attention in mainland China in 2026.

This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as “2026年台海两岸更纷扰又和平”.

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