China just shifted gears in the Middle East
As war, rivalry and realignment grip the Middle East, China is abandoning its patient, low-risk approach. Beijing is accelerating diplomacy, security engagement and economic planning — raising both its influence and its exposure. Academic Alessandro Arduino explores the situation.
At the Doha Forum in Qatar, one moment captured the changing contours of Middle Eastern diplomacy: Syria’s former militant-turned-president exchanging remarks with CNN’s Christiane Amanpour before a global audience.
It was more than a media spectacle. It was a reminder that the Gulf is once again the centre of gravity for regional and global diplomacy, and increasingly, for China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) ambitions. Both Beijing and Washington look to the Gulf to manage their interests in the Middle East. Where the US once relied on Europe as its primary partner, the European Union (EU)’s role in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is steadily fading into strategic irrelevance.
... the visit aligns with Beijing’s ambition to play a more substantive diplomatic role in Gaza, even if Zhongnanhai remains cautious about translating rhetoric into mediation.
China’s accelerated Middle East diplomacy
Amid this volatility, China is forced to move with unusual speed. From 12 to 16 December, China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, visited the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia and Jordan at the invitation of their top diplomats. Such a tour might once have seemed routine, but today it signals something more consequential: Beijing is no longer content with a passive, purely economic role in the Middle East.
Together, the three countries reflect Beijing’s calculation of where influence and stability intersect. The UAE matters for its strategic geography, agile foreign policy, e-finance and AI development. Saudi Arabia’s growing economic and political influence in the Arab world, along with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s preferential relationship with US President Donald Trump, lies at the centre of Beijing’s efforts to balance its position and be perceived as a long-term, reliable partner.
And Jordan, home to a large Palestinian refugee population, occupies a uniquely sensitive position in the Palestinian question. In this respect, the visit aligns with Beijing’s ambition to play a more substantive diplomatic role in Gaza, even if Zhongnanhai remains cautious about translating rhetoric into mediation. Wang reaffirmed that the two-state solution remains the only viable path forward, with “Palestinians governing Palestine” as a central principle.
Wang’s diplomatic overture is also revitalising existing mechanisms, including the fifth meeting of the China-Saudi High-Level Joint Committee, which was established during President Xi Jinping’s 2016 visit to Riyadh when the two countries announced a comprehensive strategic partnership.
It also includes the trilateral talks among China, Saudi Arabia and Iran held earlier in Tehran. These discussions addressed not only the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement but also broader regional security issues, with all three sides calling for an immediate halt to Israeli actions in Palestine, Lebanon and Syria, and condemning violations of Iran’s sovereignty.
... China is prepared to align its forthcoming 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) with the development visions of Middle Eastern countries, signalling a deeper integration of economic planning and regional priorities.
Strategic alignment in a volatile region
Following the visit, Wang mentioned that China is prepared to align its forthcoming 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) with the development visions of Middle Eastern countries, signalling a deeper integration of economic planning and regional priorities. Also, he framed this approach within President Xi’s Global Security Initiative, emphasising China’s call for respect for the Middle East’s independent political choices, sensitivity to regional security concerns and the peaceful resolution of disputes through dialogue and consultation.
Even as the long-discussed China-Gulf Cooperation Council free trade agreement remains elusive, the timing of Wang’s state visit could not be more consequential. The region is changing at breakneck speed — with Syria at the centre of this transformation.
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa has promised to secure Syria without exporting instability to the region. Yet the reality on the ground tells a harsher story. ISIS has raised the stakes, killing three Americans during a counterterrorism operation, marking the first US casualties in Syria since the fall of Bashar al-Assad. The response from Washington has been familiar: public vows of retaliation on social media by President Trump.
... Beijing is filling a space created by regional uncertainty, American fatigue and a growing regional balancing act.
When waiting is no longer an option
The cycle of violence and uncertainty continues, casting a shadow on China’s possible economic and financial involvement in the country’s reconstruction and the overall BRI advancement in the Middle East. The region itself is changing faster than policymakers seem prepared to acknowledge. Iran and Israel remain on the brink of direct military confrontation. American influence, while still present, is increasingly contested. Gulf states are hedging their bets, diversifying partnerships and recalibrating alliances. In this environment, China’s appeal lies in economic engagement, infrastructure investment and diplomatic predictability — but it is also raising its security stance.
What makes this moment different is pace. China has traditionally favoured patience, waiting for conditions to mature before committing political capital. Now, it is accelerating its engagement, managing economic ties and diplomatic outreach at a speed that contrasts sharply with its cautious reputation.
In this respect, Beijing is filling a space created by regional uncertainty, American fatigue and a growing regional balancing act. Whether China can meet those expectations remains an open question, but what is clear is that the Middle East is no longer a region where China can afford to wait and watch from the sidelines.
From the Doha Forum to the Syrian stabilisation and Minister Wang’s three-pronged state visit, Beijing sees the Gulf not only as an economic partner, but as a platform for multilateral coordination — through forums such as BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the United Nations — on governance and global order.
... Beijing’s deepening engagement in the region cannot be separated from the accelerating pace of US-China competition.
The next China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF), scheduled for the coming year, will offer a telling measure of Beijing’s ambitions. Established in 2004 as a dialogue mechanism between China and the Arab League, the forum is set to highlight how China intends to promote multilateral cooperation in a region reshaping itself faster than the policies designed to manage it.
At the same time, Beijing’s deepening engagement in the region cannot be separated from the accelerating pace of US-China competition. Wang underscored this reality by commending three Arab states for their adherence to the “one-China” principle and their support for China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, signals of the reciprocal political alignment Beijing seeks as it expands its regional footprint.
