Takaichi’s gamble: Can charisma carry Japan?
Japanese PM Sanae Takaichi has called a surprise election, betting her personal appeal and high approval ratings can rally voters, check the opposition and secure a mandate to steer Japan through uncertainty. Academic Zhang Yun gives his analysis.
On 23 January, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi formally dissolved the Diet, setting a general election for 8 February. Analysts have highlighted that this marks the first time in 60 years that the Diet was dissolved on the very day it convened, as well as the exceptionally brief 16-day campaign that followed.
There is no doubt that this was a bold political gamble by Takaichi, who is counting on high approval ratings to secure victory, strengthen her governing base and gain greater leeway in shaping domestic and foreign policy. However, I argue that beyond these short-term dynamics, the broader context that sets this election apart from previous ones — as well as the implications for Japan’s politics and diplomacy over the medium- to long-term — deserve even closer attention.
The biggest difference this time lies in the domestic sphere. This is the first general election since Japanese party politics entered a multi-party era, following two consecutive defeats for the Shigeru Ishiba cabinet in the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors. In the global context, it is happening amid an acceleration towards multipolarity, triggered by the Donald Trump administration’s disruption of the existing international order.
Why, then, has Takaichi chosen to stake her political future on dissolving the Diet and calling an election? Her confidence rests not only on high approval ratings but also on the uncertainties created by Japan’s new multi-party system and a world increasingly defined by multipolar power dynamics. These factors have left Japanese voters feeling disoriented, intensifying the demand for a strong political leader willing and able to drive change.
An indicator of Japanese politics
Firstly, this election will be an indicator of the direction of Japanese politics in the multi-party era. Japanese politics was long dominated by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP); though it briefly lost power following the end of the Cold War, it maintained a de facto one-party dominant system through cooperation with Komeito. The LDP-Komeito ruling coalition’s defeat at the House of Councillors election in the summer of 2025 led to the LDP losing 13 seats, securing only 39, while Komeito took just eight.
Voters’ disappointment with Ishiba has, to a large extent, been redirected into expectations for Takaichi.
In the 2024 House of Representatives election, the LDP lost its majority, meaning it lost its majority in both houses of the Diet for the first time since its founding — ironically, 2025 marked the LDP’s 70th anniversary.
Japanese politics has formally entered a new phase, one in which the LDP is only relatively the largest party coexisting with several opposition parties of roughly comparable strength. In this multi-party era, the LDP has no choice but to rely frequently on compromise with opposition parties to push decisions through. In the long run, this would erode the party’s policy consistency and weaken its leadership’s cohesion.
During the Ishiba era, successive electoral defeats eroded his authority within the party, and passing legislation required continual concessions to the opposition, all of which contributed to a short-lived premiership. Voters’ disappointment with Ishiba has, to a large extent, been redirected into expectations for Takaichi.
To avoid following in Ishiba’s footsteps, Takaichi feels the only way is to hold a general election and obtain a direct mandate from the electorate. This would rally the party and prevent divisions, while also keeping the opposition in check. However, because she has no factional base within the LDP, Takaichi can only appeal directly to public opinion and brand herself as a strong leader capable of bringing change to Japan.
US no longer reliable
Secondly, for a long time Japan’s international strategy has been built on an international order dominated by a unipolar US. However, the return of a Trump administration has fundamentally shaken this basic presupposition.
Japan now faces an ally that is not only less reliable and more unpredictable, but also one that is willing to use Japan’s economic dependence on the US as a tool for blackmail.
In 2025, the Trump administration threatened high tariffs on allies such as Japan and demanded massive investment in the US. At the start of 2026, Trump announced US withdrawal from 66 international organisations and agreements, and took military action against Venezuela. US-Europe relations suffered a major rift over Greenland, and Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney openly criticised the US in a speech given at the World Economic Forum in Davos, describing the international order as “ruptured” rather than “in transition”. The latest US National Security Strategy shifted strategic focus to the western hemisphere and homeland security.
Japan now faces an ally that is not only less reliable and more unpredictable, but also one that is willing to use Japan’s economic dependence on the US as a tool for blackmail. In the field of AI for instance, Japan is overly dependent on the US — any issues would have a direct impact on the Japanese economy. At the same time, China-Japan relations have become more tense than ever because of Takaichi’s remarks, in stark contrast with the recent visits to China by the leaders of France, the UK, Canada and other close US allies. Japanese society would hope for a strong leader to break the diplomatic deadlock.
... the election is less a policy contest than a battle of charisma. In this age of social media, it is hard to see the centrist reform alliance producing a figure capable of matching Takaichi.
The market voting with its feet
Takaichi’s sudden call for an election has caught the opposition off guard. Although the Constitutional Democratic Party and Komeito have formed a new reform-oriented centrist party, a political coalition formed in such a short time poses major challenges, both in reconciling ideological differences and in the selection and coordination of candidates. Furthermore, the policy platform of the centrist reform alliance is not fundamentally different from that of Takaichi’s Liberal Democratic Party-Ishin alliance, meaning the election is less a policy contest than a battle of charisma. In this age of social media, it is hard to see the centrist reform alliance producing a figure capable of matching Takaichi.
Thus, Takaichi still has a strong chance of winning. But does this mean she can, like Shinzo Abe, achieve nearly eight years of long-term rule? That challenge is just as formidable, and will depend above all on two factors: the market and the electorate.
This election can be described as a “multi-party tax-reduction populist election”, with both the ruling and opposition parties calling for cuts to, or even the abolition of, the consumption tax on food. The consumption tax is a stable source of funding for social security programmes such as healthcare, caregiving and childcare, yet there has been no serious discussion of how to fill the fiscal gap created by an annual revenue loss of around 5 trillion yen (about US$32 billion). It is precisely this fundamental uncertainty over fiscal resources that the market is most sensitive to.
For a long time, the Bank of Japan has been the main buyer of Japanese government bonds, effectively serving as a source of government financing — an approach rationalised by “Abenomics”. However, with inflation now rapidly rising in Japan, this can no longer be justified. Government debt is at 230% of GDP, and market doubts about fiscal sustainability are steadily growing.
Last November, the Takaichi government announced an economic stimulus package worth 21.3 trillion yen, raising defence spending and making high school education free. Now, it is proposing to cut the consumption tax. These are all spending-heavy measures, yet they lack accompanying economic reforms or a growth strategy, inevitably leaving investors worried that they may be trapped holding assets that are losing value.
Even if Takaichi were to win by a landslide, a sharp collapse in investor confidence would see the market “vote with its feet”, dealing a heavy blow to the Japanese economy.
Besides, Japan’s potential growth rate is around or below 0.5%, and such expansionary fiscal policies will only intensify concerns about chronic budget deficits. This in turn gives rise to a paradox: voters’ overtly high support versus investors’ covert lack of confidence.
Even if Takaichi were to win by a landslide, a sharp collapse in investor confidence would see the market “vote with its feet”, dealing a heavy blow to the Japanese economy. A loss of economic confidence would directly impact the real economy, and a weaker yen would push up prices, affecting people’s daily lives — at which point voters would also “vote with their hands”.
Relations with China
The biggest external constraint on Takaichi’s long-term rule is undoubtedly China-Japan relations. Prolonged tensions between China and Japan may pose the greatest economic challenge not through a drop in tourism, but through Japan losing strategic opportunities.
Amid the restructuring of East Asia’s economic and industrial chains, every country needs to maintain links with China, the world’s second-largest economy and a key node in global industrial and supply chains. If Japan chooses the opposite path, it risks a fatal setback in realising its future economic potential.
Takaichi may hope to use an election victory to stabilise her government and, projecting the image of a long-term strong leader, compel China to engage with her and soften its stance, thereby improving bilateral relations. However, this is an overly optimistic and one-sided assumption. If Japan fails to establish a stable and constructive relationship with China, the Japan-US alliance will still fail to bring greater strategic, economic, or diplomatic space and prospects for the country, regardless of how strong the alliance may be.
This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as “高市闪电大选面对选民和市场之悖论”.
