Survival or extinction: The Middle East’s nuclear choice

An emergency summit of “Arab and Islamic” country leaders in Doha has condemned Israel’s latest strike on the Qatari capital. Yet beyond strong rhetoric, the summit produced no concrete measures — no military alliance, no binding commitments, not even a shared strategy for collective defence.

This paralysis is decades old. Since 1948, Israel has repeatedly invaded and occupied Arab territories. After acquiring nuclear weapons, its dominance has only deepened. Unlike North Korea — which fought one war with the West and then built a nuclear arsenal to deter future attacks — Arab states have not even begun a serious debate about nuclear deterrence.

Instead, they continue to meet under banners such as the “Abraham Accords” or “Arab-Islamic summits”, framing international relations — and questions of war and peace — in civilisational terms, using Abrahamic traditions as the common ground among Shia, Sunni, Christian, and Jewish communities. This plays directly into Israel’s strategy of recasting global politics as a clash between “civilisations”, a narrative that legitimises its expansionism and militarism while shielding it from accountability under the modern nation-state system.

The key question is this: can appeals to “civilisation” protect small states from “barbarism” as the old nation-state order collapses and a new world of “civilisational states” emerges?

The Middle East provides a grim answer. Gaza is in ruins. Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and Iran have endured years of relentless bombardment. Even Gulf states — whether aligned through the Abraham Accords or remaining neutral — are now direct targets. 

The bombing of Qatar, home to the US Central Command and one of Washington’s closest partners, revealed the failure of every traditional safeguard. Neither US guarantees, regional organisations like the GCC and Arab League, nor the United Nations (UN) could prevent the attack. The UN issues only symbolic statements, powerless to act.

Unlike Western European countries, which established the modern state system with the Treaty of Westphalia in the 17th century, most Arab and Muslim countries in the Middle East are not standard nation-states, as their political structures remain deeply influenced by religious and tribal ties. The modern Arab states were largely created in the early 20th century. By relying on civilisational rhetoric rather than binding, enforceable defence mechanisms, Arab states at the summit have left themselves dangerously exposed. In this emerging civilisation-state system, fragmentation — not unity — will only reinforce Israel’s strategy of domination.

For decades, Middle Eastern politics have been consumed by Sunni-Shia rivalries. Today, Israel and its backers make no such distinctions. Their project of domination does not differentiate between Arabs or Iranians, Muslims or Christians, allies or adversaries.

This broader vision — often referred to as “Greater Israel” and backed directly by the US and indirectly by other Western powers, seeks to extend its dominance “from the brook of Egypt to the Euphrates”. Sectarian divisions, often exploited by Israel, now serve only to weaken the region, preventing a unified response to an existential threat.

The Abraham Accords deepen this problem. Marketed as peace initiatives and frameworks for inter-civilisational dialogue, they divert attention from the hard realities of territorial occupation and military expansion, reframing them as civilizational exchanges rather than acts of aggression.

Traditional tools of diplomacy — such as UN resolutions, regional organisations and bilateral agreements — are increasingly ineffective and, in many cases, risk becoming obsolete. In some instances, they may even foster a false sense of security and stability in international relations. 

Even proposals to suspend Israel’s UN membership are dangerously naïve. Washington has abandoned international institutions whenever convenient, while far-right factions in both the US and Israel openly aim to dismantle them. Fighting within collapsing nation-state institutions simply accelerates their destruction — and advances Israel’s goal of replacing the international order with a civilisational one.

In the past, Arab Gulf countries relied on petrodollars to build security partnerships with the US and the West, often by purchasing weapons in exchange for protection. However, with the US now a net exporter of oil and gas, the strategic importance of the Middle East has diminished. In addition, the end of the Cold War and the rise of religious nationalism within the US have further contributed to a growing distance between Washington and the Arab Gulf states.

Previously, many Arab countries were willing to accommodate Israel, believing it was genuinely committed to negotiating with the Palestinians. Today, however, Israeli policies and politicians have largely abandoned the two-state solution, undermining those earlier assumptions.

Thus, conventional defence and weaponry will not protect the wealthy yet vulnerable states of the Middle East. Billions spent on advanced conventional weaponry will never match Israel’s capabilities, especially given Washington’s commitment to ensuring Israel’s “qualitative military edge”. Like it or not, lasting peace can only be achieved through a nuclear balance. Without it, conventional forces are merely symbolic, unable to prevent occupation or annihilation.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was designed to prevent catastrophic wars by limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. In practice, it has entrenched Israel’s nuclear monopoly, leaving Arab states defenceless. The recent history of Iraq, Libya, Syria, Lebanon, Iran, Yemen, and now Qatar illustrates the fate of states without nuclear protection. 

Sectarian tensions, such as the Shia-Sunni divide, are unlikely to escalate into existential wars. However, disputes over the occupation of the so-called biblical lands will inevitably fuel ongoing conflict unless there is a credible system of deterrence and balance in place.

As international law collapses and civilisational rhetoric takes hold, this imbalance becomes catastrophic. Non-nuclear states face unchecked coercion, bombardment, and even genocide, while the nuclear power acts with impunity. In this sense, the absence of nuclear balance in the emerging civilisational world order emboldens and promotes nuclear power to assassinate, bomb, and even commit genocide. 

North Korea provides a stark example. Despite poverty and isolation, its modest nuclear arsenal has deterred foreign invasion for decades. Without similar deterrence, small or weak Arab states remain exposed — their populations and resources vulnerable to destruction and external domination. A limited, credible nuclear capability would force expansionists and occupiers to think carefully before attacking and could provide the foundation for lasting peace.

Arab countries have historically refrained from developing nuclear weapons due to technical limitations, political considerations and constraints imposed by international relations. In the past, Saudi Arabia funded Pakistan’s nuclear programme as a form of indirect deterrence from a distance. However, Riyadh has recently shifted its approach by signing a treaty with Pakistan that underscores nuclear cooperation. This move raises the possibility that Pakistani nuclear weapons could one day be deployed on Saudi soil.

Developing independent nuclear programmes will take time and face immense external pressure. In the meantime, Arab states should consider a collective security treaty modeled on NATO’s nuclear-sharing framework.

As perhaps may already in its sights, with the signing of the security treaty with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, the only Muslim-majority nuclear power, could, like France and the UK, extend its nuclear umbrella to vulnerable states, creating a binding and credible guarantee: an attack on one member would trigger a unified response backed by nuclear deterrence. For Pakistan, this would expand its security leadership beyond South Asia. For Arab states, it would provide immediate protection while buying time to build long-term strategies.

Some say that Pakistan’s credibility as a nuclear protector could be undermined by concerns over its links to militant groups and terrorism. Regional rivalries and geopolitical risks also complicate its ability to offer a reliable nuclear umbrella to Arab states, making such a role difficult to achieve. However, the security agreement between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan is already in motion, and while various domestic groups and militant factions in Pakistan may cause sporadic violence or localised conflicts, they do not pose a serious challenge to the authority and control of the Pakistani military. Moreover, many of these groups are, to varying degrees, influenced by Arab countries through personal religious connections such as the Hajj, as well as shared religious affiliations, making it unlikely that they would directly challenge the Pakistan-Saudi alliance.

For India, an all-out war with Pakistan is already difficult to envision. Since the agreement primarily targets Israel, it is unlikely to worsen Pakistan-India relations. In fact, given the strong ties between India and the Gulf countries, this development could potentially serve as a bridge for improving relations between Pakistan and India.

Arab leaders now face a decisive choice. They can continue to depend on hollow institutions and symbolic summits — or they can take concrete steps to secure their sovereignty and survival. In today’s world, where international law has crumbled and civilisational rhetoric justifies militarism, nuclear deterrence is no longer optional — it is essential.

Whether through independent programmes or a collective defence treaty with Pakistan, Arab states must act. Without such measures, the Middle East will remain a battleground for expansionist powers, while small states face destruction and subjugation. The choice is no longer between war and peace. It is between survival and extinction.

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