Xi builds his sphere of stability in Central Asia

From 16 to 18 June 2025, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Astana, Kazakhstan, for the second China-Central Asia Summit. During his stay, Xi also met separately with the presidents of each of the five Central Asian states (CAS) — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. At the bilateral level, China signed several agreements, particularly with the host Kazakhstan. 

Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev chaired the summit, while Xi delivered a keynote address. At the end, both sides signed a Treaty of Permanent Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation. They committed to enshrining the treaty into law as a foundation for future cooperation and to establish an “everlasting” friendship. Media reports noted that the treaty text was similar to the ones China signed with Russia (2001) and Pakistan (2005).

President Xi’s speech was a key factor in shaping the summit and the future of China-Central Asia relations. Xi emphasised economic and trade collaboration, industrial investment, connectivity, green mining, agricultural modernisation, personnel exchanges, regional security and the establishment of three new cooperation centres focused on poverty reduction, educational exchange, desertification prevention and smooth trade. China pledged RMB1.5 billion (US$209 million) in grants and 3,000 training opportunities for CAS.

Both sides committed themselves to combating terrorism, separatism and extremism to maintain peace and stability. China often brings up this topic in discussions with neighbours where militancy could potentially grow. China aims to ensure the prevention of religious extremism from the region, including from CAS, entering Xinjiang. On international issues, Xi stated, “There is no winner in tariff wars or trade wars.” He criticised protectionism and hegemonism while advocating for multilateralism. 

As a bloc, China and CAS separately maintain summit-level engagements with various regional blocs and powers. The CAS has summit-level engagement with Russia, the US and the EU through a mechanism known as C5+1, and at the bloc level with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Similarly, China holds summit-level engagements with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Latin America and the GCC.

Except for the China-Central Asia Summit, no permanent secretariat currently exists. Following the first China-Central Asia summit in May 2023, both sides decided to establish a permanent secretariat in Xi’an, which became fully operational in March 2024. This will indeed institutionalise their cooperation.

CAS is crucial to China in many ways. China shares direct borders with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The region lies between China and West Asia, the Middle East and Europe. CAS is rich in oil, gas, uranium and rare earths, whereas China has an appetite for these resources. In return for access to these resources, China offers investment, technology, high-quality products, and vast experience in developing modern infrastructure.

This mutual interest shared by China and CAS is reflected in increasing cooperation in the trade, energy and infrastructure sectors. Starting from US$460 million at the beginning of bilateral relations in 1992, the two-way trade in 2024 reached US$94.8 billion, marking a 35% increase since the first summit.

China imports a large quantity of energy from CAS. The China-Central Asia gas pipeline, running from Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to China’s Xinjiang region, is China’s first transnational gas pipeline. Since its commissioning in December 2009, the pipeline has supplied a substantial amount of natural gas to China, supporting the energy needs of various provincial regions.  

In return for resource extraction from CAS, China is engaged in building megaprojects in the region. Under the green economy initiative in Kazakhstan, China constructed the Zhanatas wind farm, the largest in Central Asia, generating electricity to meet the needs of thousands of local households. Russia will build Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant; in the future, Astana is considering collaboration with the China National Nuclear Corporation. 

Other China-led major megaprojects include the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, on which construction will begin in July this year at a cost of $8 billion, and the China-Tajikistan highway. Additionally, China is advancing the construction of the third railway link between China and Kazakhstan, the phase-II restoration of the China-Tajikistan highway, and expanding the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route. Energy cooperation projects, such as the China-Kazakhstan natural gas pipeline and green technology initiatives, are also significant components of China-Central Asia cooperation.

Tourism and people-to-people exchanges are also priority areas for both sides. China has mutual visa-free engagement with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, while China Southern Airlines has started direct flights to Tajikistan’s capital, Dushanbe, twice a week. They also decided on more direct flights, further visa facilitation, and to study the feasibility of opening consular offices. In 2024, 655,000 Chinese tourists visited Kazakhstan — a 78% year-on-year increase.

Xi has a special association with Kazakhstan, the largest economy in the region. It was in Kazakhstan where he announced the “Silk Road Economic Belt” in 2013. He made six visits to the country, which makes it his second most visited country after Russia. 

To conclude, the second China-Central Asia Summit occurred amid heightened global tensions, including the ongoing trade war and active conflicts such as the Russia-Ukraine war, Israel-Iran tensions, and the Israel-Palestine conflict. While the summit leaders acknowledged these troubled situations, they did not signal any geopolitical alignments or military alliances. This diplomatic neutrality underscores CAS’s strategy of multi-vector foreign policies, enabling them to balance relations with China, Russia and the West without provoking confrontation or taking sides. 

Furthermore, despite the space left by Russia (due to its ongoing war with Ukraine) and the US, China has shown no inclination to engage in geopolitical and security matters. This summit was a clear manifestation of that approach. It indicates that Beijing remains focused on economic development, stability and partnerships. The establishment of a permanent secretariat for the China-Central Asia Summit highlights the importance both sides place on this relationship. Following this summit, cooperation between China and Central Asia in these areas is likely to further increase.

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