Beyond China: Japan’s unseen diplomacy under Takaichi
With Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi winning a huge victory in the latest snap election, what does this mean for Japan’s relations with other countries and regions, including South Korea, India and Southeast Asia? Japanese academic Shin Kawashima gives his take.
The Takaichi administration — inaugurated on 21 October 2025 — dissolved the lower house only three months later, for a general election held on 8 February, in which Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s Liberal Democratic Party won a two-thirds supermajority in the Lower House by itself in a landslide victory.
From the outset, the administration has engaged in a series of active diplomatic activities, beginning with Takaichi’s participation in the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting shortly after taking office. However, China took issue with Takaichi’s comments on Taiwan, made at the lower house budget committee meeting on 7 November, causing a setback in Japan-China relations.
Southeast Asia: toward two-way partnership
Nevertheless, the Takaichi administration’s foreign policy cannot be evaluated solely based on Japan-China relations. In Asia, notably, the administration has engaged in numerous diplomatic activities, including diplomacy with South Korea and summits with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Central Asian countries.
While Japan has traditionally advocated for assistance to ASEAN, the latest summit also emphasised calls for two-way exchanges between Japan and ASEAN countries.
Shortly after the installation of the Takaichi administration, the 28th ASEAN-Japan Summit was held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on 26 October 2025. One of the summit’s achievements was the announcement of the new “Japan-ASEAN Co-creation Initiative for Artificial Intelligence”, which focuses on AI. Other notable achievements include cooperation with ASEAN countries in maritime security and disaster response, and in cybersecurity through the ASEAN-Japan Cybersecurity Policy Meeting and the ASEAN-Japan Cybersecurity Capacity Building Centre (AJCCBC).
In November 2025, Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi attended the “2+2” Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting with Indonesia, where the ministers discussed areas of cooperation, such as developing patrol vessels with Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) and providing fast patrol boats with Japan’s Official Security Assistance (OSA).
These developments clearly demonstrate Japan’s commitment to collaborating with other countries to address new challenges. Another notable feature is promoting intergenerational private-sector exchanges between Japan and ASEAN countries. While Japan has traditionally advocated for assistance to ASEAN, the latest summit also emphasised calls for two-way exchanges between Japan and ASEAN countries.
Central Asia: energy, AI and economic security
Next, it is also noteworthy that the “Central Asia plus Japan” Dialogue (CA+JAD) Summit was held in Tokyo in December 2025. Although the summit was planned for August 2025 during the Fumio Kishida administration, it was cancelled due to warnings over a possible megaquake in Japan.
... Takaichi highlighted three reasons why Central Asia is important to Japan: its geopolitical significance as a junction between Europe and Asia, its importance to economic security due to its energy and mineral resources, and its potential for high economic growth and population increase.
There are high expectations for outcomes from the December 2025 meeting. At the summit, Takaichi highlighted three reasons why Central Asia is important to Japan: its geopolitical significance as a junction between Europe and Asia, its importance to economic security due to its energy and mineral resources, and its potential for high economic growth and population increase.
She then listed “green and resilience”, “connectivity” and “human resource development” as key areas of cooperation. In particular, in terms of connectivity, she proposed a new “Japan-Central Asia AI Cooperation Partnership”. Promoting AI cooperation is noteworthy in the Takaichi administration’s Asian diplomacy, as it has also been evident in ASEAN diplomacy.
South Korea and India
When it comes to Japan-Korea relations, the leaders of both countries held a summit during the APEC summit in Korea in late October 2025, followed by another session in January 2026 when South Korean President Lee Jae-myung visited Japan, marking the start of “shuttle diplomacy”. Such a close relationship between South Korea’s progressive Lee administration and Japan’s conservative Takaichi administration was previously hard to imagine, and likely developed from the convergence of Japan and South Korea’s national interests amid a changing international situation.
Security and economic issues were discussed at the two leaders’ meeting in January, and there was a relatively calm exchange of views on historical issues between Japan and South Korea. The meeting was held in Nara prefecture, Takaichi’s constituency, and the two leaders engaged in a surprise two-kit drumming session, further highlighting the positive relationship between Japan and South Korea at home and abroad.
In January this year, Motegi visited India for a meeting with his Indian counterpart. The two foreign ministers pledged to cooperate in line with the “Japan-India Joint Vision for the Next Decade”, which was proposed during Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Japan in August 2025. They also confirmed that cooperation would be promoted based on three pillars: security; the economy, investment, and innovation; and people-to-people exchanges.
In addition to economic and security cooperation, as well as private-sector cooperation focused on five priority areas — semiconductors, critical minerals, information and communications technology, clean energy, and pharmaceuticals — the two countries agreed to promote cooperation in the field of AI under the “Japan-India AI Cooperation Initiative (JAI)”.
However, these achievements may not be fully recognised due to Japan’s inadequate international public relations and information dissemination capabilities, as global coverage of the Takaichi administration’s foreign policy has largely focused on the issue of China.
As these developments indicate, since its inception, the Takaichi administration has actively pursued Asian diplomacy, making it clear that cooperation in new fields such as AI is a common theme. Furthermore, strategic dialogue and cooperation in areas such as national and economic security are progressing, as seen with Indonesia and India.
However, these achievements may not be fully recognised due to Japan’s inadequate international public relations and information dissemination capabilities, as global coverage of the Takaichi administration’s foreign policy has largely focused on the issue of China. The administration needs to communicate more proactively about other aspects of its foreign policy.
