TikTok, Manus and the new rules of going global
With TikTok selling its US business at a discount to survive while Singapore-headquartered Manus gains a valuation premium through relocation, the US-China tech rivalry inevitably puts tech companies’ operations at risk. Lianhe Zaobao business editor Shen Yue tells us more.
The date 22 January 2026 marked the deadline set by US regulators for ByteDance to divest TikTok’s US business to a joint venture (JV) controlled by US investors.
If everything goes smoothly, this tug of war that has lasted several years and over two US administrations may finally reach its conclusion. The “sell or be banned” standoff has also made TikTok’s Singaporean CEO, Chew Shou Zi, a household name.
Of course, this day marks more than the conclusion of a business deal. It is also a watershed moment in the governance of tech companies amid geopolitical competition.
According to the agreement, the newly established JV will be led by Oracle, Silver Lake and United Arab Emirates sovereign investment firm MGX, holding a combined 50% stake. Legacy investors such as Sequoia Capital will own over 30%, while parent company ByteDance will retain less than 20%. The new JV entity will be governed by a seven-member board with a US majority.
TikTok’s US business sold at a bargain
At first glance, the US appears to be the winner, both in acquiring control of the company and in securing a bottom-of-the-barrel valuation.
TikTok’s US operations, which reach about 170 million monthly users, are reportedly being sold for around US$14 billion — less than half of the earlier estimated valuation of US$30-40 billion. Observers have noted that the deal’s price-to-sales ratio is below one, based on TikTok’s US revenue of about US$16 billion in 2023.
Amid the essence of the separation of ownership and control, ByteDance’s handling of the deal could become a classic example of strategic survival under pressure.
For new investors, this is a bargain-basement price, acquiring American users at approximately US$82 per user. By comparison, Meta, the parent company of Facebook, with three billion global users, has a market capitalisation of about US$1.5 trillion. This translates to about US$500 in market value per user. In North America alone, Meta’s 2025 average revenue per user (ARPU) is at least US$250.
For existing shareholders, the newly formed US-controlled JV entity offers an opportunity to de-risk and a way out of regulatory limbo. A possible separate listing in future could offer these shareholders a chance to exit and cash out their investments.
Despite losing control of the company and seeing its valuation slashed, ByteDance is not necessarily the loser here. Amid the essence of the separation of ownership and control, ByteDance’s handling of the deal could become a classic example of strategic survival under pressure.
ByteDance retains its cash cow
According to a December 2025 internal memo from Chew, the new US JV entity will have independent authority over data protection, algorithm security and content moderation. However, another ByteDance-owned entity will continue to oversee the profitable operations — including e-commerce, advertising and marketing — while maintaining TikTok’s global product interoperability.
Crucially, ByteDance’s core technology, the content recommendation algorithm that enables users to scroll endlessly, is not sold. Instead, it will be licensed to the new JV entity. Using US user data, Oracle will oversee the retraining of the algorithm to effectively ensure that the content feed is free from “China’s manipulation”.
... if TikTok’s US business was likened to a shopping mall, the US has bought ownership of the mall but the escalators that move people (the algorithms) and the checkout counters (monetisation) are still managed by another party.
As the first case of a Chinese tech company surrendering control under US regulatory pressure, this “split-in-two” approach enables ByteDance to unshackle itself from politics in exchange for the right to legally operate in the US. At the same time, it retains the high-margin commercial activities as its cash cow.
In other words, if TikTok’s US business was likened to a shopping mall, the US has bought ownership of the mall but the escalators that move people (the algorithms) and the checkout counters (monetisation) are still managed by another party. This could well become a new model for China’s tech companies’ entry into the US market.
How China has done this before
Algorithms and monetisation are inextricably linked in the world of internet products. Separating ownership and control may directly affect profitability as the details of the new profit-allocation structure remain unclear. Putting aside TikTok’s special circumstances, such JV operating models are not new, differing in the sequence of implementation.
For instance, in the past three decades, China’s auto industry has adopted the 50:50 JV rule, requiring foreign carmakers to partner with local companies and limiting foreign shareholding to not more than 50%. Examples include SAIC Volkswagen and SAIC General Motors.
Microsoft Azure is operated by 21Vianet, Amazon AWS is operated by Beijing Sinnet Technology and Ningxia Western Cloud Data Technology, and Apple iCloud is operated by Guizhou Cloud Big Data.
Another instance, foreign cloud computing companies in China can only adopt a local cooperation operation model. Microsoft Azure is operated by 21Vianet, Amazon AWS is operated by Beijing Sinnet Technology and Ningxia Western Cloud Data Technology, and Apple iCloud is operated by Guizhou Cloud Big Data.
Currently, although the TikTok deal appears virtually finalised, a few risks remain. Some US Democrats question whether the arrangement amounts to pork-barrel politics that benefits Trump’s allies, including Oracle founder Larry Ellison. In addition, China’s regulators must approve the deal, that the licensed use of the algorithm does not constitute technology disclosure.
It is noteworthy that although ByteDance remains rooted in Beijing, TikTok has long maintained a “dual-headquarters” structure in Los Angeles and Singapore.
As TikTok’s US business is formally reorganised into new entities with distinct functions, it remains to be seen whether its organisational structure will change and whether this will send ripples through its Singapore operations.
Manus deal a premium purchase
Interestingly, just as the drama of the TikTok deal appears to draw to a close, Manus, another AI agent start-up headquartered in Singapore, is reported to be the target of a full acquisition by Meta at a valuation above US$2 billion. However, this has met with uncertainty as China’s regulators have commenced a review.
If the TikTok deal is described as a discounted sale, then the Manus deal is a premium purchase. The latter is reportedly concluded within a mere ten days.
Manus launched its general-purpose AI agents in March 2025, and its parent company, Butterfly Effect, was founded in 2022. When Manus completed its Series B funding in April 2025, its estimated valuation was US$500 million. After relocating its headquarters to Singapore in July 2025, its valuation soared to above US$2 billion in just half a year.
Based on its annual recurring revenue (ARR) of some US$125 million, the Manus deal represents a price-to-sales ratio of 20, lower than that of major AI model developers such as OpenAI (about 35) but higher than that of mature software-as-a-service (SaaS) companies such as Salesforce (about 6).
Business community: the Manus deal will not diminish Singapore’s attractiveness
The main contention now lies in whether China considers parts of Manus’s core technology as having originated in China. Although Manus relocated its headquarters to Singapore in mid-2025 and has divested much of its China business, Beijing may consider the sale of relevant technology or assets to a US company and subject it to technology export restrictions.
Applying the same analogy of the shopping mall on Manus, “transplanting” entirely to Singapore would be akin to gilding its title deed with gold, increasing its value exponentially.
In the past month, Singapore business figures told me that China’s review of Manus’s “technological birthplace” is unsurprising. It essentially serves as a structural warning to other Chinese tech companies that may be considering similar moves.
As an industry observer put it, having long been accustomed to the US wielding the regulatory stick, the tables have now turned with China’s intervention.
This case also highlights Singapore’s unique and critical position. When interviewed, the several business figures believed that such regulatory frictions will not diminish Singapore’s attractiveness.
From a capital-market perspective, Singapore is not only an ideal hub for companies seeking global expansion but also a valuation amplifier. Applying the same analogy of the shopping mall on Manus, “transplanting” entirely to Singapore would be akin to gilding its title deed with gold, increasing its value exponentially.
For now, it remains uncertain whether the Manus deal will go through, but Meta is not Manus’ only exit option.
When going global meets geopolitics
In November 2025, the Singapore Exchange announced plans for the Global Listing Board (GLB) to attract high-growth Asian unicorns, valued above S$2 billion (US$1.6 billion), with an Asian nexus and seeking to expand globally. Through a single set of prospectus documents, these companies would be able to pursue a dual listing on both Nasdaq and SGX. With the platform expected to go live in mid-2026, Manus has reportedly secured eligibility for the GLB.
... they reveal a common reality for today’s tech companies: before these metamorphosed butterflies spread their wings to go global, geopolitical headwinds may well tear them to shreds.
Some scholars highlighted that China has no intention of regulating AI startups that go global; otherwise, it could have intervened earlier when Manus relocated to Singapore. The pertinent questions are: would the situation be different if the buyer in the Manus deal is a regional tech giant and not a US tech company, and is China cautioning against the “divest and go overseas” model itself or simply disallowing the sale of technology to US companies?
As the China-US competition in technology further escalates, the conclusion of the separation of TikTok’s ownership and control is not the end. Likewise, the uncertainty in the Manus deal may only be the opening act.
These are two contrasting cases: one sells at a discount to survive, while the other gains a valuation premium through relocation. Yet, they reveal a common reality for today’s tech companies: before these metamorphosed butterflies spread their wings to go global, geopolitical headwinds may well tear them to shreds.
Still, the very moment of surviving existential ordeals marks the birth of a new order.
This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as “从TikTok到Manus 谁能凭风口高飞？”.
