China’s diplomatic blitz in Trump’s backyard — who will dominate the western hemisphere?

When Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi elaborated on China’s foreign policy priorities in 2026, he gave the impression that there will be more of the same, i.e., Beijing will focus on strengthening relations with the major powers, neighbouring countries and the Global South to continue with its global initiatives and build a community of shared future. Yet what has happened at the start of this year suggests that there is much more focus and urgency, especially in Beijing’s efforts to draw US allies closer and counter the US’s efforts to restore preeminence in the western hemisphere.

A distinctive feature of China’s foreign policy in the initial months of 2026 compared with previous years is the high frequency of high-level incoming visits. In January 2026 alone, Beijing hosted five heads of state and government, namely, South Korean President Lee Jae-myung (4-7 January), Irish Taoiseach Micheál Martin (4-8 January), Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney (14-17 January), Finnish Prime Minister Petteri Orpo (25-28 January) and Britain Prime Minister Keir Starmer (28-31 January).

In quick succession, in February 2026, Beijing further received Uruguayan President Yamandu Orsi (1-7 February) and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz (25-26 February).

In stark contrast, in January 2025, Beijing only hosted two high-level visits, namely, Grenadian Prime Minister Dickon Mitchell (11-17 January) and Sri Lankan President Anura Kumara Disanayaka (14-17 January).

Another distinctive feature is the broad geographical spread of foreign dignitaries from Asia, Europe and South America, with an overwhelming representation from Europe compared with previous years. In January 2026, the leaders from Ireland, Finland and the UK visited China. If the visits by French President Emmanuel Macron and Spanish King Felipe VI to China in December 2025 and November 2025 respectively are taken into account, the European presence is even more pronounced.

Notably, three key Western European leaders of Germany, France and the UK have already visited China in a short span of time.

A third notable characteristic is the strong showing by dignitaries from the western hemisphere, i.e., Canada and Uruguay, where the US has committed to restoring its preeminence. In particular, Mark Carney’s visit marks a break from Ottawa’s erstwhile policy of working in lockstep with Washington to one where Canada exercises agency and acts together with like-minded countries to be at the table, not on the menu.

While the Trump factor is the primary factor driving these countries towards China, considerably less attention is paid to the objectives Beijing seeks to achieve by hosting these visits.

At the international level, Beijing wants to burnish its credentials as a champion of multilateralism and free trade, and an upholder of the international system with the United Nations at its core at a time when the US has shunned these practices and global institutions. It is further pushing the international order in a more fair and reasonable direction to give more voice and representation to developing countries such as China, thereby diluting America’s influence on the world stage.

Beijing is positioning itself as a reliable partner by pursuing pragmatic and win-win cooperation on a range of issues with other countries. One highlight was Mark Carney’s announcement of a “preliminary but landmark trade agreement” with China to import 49,000 Chinese electric vehicles at a much reduced tariff rate of 6.1% (down from 100%) in exchange for Beijing significantly reducing tariffs to 15% (down from 84%) on Canadian canola seed, and the removal of tariffs on other Canadian agricultural and seafood products starting from March 2026. 

Similarly, Keir Starmer’s visit led to the announcement by China, among other things, to cut import tariffs on Scottish whisky by half (from 10% to 5%) and the designation of the People’s Bank of China in London as an RMB clearing bank, a move intended to buttress London’s global financial status. Beijing further unilaterally announced visa-free travel for nationals from the UK and Canada, expanding an earlier measure it granted to visitors from Finland, Ireland, South Korea and Uruguay. 

Notwithstanding questions raised over the extent of follow-through on the agreements signed, Beijing would like to be seen as working with other countries to reduce or remove barriers to bilateral exchanges, as opposed to what the US is doing.

Even more strategically, Beijing seeks to draw closer countries that are traditionally more aligned with the US, such as Canada and the UK. Likewise, Ottawa and London see value in engaging China more in areas they are comfortable with, and to finally turn the chapter on their unhappy episode related to Meng Wanzhou’s arrest and the Hong Kong issue, respectively.

Furthermore, Beijing wants stronger ties with European countries such as Ireland and Finland, and bring the EU closer in the process. This was evident when the Chinese side highlighted that Irish Taoiseach Micheál Martin is the first European leader to visit China in 2026 and that Ireland will take over the EU presidency in the second half of this year.

Equally important, Beijing wants to demonstrate its enduring ties with countries in the western hemisphere, following its apparent setback in Venezuela after the US successfully captured President Nicolás Maduro, who was friendly to China. 

During Uruguayan President Yamandu Orsi’s visit, China highlighted its role as a key market for Uruguay’s agricultural products, especially beef. Uruguay reaffirmed its neutrality principle on the use of foreign technology and welcomed the participation of Chinese companies in its domestic 5G rollout. To Beijing’s benefit, Uruguay is expressing its opposition to foreign interference in its internal decision-making, in an indirect message to the US. This paves the way for Huawei to play an even bigger role in building Uruguay’s telecommunication network.

Interestingly, President Yamandu Orsi’s visit to China lasted seven days, three days longer than his predecessor, Luis Lacalle Pou’s four-day visit in 2023, indicating Uruguay’s willingness to lean closer to China. Likewise, Beijing seeks stronger ties with Uruguay as the latter is the current chair of G77 (comprising 134 developing countries) and will chair the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (or CELAC, comprising 33 developing countries in the western hemisphere) and Mercosur (comprising 13 developing countries in the western hemisphere). Stronger engagement with Uruguay fits into Beijing’s strategy of championing the interests of countries in the Global South and complicates the US’s efforts to own the western hemisphere.

Beijing took advantage of the incoming visits to reaffirm its commitment to reunify with Taiwan. In particular, Uruguay, in a clear tilt towards China, expressed the strongest support for China on this issue. It stated its adherence to the “one China” principle, recognised China as the sole legal government representing all of China, acknowledged Taiwan as an inseparable part of Chinese territory, opposed any form of Taiwan independence, and supported the efforts of the Chinese government to achieve national reunification. In essence, the reference related to Taiwan was lengthier and tougher in tone than the language used during his predecessor, Luis Lacalle Pou’s visit to China in 2023.

It is worth noting that Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney deviated from the practice of his predecessor, Justin Trudeau, by including Canada’s reaffirmation of its longstanding “one China” policy in the joint statement issued during his visit. When Trudeau visited China in 2016 and 2017, there was no mention of Canada’s “one China” policy in the official documents released. However, Carney’s approach is not unusual as Canada had reiterated its consistent and longstanding “one China” policy in the joint statement during Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s visit to China in 2009.

China is capitalising on the disruption caused by Trump’s policies and actions to expand its international influence and strengthen ties with countries, especially those from the West and in America’s own backyard. In Chinese parlance, the world is experiencing changes unseen in a century, and Beijing is taking full advantage of the situation. 

However, China’s gain does not necessarily mean a loss for America. In particular, the raft of socioeconomic agreements struck during the high-level visits are largely confined to practical areas of cooperation and avoid sensitive areas related to defence or security. Moreover, the agreements China struck with Canada, South Korea and the UK are essentially efforts aimed at restoring ties to a level before the downturn in their bilateral relations.

Furthermore, a major preoccupation of the visiting foreign dignitaries is to diversify risks and markets, and search for growth opportunities, not simply to jump onto the China bandwagon. These countries continue to see the importance of managing and maintaining ties with the US, notwithstanding the latter’s unpredictability and highly transactional nature.

Beijing is certainly well aware of the calculations of these foreign leaders and seems ready to proceed at a mutually comfortable pace. At the same time, by hosting the countries that are traditionally more aligned with the US and even from America’s own backyard, China appears to be strengthening its hand as it makes preparations to host US President Donald Trump from 31 March to 2 April.

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