Biden skips 2024 ASEAN Summit: US not walking the talk in Southeast Asia

The ASEAN-US Summit and the East Asia Summit will convene in Vientiane, Laos, on 11 October 2024, but US President Joe Biden will once again be absent. For the second consecutive year, President Biden has opted to send a representative in his place. This year, however, the level of representation has been further downgraded from Vice-President Kamala Harris in 2023 to Secretary of State Antony Blinken.

While Biden’s absence may seem understandable given the demands of the upcoming 2024 presidential election, the reasons go beyond mere electoral necessity. The decision reflects a broader, more concerning trend in US foreign policy — one that signals a deprioritisation of Southeast Asia and ASEAN.

During the same period, Biden will travel to Germany and Angola to strengthen relations with allies and friends, according to a White House statement. This perceived diplomatic snub raises serious questions about Washington’s long-term commitment to ASEAN and the broader Indo-Pacific region. As China’s influence continues to grow in Southeast Asia, the US’ inconsistent participation at these key forums again sends mixed signals. This will undermine its strategic objectives and weaken its credibility in the region.

Despite Southeast Asia being frequently highlighted as a key pillar of the US Indo-Pacific strategy, Washington’s actions suggest that ASEAN continues to take a backseat in its broader geopolitical calculations. An example is President Biden’s decision to host the fourth Quad leaders’ summit in his hometown in Delaware, alongside the prime ministers of Australia, Japan and India. This reflects the emphasis the US places on security-oriented alliances such as the Quad and the trilateral security partnership between Australia, the UK and the US (AUKUS).

Last month’s Joint Leaders Statement marking AUKUS’s third anniversary further underscores the US’ prioritisation of these exclusive, security-focused groupings over broader multilateral engagement with ASEAN. 

The US has also strengthened trilateral cooperation in the region, mainly with like-minded partners. Notable examples include the trilateral summit with Japan and South Korea in Camp David last year and the inaugural summit with Japan and the Philippines held in Washington in April this year. These groupings reflect the US’ broader strategy of forging coalitions with partners that align with its strategic objectives, primarily to counter China’s expanding influence in the region.

While regional security concerns, such as China’s increasing assertiveness and growing threats from North Korea, undoubtedly impact ASEAN countries, the grouping as a whole remains largely sidelined in US’ security considerations despite being at the heart of the Indo-Pacific.

Although the US frequently emphasises ASEAN centrality in its rhetoric, its actions often reveal a preference for smaller, exclusive groupings or bilateral ties with like-minded countries and viewing ASEAN through the lens of its strategic competition with China. As a result, many in the region are wary of the potential consequences. While the State of Southeast Asia 2024 report shows that Southeast Asians may view the Quad as beneficial to the region, there are lingering and ingrained fears that such minilaterals undermine the centrality of ASEAN.

The US’s absence in ASEAN summits and its retreat from economic multilateralism — evidenced by its withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership — has created a void that China has been quick to fill. Washington’s engagements in the region have been sporadic — in particular, IPEF has not gained traction due to its lack of market access.

Conversely, China has been proactive and consistent in its diplomatic efforts. It has long understood the importance of ASEAN as a partner in economic integration and regional governance, and has positioned itself as an indispensable partner. Apart from being ASEAN’s top trading partner, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), despite its fair share of criticism, has directly addressed ASEAN’s development needs and deepened Beijing’s economic influence, such as in the case of the Laos-China railway.

China’s proactive approach in Southeast Asia has not gone unnoticed. For the first time since the survey’s inception, the State of Southeast Asia 2024 report indicated that China has overtaken the US as the region’s preferred alignment choice. In the same survey, Southeast Asians affirmed China as ASEAN’s most strategically significant partner.

For six consecutive years since the start of the survey in 2019, China has also been perceived as the most influential economic, political and strategic power in the region. Despite lingering concerns about China’s growing influence, the majority of respondents expressed an increasing sense of optimism regarding their future relations with China.

In contrast, when asked about US engagement in the region, there was a notable decline in perception towards the US, with respondents perceiving a decrease in US engagement compared to 2023. Additionally, more Southeast Asians express little or no confidence in the US as a strategic partner and provider of regional security, a significant drop from the previous two years. 

The US’s internal political dynamics have further contributed to this disengagement. Both the Democratic and Republican parties are currently focused on domestic issues such as inflation, immigration, healthcare and job creation, with bipartisan support largely limited to countering China. This inward focus is reflected in the State of Southeast Asia surveys, where the largest group of respondents who distrusted the US cited its distraction with internal affairs as the reason it cannot focus on global issues.

The US continues to lose ground in Southeast Asia. The Israel-Hamas conflict has led to a decline in the region’s perception of US leadership. ASEAN is not short of alternatives. The region is increasingly pivoting towards middle powers such as Australia, Japan, South Korea, India, and the EU, while China continues to solidify its presence.

If the US seeks to regain ASEAN’s trust and maintain its strategic foothold in the region, it must recalibrate its approach and demonstrate a consistent commitment to ASEAN. Would it be conceivable for ASEAN foreign ministers to attend a summit hosted by the US president in place of their leaders? Reciprocity and parity are crucial in diplomacy, and showing up at the summit is just as important as achieving outcomes.

This article was first published in Fulcrum, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute’s blogsite.

Related: State of Southeast Asia Survey 2024: Choosing China over the US is neither a tidal shift nor a sea change | US-Southeast Asia strategic dialogue must shift gears