The geopolitics of the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation: Where does India stand?
Despite its political and military consolidation in Tibet, Beijing remains concerned about the spillover effects of Tibetan affairs from India and Nepal. This vigilance persists, even as India upholds its longstanding policy on the Dalai Lama and Tibet. Indian analyst Rishi Gupta explains.
Chinese President Xi Jinping made a rare and surprise visit to Lhasa on 20 August to mark the 60th anniversary of the foundation of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) — a much-contested and debated region in global affairs.
Xi’s visit to Tibet comes after the recent announcement by the Tibetan spiritual leader, the 14th Dalai Lama, on the reincarnation of his successor. On his 90th birthday, he affirmed that “the institution of the Dalai Lama will continue” during the 15th Tibetan Religious Conference held at Dharamshala in India — a place where the Tibetan government-in-exile is located.
In a sharply worded statement, the 14th Dalai Lama said, “Gaden Phodrang Trust has sole authority to recognise the future reincarnation; no one else has any such authority to interfere in this matter.” The Gaden Phodrang Trust is a 14-year-old institution associated with the 14th Dalai Lama.
... despite China’s controversial reforms across religious, cultural, political, social and educational spheres of Tibet, fears of an anti-China movement resurfacing in Tibet persist.
Fears of an anti-China movement
When considering the two events — the Dalai Lama’s assertion on his reincarnation and President Xi’s visit to Lhasa — two key observations surface. One is that even after 70 years of the People’s Liberation Army’s control of Tibet, the region remains a source of concern for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Why?
Because the 14th Dalai Lama continues to be the most influential leader for the Tibetan community, and despite China’s controversial reforms across religious, cultural, political, social and educational spheres of Tibet, fears of an anti-China movement resurfacing in Tibet persist.
This is evident not only in the security and surveillance architecture China has put in place but also in the bilateral security arrangements with neighbouring countries such as Nepal, which borders Tibet and hosts around 12,000 exiled Tibetans.
Secondly, the 14th Dalai Lama has clarified the questions regarding his reincarnation and succession, affirming that the Central Tibetan Administration — the government-in-exile — in Dharamshala remains the legitimate Tibetan political authority and that the office of the 14th Dalai Lama holds the right to identify and appoint his successor — a contrary position to what China upholds as Beijing’s sole right.
But where does India fit into all this? After all, India has hosted a large Tibetan community and their highest spiritual leader since 1959.
... the “Government of India does not take any position or speak on matters concerning beliefs and practices of faith and religion” and “Government has always upheld freedom of religion for all in India and will continue to do so”.
India’s longstanding position
A decade after the 14th Dalai Lama escaped to India, in 1969, the 14th Dalai Lama said in a statement: “When I am about ninety, I will consult the high Lamas of the Tibetan Buddhist traditions, the Tibetan public, and other concerned people who follow Tibetan Buddhism, to re-evaluate whether or not the institution of the Dalai Lama should continue.”
However, every once in a while since then, the 14th Dalai Lama’s office has been met with similar queries by the international media, Tibetan people and followers of Tibetan Buddhism about who will succeed the spiritual leader and whether or not there will be a next Dalai Lama. Also, some claimed that there might be no successor of the Dalai Lama and that the institution might conclude with the 14th Dalai Lama, and others said that maybe a woman might be the next one.
It was clear that there was no clarity on this issue. However, these queries were more frequent every time Beijing issued statements claiming that the “reincarnation and succession of the Dalai Lama is inherently an internal affair of China”.
Interestingly, India, as the host of a large exiled Tibetan community and their spiritual leader, said in its immediate media response on 4 July — two days after the 14th Dalai Lama revealed his plans — that the “Government of India does not take any position or speak on matters concerning beliefs and practices of faith and religion” and “Government has always upheld freedom of religion for all in India and will continue to do so”.
In the latest statement made in the Rajya Sabha — the upper house of the Indian parliament — Kirti Vardhan Singh, India’s minister of state in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) reiterated the same on 21 August, stating that the “Government has seen a statement regarding the institution of Dalai Lama issued by His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama on 02 July 2025” and that the “Government of India does not take any position on matters concerning beliefs and practices of faith and religion”.
As far as India’s official stand on Tibet is concerned, the declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation signed by the then Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao on 23 June 2003, states: “The Indian side recognizes that the Tibet Autonomous Region is part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China and reiterates that it does not allow Tibetans to engage in anti-China political activities in India.”
The declaration further states: “The Chinese side expresses its appreciation for the Indian position and reiterates that it is firmly opposed to any attempt and action aimed at splitting China and bringing about ‘independence of Tibet’.”
A shift in India’s stand?
But has that position changed for India against the backdrop of the India-China border conflict in 2020? For many China watchers in India, raising issues on Tibet could have been a tactical stand for India to counter China, but Delhi seems to have remained with its 2003 Stand on Tibet, recognising TAR as “part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China”.
India’s position is both a matter of diplomatic consistency and geopolitical necessity — a clear, consistent position on Tibet helps India protect its own security interests.
Among other things, this could be due to the historical legacy of the McMahon Line — a demarcation line drawn between British India and Tibet in 1914. China rejects the McMahon Line, asserting that Tibet was not a sovereign state and thus lacked the authority to conclude treaties. Therefore, India’s position is both a matter of diplomatic consistency and geopolitical necessity — a clear, consistent position on Tibet helps India protect its own security interests.
Meanwhile, India’s official position on the Dalai Lama is clear in MEA’s 2021 response, where Delhi conveyed: “It is the consistent policy of the government of India to treat His Holiness the Dalai Lama as an honoured guest in India and as a respected religious leader who enjoys a large following in India.” This has also seemingly remained unchanged in the Indian apparatus.
With its highest regards for the office of the Dalai Lama, the Indian leaders, civilians, and followers and believers of Buddhism have engaged with the religious leader and sought his spiritual wisdom. Historically, the Indian prime ministers have wished the 14th Dalai Lama on his birthdays.
On the occasion of the 14th Dalai Lam’s 90th birthday, Prime Minister Modi, in his post on X (formerly Twitter), wrote, “I join 1.4 billion Indians in extending our warmest wishes to His Holiness the Dalai Lama on his 90th birthday. He has been an enduring symbol of love, compassion, patience and moral discipline. His message has inspired respect and admiration across all faiths. We pray for his continued good health and long life.”
Despite Beijing’s assertion that it controls Tibet, the institution of the Dalai Lama has been influential in creating a cause for the Tibetan society within Tibet or outside.
Why does China still feel insecure about Tibet?
While India maintains a position on Tibet and distances itself from the reincarnation process or Tibetan affairs, why does China still feel insecure?
The most straightforward answer would be that control over the institution of the Dalai Lama remains China’s last and most desired aim in settling the issues of Tibet once and for all. The stay of the 14th Dalai Lama in India has been historically the symbol of resilience and freedom against the perceived oppression and subjugation by the Chinese State. Despite Beijing’s assertion that it controls Tibet, the institution of the Dalai Lama has been influential in creating a cause for the Tibetan society within Tibet or outside.
By being able to appoint a new Dalai Lama and getting one recognised globally, Beijing will symbolically be able to conclude the process that it started in 1950-51, in the form of taking control of Tibet. Meanwhile, towards that conclusion, Beijing continues to face resistance from the vocal Tibetan diaspora, who advocate for freedom and self-determination concerning Tibetan identity, culture and language. This movement is bolstered by support from countries like the US.
Also, even though Beijing has politically and militarily strengthened its roots in Tibet over the years, the spillover effects of what happens in India and Nepal regarding Tibetan affairs continue to worry China. Seventeen years ago, in 2008, Beijing faced the fiercest protests in Lhasa by Tibetans against the CCP as the state hosted the Olympic Games. Among China’s various wakeup calls on Tibet, 2008 was the most prominent, forcing Beijing to bring in more surveillance, security and reforms.
... India is likely to adhere to its historical position, balancing principle with geopolitical necessity.
Symbolic battle
But China still sees too many loose ends, especially with regards to the ethnic and linguistic unity, and therefore, in his message to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the establishment of the TAR, Chinese President Xi was reported to have stressed on “advancing the adaptation of Tibetan Buddhism to the socialist society according to the guideline of adapting religion to China’s realities and handling religious affairs in line with the law”.
Further highlighting the importance of political ideology and the leadership of the CCP, Xi said that there was a need to “adhere to the Party’s leadership and strengthen Party building” and make “constant efforts to enhance cohesion and forge inner strength with the Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, and guide officials and the general public of all ethnic groups to follow the Party and its guidance”.
To conclude, Tibet remains a symbolic battle between the 14th Dalai Lama and the CCP — one seen by many as a global icon of peace and spirituality, the other determined to cement political control. The question of his reincarnation and succession will keep Tibet alive as an international issue, far beyond its borders. However, India is likely to adhere to its historical position, balancing principle with geopolitical necessity.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not reflect the views of the author’s current or past affiliations in any form.
