North Korea’s only hope: reform and opening up

Forty-six years ago, on 18 December 1978, the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was held in Beijing. This meeting proposed the reform and opening up policy that guided China to become a world-class nation today.

The meeting advocated for building “socialism with Chinese characteristics”, moving away from class struggle, and shifting the efforts of the entire party and the nation’s attention to socialist modernisation, marking the first step in a historic transformation. 

To free itself from ideological constraints, the meeting criticised the “Two Whatevers” — which conferred absolute authority to Mao Zedong’s thoughts — and adopted a pragmatic approach, emphasising that “practice is the sole criterion for testing truth”.

At the same time, it centred on economic development, emphasised the development of productive forces, and adhered to the reform and opening up policy and the “one central task, two basic points” of the Four Cardinal Principles. This has been the theoretical foundation supporting China’s reform and opening up over the past 40 years.

As a result, the highest value of China’s modernisation lies in the development of productive forces, the growth of national power and the improvement of living standards for the people. Deng Xiaoping’s theory of socialist development was later recognised at the 15th National Congress in 1997 as Deng Xiaoping Theory, becoming one of the guiding principles for the CCP. 

The results of China’s reform and opening up over the past 40 years are truly remarkable. China’s production instruments and fixed assets investment link with the fiscal revenue increase from 51.928 trillion in 1978 to 15,640.286 trillion in 2018, increasing 300 times.

China’s strong economic foundation has not only enhanced its international influence but also transformed it from the world’s largest developing nation into a global power alongside the US, boasting substantial military and scientific strength. However, this rapid growth has fueled strategic tensions with the US, which views China’s rise as a threat. Furthermore, China itself grapples with the consequences of its compressed development.

The achievements of contemporary China can be largely attributed to its reform and opening up policy. China’s growth originated from the party’s strategic policy shifts, grounded in national and public interests, and its engagement with the US-led international community. This included expanding economic exchanges and a strong commitment to forging a new future for the country.

Many people naturally focus on China’s openness and economic reforms, but the party system in China has also undergone political changes over the past 40 years. As early as 1980, Deng Xiaoping emphasised the importance of political reform in China’s reform and opening up, pointing out the problems of bureaucracy, excessive concentration of power, patriarchal leadership, the lifetime tenure of cadres and various forms of abuse of privileges. Ultimately, a series of political improvement policies underpinned the successes of China’s reform and opening up, shaping the nation we see today.

On the other hand, North Korea has remained unyielding, even as it witnesses China’s reform and opening up. North Korea is essentially an autocratic monarchy, especially with the Kim dynasty’s three-generation succession — Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un. If central control weakens significantly, the Kim family’s hold on power will be threatened, leading to an obsessive consolidation of power that ignores reform and opening up.

Although China experienced the Cultural Revolution, it successfully charted a new course by appointing new leadership through internal party processes. In contrast, North Korea has monopolised power within the Kim family, without established rules and formal procedures for power succession since its founding.

This is also the reason why North Korea has not kept up with China’s reform and opening up, or Russia’s economic reforms.

In 2011, when Kim Jong Un inherited power in North Korea at the age of 33, there were high expectations not only in South Korea but also in the Western world. This was because he had studied in Switzerland for six years, and had some exposure to the free democratic world. However, his actions were completely contrary to expectations. 

Initially, Kim attempted to maintain the state-run economy while exploring decentralisation and market-oriented reforms, but these efforts were short-lived. Ultimately, aside from its nuclear weapons programme, North Korea has lost much of its industry and technology, becoming an isolated and closed nation characterised as a Stalinist-hereditary dictatorship.

Because Kim only emphasised an extreme independent economy, he irrationally focused wholly on nuclear and intercontinental missile development to maintain the Kim dynasty regime.

In the past, China proposed the concept of socialism with Chinese characteristics, loosening control over politics and ideology while maintaining control over core economic sectors and expanding reforms. This approach led to significant economic growth. However, North Korea has not kept pace. In actuality, Vietnam’s reform and open-door policy could have been another option for North Korea. 

To address many difficulties such as the devastation before and after the Vietnam War from 1975 to 1986, social issues, a large-scale refugee crisis, conflicts with Cambodia and natural disasters, Vietnam began implementing comprehensive renewal policies. Consequently, with aid from the US and other Western countries, Vietnam achieved rapid economic growth while maintaining the Communist Party of Vietnam’s one-party rule.

Kim’s greatest dilemma lies in achieving the dual goals of maintaining the regime and pushing for economic development. However, he is also aware that nuclear weapons and missile development cannot solve economic problems; without denuclearisation, economic development must be sacrificed.

Ironically, the shortcut to maintaining the regime is to ensure rapid economic growth in North Korea. If the economic living standards of North Korean residents improve, there will be no reason to reject the Kim Jong Un regime. Given such reasoning, Kim’s attempts to establish “Kim Jong-Un-ism” and oppressively control North Korea internally are outdated and ill-advised.

If North Korea abandons its obsession with nuclear weapons and missiles, undergoing reform and opening up for economic development, the incoming Trump administration — and the rest of the world, including South Korea — will take notice and welcome the change.

This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as “金正恩的最后出路— 改革开放”.

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