Can the Philippines deter China without US backing?
Chinese water cannon attacks on Filipino fishermen at Escoda Shoal mark a dangerous escalation. Sustaining deterrence in the South China Sea now depends on US support and the Philippines’ resolve, says Manila-based analyst Don McLain Gill.
On 12 December, the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) reported that nearly two dozen Filipino fishing boats were targeted by China Coast Guard (CCG) water cannons near the Sabina Shoal (also known as Xianbin Jiao and Escoda Shoal) located within the 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of the Philippines. The CCG also reportedly cut the anchor lines of several boats of Filipino fisherfolk. More critical, however, was that three Filipino fishermen were injured during this violent encounter.
This marks the first time the CCG directly targeted Filipino civilians with water cannons, setting a worrying precedent for more violent activities from the CCG in other parts of the West Philippine Sea, or what Manila deems part of the South China Sea, encompassing the country’s lawful EEZ.
Testing limits: from Ayungin Shoal to Escoda
The Escoda Shoal is a low-tide elevation located 75 nautical miles west of the Philippine province of Palawan and well within the Southeast Asian country’s EEZ. The shoal is close to the energy-rich Reed or Recto Bank. Additionally, it serves as an important rendezvous point for resupply missions for Filipino troops stationed on the BRP Sierra Madre, which is the de facto Philippine outpost at Second Thomas or Ayungin Shoal, located 105 nautical miles west of Palawan. The Escoda Shoal became a flashpoint in August 2024 when the CCG embarked on a series of violent activities against PCG vessels, including the BRP Teresa Magbanua, the Philippines’ largest coast guard ship.
However, it is important to note that China’s assertive posture in the Escoda Shoal began only a few weeks after Manila and Beijing announced a provisional agreement on 21 July 2024 to manage tensions around the Ayungin Shoal. This indicates continuity in China’s salami-slicing strategy, which entails expanding low-risk area targets while avoiding escalation in high-risk areas.
... its willingness to directly target Filipino fisherfolk and their small vessels demonstrates Beijing’s intent to push its limits further by adding more layers of violence.
China determines the risk level of a target area based on how far it can get away with adding as many layers of violence as possible without incurring high cost. Once it can introduce these new layers, it normalises them, making it difficult to alter its behaviour. This then results in a status quo situation, allowing China to maintain its dominance. From 2023 to 2024, China was able to normalise frequent blocking, ramming and water cannon firing activities against Philippine public vessels around the Ayungin Shoal.
However, after the escalation in June 2024, which led to a Filipino soldier losing his thumb, China had to back-track due to concerns over horizontal escalation as the US showed willingness to accompany future Philippine resupply missions to the BRP Sierra Madre. Consequently, while the CCG refrained from its disruptive activities in the Ayungin, it sought to offset its limitations by targeting other key features of the West Philippine Sea. This marked the rise of tensions around the strategically located Escoda Shoal.
Ahead of Philippines’ ASEAN chairmanship
What happened on 12 December is problematic for various reasons. While the CCG has already engaged in ramming and blocking activities against PCG ships in the Escoda Shoal, its willingness to directly target Filipino fisherfolk and their small vessels demonstrates Beijing’s intent to push its limits further by adding more layers of violence. This should be a wake-up call for the Philippines and its sole treaty ally, the US.
...its [the US’s] recently released National Security Strategy makes no mention of the Philippines or the value of the Philippines-US alliance.
It appears that China is attempting to capitalise on the goodwill recently shown by Manila to Beijing ahead of the 2026 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit, where the Ferdinand Marcos Jr. administration looks to invite Chinese President Xi Jinping. Additionally, in October, the Philippines’ Department of Foreign Affairs floated the idea of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the PCG and CCG to manage tensions.
Moreover, Beijing is also likely to test the level of interest the Donald Trump administration has towards its security commitments in the Western Pacific at a time when its recently released National Security Strategy makes no mention of the Philippines or the value of the Philippines-US alliance.
US anchors Philippine sea denial
In this regard, the most immediate course of action should be for the Philippines and the US to increase the frequency of their presence operations around the shoal. The goal is to ensure that deployments of ships from the Philippines, as well as those from the US, are conducted regularly and in a consistent cycle. This will serve as a stopgap deterrent against a possible recurrence of the 12 December incident.
Eventually, patrols between the Philippines and the US can be supplemented with more frequent multilateral maritime collaborative activities with Japan and Australia around the area. However, these patrols must also encompass other features located within the Philippine EEZ.
However, the Philippines can only properly focus on more practical and asymmetric procurements if the US supplement these efforts by deploying more advanced weapon systems to strategic Philippine islands.
The challenge lies in sustaining these regular patrols for the medium to long term. Hence, the key to sustained deterrence depends on how invested the Philippines is in modernising its military and coast guard based on a purely sea-denial strategy. This requires Manila to prioritise asymmetric assets, such as shore-based anti-ship missiles, patrol vessels built for endurance and long-term deployments, unmanned systems and assorted naval mines.
However, the Philippines can only properly focus on more practical and asymmetric procurements if the US supplement these efforts by deploying more advanced weapon systems to strategic Philippine islands. Since 2023, the US has begun deploying vital assets to the archipelago, including the mid-range Typhon missile system, the NMESIS anti-ship missile system, and the HIMARS.
Tensions around the Escoda Shoal will be a test for the Philippines and the alliance at a time when China is looking to tilt the balance of power of the greater South China Sea to its favour. Therefore, it would be crucial for the Philippines, the US, and the extended hub-and-spoke alliance network to muster the political will to devise more functional sea denial strategies for the medium to long term. Ultimately, the future of the Western Pacific’s maritime order will be determined by the security of the West Philippine Sea.
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