How Takaichi’s landslide win will shape Japan’s China and ASEAN ties
The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) landslide victory gives Takaichi political stability and a strong mandate, enabling her to press Beijing, mend ties and strengthen engagement with ASEAN while balancing US alliance priorities. Lianhe Zaobao journalist Tan Jet Min reports.
Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has scored a landslide victory in the House of Representatives election. Academics widely believe this marks Takaichi’s reshaping of Japan’s political landscape, ushering in a new phase of Japanese politics and potentially bringing an end to the frequent turnover of prime ministers in recent years.
Strong mandate
On 8 February, Japan held a nationwide general election at the peak of winter for the first time in 36 years. Takaichi’s LDP-led coalition swept to victory, securing 352 of 465 seats in the House of Representatives, NHK figures show, with the LDP alone winning a commanding majority of 316 seats.
Jeff Kingston, director of Asian Studies at Temple University’s Japan Campus, told Lianhe Zaobao that the LDP’s return to a parliamentary majority means Takaichi will be able to claim a strong mandate for her sweeping agenda of economic and security forms, pass a ramped up big spending budget, and enact relevant legislation, ending the revolving door at top and providing resolute stable leadership and policy continuity.
Shin Kawashima, professor of international relations at the University of Tokyo, said in an interview, “This victory will bolster Takaichi’s standing as party president within the LDP, while also highlighting the resurgence of the former Abe faction (the Seiwa-kai), whose influence had waned during the Shigeru Ishiba administration.”
Kawashima argues that while the Takaichi administration may lean more conservative, this does not represent a radical rollback. On issues such as immigration and gender, societal realities and public opinion will continue to act as constraints — making policy moderation more likely than any lurch towards conservative extremes.
Ken Jimbo, a professor at Keio University’s Faculty of Policy Management, told Lianhe Zaobao that rather than signal a rightward shift in Japanese politics, it is better described as a conditional endorsement of “firmness plus competence”, not a blank check for assertiveness.
Takaichi may be leveraging her landslide victory to project the image of a strong, long-term leader, pressuring China to engage with her. The aim would be to soften Beijing’s stance, repair bilateral relations and gradually downplay incidents related to Taiwan... — Professor Zhang Yun, School of International Relations, Nanjing University
Balancing China and US ties
On the diplomatic and security fronts, having secured the mandate she sought, Takaichi is expected to adopt a more proactive posture on the international stage.
Zhang Yun, a professor at the School of International Relations, Nanjing University, told Lianhe Zaobao that although Takaichi has expressed a willingness to engage in dialogue with China, there has been no substantive progress on issues involving China’s core interests. He suggested that Takaichi may be leveraging her landslide victory to project the image of a strong, long-term leader, pressuring China to engage with her. The aim would be to soften Beijing’s stance, repair bilateral relations and gradually downplay incidents related to Taiwan, with a view to a “soft landing” in China-Japan relations ahead of the APEC meeting in Shenzhen.
In November 2025, Takaichi’s remarks on a “Taiwan contingency” angered Beijing, and China-Japan relations hit rock bottom.
Zhang added that if China-Japan tensions persist, Japan’s greatest cost may not be short-term trade losses or a drop in tourism, but the loss of a strategic opportunity amid East Asia’s industrial chain restructuring. He argued that without stable and constructive ties with China, Japan would struggle to secure new space for strategic and economic development, even with a stronger US-Japan alliance.
Takaichi has repeatedly said publicly that strengthening the US-Japan alliance would be her top priority in security policy, and that she would align closely with Washington’s security agenda by rapidly increasing defence spending and expanding defence capabilities.
Kingston pointed out that from Washington’s perspective, “a militarily stronger Japan has long been what the US hoped for. This will also strengthen Trump’s bargaining chips when he holds a summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping.”
Japan and ASEAN insufficient to counterbalance China’s influence
How Japan would position its relationship with ASEAN under Takaichi’s leadership has also become a focus of attention across the region.
Japan does not see ASEAN as an independent fulcrum for containing China, but instead would look to incorporate ASEAN into a broader network of multilateral cooperation. — Professor Lin Dawei, Soka University in Japan
Lin Dawei, a professor from Soka University in Japan, said when interviewed that Takaichi’s victory does not mean a policy shift for Japan with regard to ASEAN, but rather a further strengthening of security and capacity building cooperation along existing lines. He stressed that this strengthening would not be about offensive military cooperation, but rather is focused on building defensive capabilities, with an emphasis on maritime law enforcement, early warning systems as well as high-quality infrastructure construction in an attempt to minimise geopolitical sensitivities.
As for whether Japan regards ASEAN as a key platform for counterbalancing China’s influence, Lin noted that Japan does not see ASEAN as an independent fulcrum for containing China, but instead would look to incorporate ASEAN into a broader network of multilateral cooperation.
“Japan and ASEAN alone cannot balance against a massive superpower like China. Moreover, China also has strong informal alignees/quasi-allies within ASEAN such as Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar.”
This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as “高市历史性大胜获“强势授权” 日本政治迈入新阶段”.
