How should China see SpaceX?

04 Jul 2024
technology
Zhang Chengxin
Researcher
Translated by James Loo
While the US’s SpaceX is currently dominating the aerospace industry, China should not be cowed and its preparations should stand it in good stead, says researcher Zhang Chengxin.
A Long March-2C rocket takes off from Xichang Satellite Launch Center in Sichuan province, China, on 22 June 2024.  (CNS via Reuters)
A Long March-2C rocket takes off from Xichang Satellite Launch Center in Sichuan province, China, on 22 June 2024. (CNS via Reuters)

Recently, the US Space Exploration Technologies Corp (SpaceX) completed the fourth test flight for its super heavy-lift launch vehicle Starship. With the booster successfully splashing down in designated waters and the rocket successfully entering the atmosphere under control, the preset goals for this test flight were met, achieving a key breakthrough. According to design specifications, the Starship is the most powerful launch vehicle in human history in terms of overall performance.     

Besides the Starship, another of SpaceX’s competitive advantage lies in the use of stable or matured reusable heavy-lift launch vehicles such as the Falcon 9 and Falcon Heavy, for frequent launching of commercial payloads. In 2023, SpaceX carried out 98 launches, while China only carried out 67 launches. The difference is even more pronounced when it comes to orbital quality: to date SpaceX has sent 1,195 tons to orbit, accounting for 80% of global tonnage to orbit.

Chinese officials have in fact adopted a humble approach when it comes to SpaceX.

Moreover, the launch costs for the Falcon series of launch vehicles does not exceed US$3,000 per kilogram, far below the average launch cost of US$10,000 to US$20,000 per kilogram for the global commercial spaceflight industry.

China’s current approach

Chinese officials have in fact adopted a humble approach when it comes to SpaceX; in late 2023, the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) stated that in comparison to SpaceX, the CASC “is bigger but neither stronger nor better”, and that it was still far from meeting the goals of an aerospace powerhouse nation.

China’s aerospace development is spearheaded by CASC, the largest state enterprise in the sector, making it synonymous with China’s aerospace efforts. However, its statement implicitly acknowledges that China’s aerospace capabilities still lag behind those of SpaceX. Thus far this year, CCTV News, as well as other Chinese state media, have also referenced SpaceX when commenting on the need for China to develop its commercial aerospace industry. 

Yet, with regard to a company like SpaceX — a commercial aerospace titan that rose against the backdrop of unique geopolitical circumstances, with the potential to impact international political and economic order — merely stressing the need to “humbly learn” from them does not seem to suffice. China needs to have an even more comprehensive and objective understanding of SpaceX, and also make strategic adjustments.  

Two boosters return to the Cape Canaveral Space Force Station after launch from the nearby Kennedy Space Center after a SpaceX Falcon Heavy rocket carried the fourth and final satellite of the next-generation series of geostationary weather satellites for NASA and NOAA in Cape Canaveral, Florida, US, on 25 June 2024. (Joe Skipper/Reuters)

Firstly, to conclude that the CASC is “bigger but not better” is debatable. Admittedly, SpaceX is very adept at the research and development of launch vehicles, but aerospace systems engineering is a massive field, and launch vehicles are just one component; to assess overall capability based on that single aspect is undoubtedly lopsided.

China’s achievements in aerospace

For example, the Chang’e-6 lunar probe which completed its mission of gathering samples from the far side of the moon, as well as the Tianwen-1 probe, which successfully landed on Mars, are both less than 8.2 tons. The Long March-2E carrier rocket, which was in service in 1990, can carry 9.2 tons of weight at low orbit.

If carrier rockets were the only determining factor when it comes to aerospace mission success or failure, China would have already been able to collect samples from the far side of the moon, and even land on Mars in the 1990s. The reality is, of course, not so.

Besides the rocket ship itself, aspects such as navigation equipment, deep space communications network, high-precision radar, energy supply equipment, spacecraft attitude control, variable thrust engine and obstacle avoidance algorithm are all core technologies that support such probe missions.

Only by comparing with the US aerospace industry as a whole can we definitively say that China’s aerospace is “bigger but not better”; after all, China’s aerospace is a complete industrial system in itself. 

Has SpaceX mastered all these core technologies? While SpaceX — which focuses on the colonisation of other planets as their ultimate goal — has achieved a direct-to-GEO (geostationary equatorial orbit) launch in 2022 and helped land the uncrewed Odysseus spacecraft on the surface of the moon, China has also orbited, landed and probed both the moon and Mars.  

When it comes to Low Earth orbit (LEO), SpaceX is not leading on all fronts; at the very least, it is unable to independently construct and operate a third-generation space station like China. Of course, SpaceX has Starlink, the world’s largest LEO satellite internet constellation — but China also has BeiDou, offering other nations a viable GNSS alternative to GPS with features that essentially did not exist before.

Whether SpaceX is superior to China’s aerospace industry is quite debatable. Only by comparing with the US aerospace industry as a whole can we definitively say that China’s aerospace is “bigger but not better”; after all, China’s aerospace is a complete industrial system in itself. 

The Chang’e 6 lunar probe and the Long March-5 Y8 carrier rocket combination sit atop the launch pad at the Wenchang Space Launch Site in Hainan province, China, on 3 May 2024. (Eduardo Baptista/Reuters)

Even more importantly, against the background of deepening China-US competition, what is SpaceX’s actual significance for China? Or, what does SpaceX mean for China?

... it is hard to see SpaceX collaborating effectively with China, as the various aerospace products, services or technologies that it exports to China would be subjected to stringent review. 

No need to change course

In essence, SpaceX is still a spokesperson for US interests; at the very least it is a passive spokesperson, which means that SpaceX’s development is unlikely to bring benefits to China. From the Cox Report to the Wolf Amendment, the Washington authorities have persisted in leaving no stone unturned when it comes to restricting China’s collaboration with the world in the aerospace sector, in a bid to stymie China’s development.

Though the Wolf Amendment only restricts NASA and other US governmental agencies from embarking on aerospace collaborations with China, and does not extend to private enterprises such as SpaceX, the Washington authorities have set up other policy blockades, such as the International Traffic in Arms Regulations and the Export Administration Regulations as well as the Committee on Foreign Investment. As such, it is hard to see SpaceX collaborating effectively with China, as the various aerospace products, services or technologies that it exports to China would be subjected to stringent review. Due to the US’s national security concerns, such transactions are highly unlikely to happen.

With the US designating China as its top strategic competitor, Starlink could be used as a military tool against China.

Even so, if SpaceX’s operations do not go beyond the commercial sector, it may not lead to negative impact. However, since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, Starlink has served the Ukrainian military by transmitting large amounts of intel, and stepped up on its precision in targeting the Russian military. With the US designating China as its top strategic competitor, Starlink could be used as a military tool against China.

More seriously, in late 2021, news broke that Starlink satellites have more than once approached China’s space station at high speeds without notice, posing a threat to the lives of astronauts stationed there. These satellites have continually switched their orbit without clear intent, forcing the space station to adopt emergency preventive collision measures. To date, the US has not explained this irregular behaviour.

Astronauts for China’s Shenzhou-18 space mission wave during a departure ceremony before boarding a bus to take them to the Shenzhou-18 spacecraft at the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Centre in the Gobi desert in northwest China on 25 April 2024. (Greg Baker/AFP)

Though China is very open to international aerospace collaboration, the long reach of the authorities in Washington makes it very easy to destroy any such prospects. Besides, SpaceX has already begun to serve the US in its regional interventions, even threatening China’s national security.

In short, China should maintain an attitude of “tactical emphasis, strategic disdain”. China’s aerospace sector should objectively assess SpaceX’s capabilities, and avoid over or underestimating it, in order to more accurately ascertain its own standing. At the same time, it should make clear its strategic emphasis, and view the entire US aerospace industry as a key point of reference and a rival to catch up to, and not let one company like SpaceX mess up its overall strategy.

Considering the current geopolitical environment, China should better appraise SpaceX’s nature and limitations, as well as the zero sum relationship between the two. Certainly, China needs to learn from SpaceX’s innovation and commercialisation strategy, but the ultimate goal is to fortify China’s advantages through competition, in order to more effectively safeguard national security and advance national interests.

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