Double-backed power: How the US and China are cementing Pakistan’s military rule

Pakistan is once again making headlines — this time for its parliament’s passing of the 27th Amendment, which broadly restructures the country’s judiciary and defence. Passed on 13 November 2025, the new amendment makes two key changes: first, establishing the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) alongside the existing apex court, the Supreme Court of Pakistan. 

The FCC is granted sweeping powers that, until now, rested with the Supreme Court, including matters related to fundamental rights. FCC will have politically appointed judges, creating a divide within the judiciary and raising questions about its independence. However, global attention is less on the judicial restructuring of Pakistan, but rather on the transformation of a politically powerful army into an even more powerful one.

The chief of the army would now also be the chief of the defence forces— overseeing the army, navy and air force. While this comes as a surprise to many, the army has always been given primacy throughout the history of Pakistan’s defence; hence, it is of little shock that the army chief becomes the chief of defence staff. In addition, the amendment states that anyone who is promoted to the rank of a field marshal in the army, marshal in the air force and admiral of the fleet by the federal government, “shall retain the rank, privileges and remain in uniform for life… [and] shall not be removed…” 

While this may seem like a regular defence reform, it is about one person — Chief of Army Staff Asim Munir — who has become the second chief to be promoted to field marshal in the entire history of the Pakistan Army. 

A former spy chief, Munir, became the army chief in 2022, when Pakistan’s popular leader and then Prime Minister Imran Khan was removed from office for questioning the army’s role in Pakistan’s politics. Khan also spoke out against the army at public forums, annoying the top brass of the military. 

After Khan’s removal, Pakistan had an interim government, and then an elected government in 2024 for five years, which remains under the tight grip of the military, with the likely fear that upsetting the army could lead to the toppling of an elected government — as what happened to Khan.

While Pakistan is not the first country in the world to have the army play a central role in the country’s security and political affairs, it would undoubtedly be the first nuclear state that claims allegiance to democracy but blurs the line between the civil and military settings of the country. 

But isn’t this purely an internal matter of Pakistan? 

Probably not. Munir’s elevation to the rank of field marshal — along with the immunities it grants and the accompanying constitutional amendment — does not remain limited to Pakistan’s internal affairs. It carries significant regional and global implications, involving major powers such as the US and China. But how did it all begin, and will this result in another authoritarian military regime in Pakistan? 

The two-nation theory championed by Pakistan’s founding father, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, whereby the belief that Muslims of the subcontinent needed a separate state distinct from India, has shaped Pakistan’s identity since its creation in August 1947

While British colonial rule left India divided with Pakistan as a new ideological state, it also left behind contested borders and territories, including Kashmir, and this narrative continues to influence Pakistan’s defence and political life. The Kashmir issue is so entrenched in Pakistani politics that it often becomes the political anthem in winning elections. Still, Pakistan’s position on Kashmir has little practical effect, as Delhi has remained clear that Kashmir is an integral part of India. 

In the past seven decades, Pakistan has fought several wars, including the recent one in May 2025, and failed to achieve a decisive victory over India. Almost all had a Kashmir angle, except the Bangladesh Liberation War, where the Indian Army fought alongside the independence forces of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in 1971 against West Pakistan, resulting in India’s victory and the creation of an independent Bangladesh. 

While the Pakistani army reached its nadir in 1971 with its defeat by India, Islamabad has since continued to rely on non-state actors, including militant and terrorist groups, in its confrontation with India. The recent attack in the heart of Delhi has once again been traced to networks based in Pakistan, recalling earlier episodes such as the discovery of Osama bin Laden living just kilometres from a major Pakistani military cantonment. Therefore, despite its efforts, Pakistan struggles to deal with terrorism, which has become an industry in itself. 

In April 2025, this dynamic escalated sharply when a Pakistan-based militant group killed 26 civilians in Kashmir. India responded with Operation Sindoor, targeting militant infrastructure in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, triggering a brief but intense armed confrontation between the two nuclear-armed neighbours.

Meanwhile, no industry thrives in isolation — least of all one as complex and organised as terrorism — and the Pakistan Army is often seen as central to this nexus. And while Pakistan did not prevail in its confrontation with India, requesting a ceasefire from the Indian Army, the episode nonetheless reinforced and elevated the army’s domestic standing in the second half of 2025.

The India–Pakistan War in May 2025 captured global attention, as the two powerful nuclear-armed states’ conflict could have significant regional and international implications, including towards the US. 

US President Donald Trump claims to have ended the war — a claim supported by Pakistan. Conversely, Pakistan was quick to thank Trump and even recommended him for the Nobel Peace Prize. 

However, India’s denial of any third-party role in the war impacted Delhi’s bilateral ties with Washington. On the contrary, India continues to hold onto a position that it was the Pakistani Army that requested a ceasefire from the Indian Army.

As a result of Pakistan acknowledging the US’s role in ending the war, Islamabad and Rawalpindi – the headquarters of the Pakistan Army – were granted greater access to the White House. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Chief of Army Staff Asim Munir were hosted by President Trump twice, including a closed-door meeting in September 2025.

The Biden administration had hardly established a hotline with Pakistan. The Democrats even invested heavily in developing a strategic partnership with India, which eventually bore fruit in initiatives such as the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET), which has evolved into Transforming the Relationship Utilizing Strategic Technology (TRUST) under President Trump. 

Meanwhile, the India-US bilateral ties have undergone significant changes. While India continues to negotiate a trade deal with the US, the two countries’ leaders have avoided meeting. A Quad Leaders’ Summit that India was supposed to host this year has not materialised, possibly due to the state of bilateral partnership between Delhi and Washington. 

As a result of a war with India and access to the White House, Rawalpindi restored its prestige, elevated its strategic importance, and re-infused Islamic nationalism into the state’s political and military narrative. Therefore, Munir’s elevation to field marshal speaks of the political victory that the Pakistani Army had, if not on the battlefield. 

At the same time, the US has locked a US$500 million rare earths partnership with Pakistan, and Islamabad has even reportedly delivered the first batch of the consignment.  Many questions surround Pakistan’s claims to rare earths deposits in the country, and if any are found, how would this not impact Islamabad’s “all-weather” relationship with China? But this seems to be the best advice received from the lobbyist that Pakistan has reportedly hired to win over the Trump administration. 

In all of this, the army remains a key force in pushing Islamabad to expand its outreach. Additionally, any administration in Pakistan understands that opposing the army or attempting to draw a line between the military and politics would jeopardise the political future of that party, a consequence that befell Prime Minister Imran Khan and leading to his jail sentence. Therefore, the legal immunity granted to Munir is a reward for the immense authority he has as army chief and his growing role in steering Pakistan’s state machinery. 

The other power nexus that boosts Munir’s position is the “all-weather strategic partnership” with China. While history provides layers to this equation, China’s multi-billion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative project — the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) — remains the backbone of the bilateral relationship. 

However, the project has not been without risk, especially in a region like Balochistan, where pro-independence forces have approached such investments with caution. In August 2023, the Balochistan Liberation Army had reportedly attacked a convoy of Chinese engineers, killing four Chinese nationals and nine Pakistani military personnel. China, on multiple occasions, has raised the safety and security of its personnel and infrastructure in discussions with Pakistan. The Pakistan Army guards critical strategic infrastructure and investments involving China, such as Gwadar Port, thereby building Beijing’s immense reliance on the Pakistan Army. 

Meanwhile, the other bond that empowers the Pakistani Army, with Beijing at its centre, is the defence imports from China, making it a key market for Beijing. It is estimated that China supplies 81% of Pakistan’s defence imports (2020-2024). 

Additionally, in recent years, Pakistan Chief of Army Staff Munir has travelled to China and held high-level meetings with Wang Yi, a member of the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs. Wang hosted Munir in Beijing in July 2025, where he praised the Pakistani Army, saying that the Pakistani military stands as a staunch defender of national interests and a firm supporter of China–Pakistan friendship. He expressed the hope that the Pakistani military will continue to make efforts for the development of China–Pakistan relations. Munir was also seen accompanying Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation annual summit in Tianjin, China. 

Therefore, the Pakistan Army’s firm grip on domestic politics — strengthened by measures like the 27th Amendment and acknowledgement from both Washington and Beijing — marks a new chapter in the country’s long history of “deep state”, this time without the theatrics of a coup. 

However, unlike previous eras, the current shift appears to be driven less by institutional consensus and more by the ambitions of one man — Asim Munir. And that personal imprint could steer Pakistan into a more unpredictable and tightly centralised form of military rule with bits of military dictatorship. 

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not reflect the views of the author’s current or past affiliations in any form.

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