Space

The solidarity between North Korea and Russia based on an “anti-imperialist” or anti-American mindset can be said to be a strategic and simple construct: “An enemy’s friend is an enemy.” 

For mineral resources as well as various military and strategic reasons, the great powers of the world are reviving their interest in the moon. While US-China competition is strong, one should not forget that the US is actually the only country capable of establishing bases on the moon and putting its flag on large swathes of the moon in the next decade.

With heightened tensions between the US and China, it’s easy to reach for Cold War analogies, says science journalist Dan Garisto. But the quantum race is not like the space race, or most other tech races. That’s because quantum tech — despite the name — is more science than technology. If quantum tech is in its infancy, it should not be viewed in the same light as semiconductors and other currently critical technology. In fact, seen as science and not a deployable technology, quantum tech leaves much scope for cooperation.

Tesla CEO Elon Musk drew widespread criticism for his comment on establishing Taiwan as a special administrative zone. While Musk raised his suggestions based on his own commercial interests, the controversial statement shows the impact of the Taiwan Strait issue for the business world. Is there a time and place for businessmen to tread on geopolitical issues?

China recently announced that its space exploration programme will recruit payload specialists from Hong Kong and Macau, sparking excitement for the people of Hong Kong. While the announcement is a recognition of the special administrative region’s R&D capabilities, some believe that it is an effort to win over the people of Hong Kong and boost their sense of belonging and patriotism. Lianhe Zaobao’s China Desk takes a look at what this opportunity means for Hong Kong.

Li Cheng, director of the John L. Thornton China Center of the Brookings Institution, notes that well-educated and professionally capable military technocrats are prominently represented in the PLA leadership, and this trend is set to continue after the 20th Party Congress. What contributions will this new corps of military technocrats make as Xi Jinping heads into a likely third term?

The rapid rise of “the cosmos club” has paralleled China's rising aspiration to take on a prominent role in the international “space club”. Li Cheng, director of the John L. Thornton China Center of the Brookings Institution, takes a closer look at the career paths and institutional associations of emerging rocket scientists in China’s national and provincial leadership.

The presence of leaders in the CCP Central Committee with aerospace backgrounds is not new, but this group has never penetrated the national and provincial levels of leadership at the rate and scale that it has during the Xi Jinping era. Two and perhaps even three of them will be strong contenders for the Politburo at the 20th Party Congress, and most of them will play an important role in Xi Jinping’s third term and beyond, says Li Cheng, director of the John L. Thornton China Center of the Brookings Institution.

With China's accelerated efforts to become a great space power, including opening up its space sector to private firms, Western developed countries worry that China's military-civil fusion (MCF) strategy may see technology developed in the commercial sector being used to boost China's military space power in the future. Are these fears justified? Japanese academic Masaaki Yatsuzuka looks into the issue.