Takaichi: Moderate in Japan, hawk abroad?

The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), led by party president Sanae Takaichi, won a landslide victory in the lower house election on 8 February 2026, securing more than two-thirds of the seats and thereby monopolising all committee chair positions in the lower house. Some observers believe that Prime Minister Takaichi will translate her political ideology into policy, in particular, foreign and security policy. 

Despite considerable concern over Japan-China relations, Taiwan, the three security documents, constitutional reform, and historical issues (visits to Yasukuni Shrine), Takaichi’s election campaign had emphasised “proactive” public finances. Her immediate priorities are passing the 2026 budget, cutting the consumption tax, and deliberating the content of proactive public finances.

Diplomatically, the second Takaichi administration’s biggest challenge is her visit to the US in March 2026. It will therefore be important to see if Japan can demonstrate its importance to the US while aligning with US President Donald Trump’s policies.

So why are Taiwan, the three security documents, constitutional reform, and historical issues, such as visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, not considered major issues in Japan? 

In her response regarding the Taiwan issue in the Diet on 3 December 2025, Takaichi stated, “The Japanese government’s basic position regarding Taiwan remains as stated in the 1972 Japan-China Joint Communiqué, and there has been no change to this position.” 

What was Prime Minister Takaichi trying to say in her much-reported Diet response about “a Taiwan contingency” on 7 November 2025? She was not discussing a change in Taiwan policy, but rather the legal aspects of collective self-defence. Specifically, she discussed the circumstances under which the “survival-threatening situations” defined in the Legislation for Peace and Security would apply. She stated that certain cases involving the Taiwan Strait could constitute such situations. 

In other words, the discussion was not about Taiwan policy, but rather, legal interpretation. Therefore, Takaichi does not intend to change Japan’s Taiwan policy. Consequently, Japan has not discussed whether to change its Taiwan policy, nor have any Taiwan-related bills been proposed.

Second, the Takaichi administration has stated that it will revise the “three security documents” compiled by the Fumio Kishida administration in December 2022: the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Defense Buildup Program. This policy was confirmed after the lower house election. Since the revisions have been completed ahead of schedule, the draft documents are expected to be finalised by the end of the year. 

Unlike the Taiwan issue, the three security documents are recognised in Japan as the second Takaichi administration’s concrete policies. Potential revisions may include the three non-nuclear principles (not possessing, producing or permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons), promoting arms exports, enacting an anti-espionage law and establishing a Japanese CIA. However, this represents a move to abolish the “self-restraint” imposed on Japan as a defeated nation. 

This shift stems from growing tensions in Japan’s security environment and the lack of transparency of the Trump administration in the US. The policy seeks to revise the security policy on the premise that Japan has the same rights as other countries. In Japan, this is not viewed as “militarisation”, but rather as an attempt to alter the current state of self-restraint. Expectedly, the move has been met with much opposition, and the debate will most likely continue.

Third, regarding the constitutional amendment, although the LDP holds a two-thirds majority in the lower house, approval from both houses is required and the lack of a two-thirds majority in the upper house creates institutional hurdles.

Furthermore, questions remain about what changes should be made to the constitution and how, but these issues are not currently being debated. Takaichi has previously called for explicitly mentioning the Self-Defense Forces in Article 9, yet the future remains uncertain. In other words, a constitutional amendment has not yet been formally put forward for public discussion.

Fourth, regarding historical issues, Takaichi announced that she would not attend the annual autumn festival at the Yasukuni Shrine in 2025. There were still concerns that she might visit at the end of December 2025, but she did not. Furthermore, on 7 November 2025, Takaichi stated that she would uphold the 1995 Murayama Statement, which expressed remorse and an apology for war and colonial rule. For these reasons, Takaichi, whether as LDP president or Japan’s prime minister, is not seen as having caused any specific historical issues, at least within Japan.

Furthermore, there are significant discrepancies between the substance of the debate in Japan and how the Takaichi administration’s rhetoric is perceived and portrayed in China, Taiwan and elsewhere. Some of this misinformation may be deliberate. Hence, it is important that information be disseminated by Japanese correspondents who understand the local situation, and that Japanese readers approach information in multiple languages.

Related: Takaichi’s supermajority: Power without brakes? | Beyond China: Japan’s unseen diplomacy under Takaichi