Trump 2.0 and the building of autonomous China-Japan relations

On 15 November, Chinese President Xi Jinping held talks with Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba at the APEC summit in Lima, Peru. This summit was the first between the two countries since Ishiba assumed office less than a month ago. Both parties agreed on comprehensively advancing the bilateral strategic partnership and being committed to building constructive, stable China-Japan relations that meet the needs of this new era.

The summit took place against the backdrop of Donald Trump’s impending return to the White House. Many analysts believe that closer ties between China and Japan are due to the “Trump factor”; both China and Japan hope to jointly tackle the uncertainties of Trump’s second term. This seems reasonable, given Trump’s threat to impose a 60% tariff on China and him being against Japan’s Nippon Steel acquiring the US Steel Corporation, citing national security concerns.

Indeed, the US has always been a significant factor influencing China-Japan relations. However, if the rise and fall of China-Japan relations is dictated solely by the US, this indicates a certain immaturity and unsustainability. I believe that over the past decade, the strategic relationship between China and Japan has gradually shifted from being dominated by external US factors to an autonomous relationship driven by the internal dynamics of China and Japan. Although progress has been slow, the general direction is clear. Both sides should continue their efforts along this path to improve and develop China-Japan relations.

Firstly, Trump’s second term will accelerate Japan’s strategic autonomy, presenting challenges but also opportunities for China-Japan relations. Trump’s “America First” philosophy prioritises domestic issues, and his re-election occurred mainly because he won over public opinion. According to The Fox News Voter Analysis (FNVA) conducted in conjunction with the Associated Press, when asked what the key issues were in the recent US election, the economy and jobs was identified in 39% of the responses, with immigration at 20%, abortion at 11% and healthcare at 8%. In comparison, foreign policy — including China-related issues — was not a focal point even in battleground states like Pennsylvania, where economic concerns were similarly the central issue.

In his post-election speech, Trump stated that “America First” is his priority. This inward focus means the US will be less willing to intervene in international disputes, as is evident from remarks made by Trump on ending the Russia-Ukraine war during a meeting with Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. While Trump 2.0 will still value alliances, the approach will be different. Trump wants alliances to be on equal footing, as he believes that the US is bearing too much of a burden and that allied nations should contribute more rather than just freeload. 

In terms of China policy, he will adopt tough economic measures like tariffs, and leverage on issues such as Taiwan and the South China Sea as bargaining chips. The ultimate goal is to reduce US burdens, so as to better focus on domestic agendas. For Japan, an inward-looking US means that the foundation of its strategic reliance on the US is gradually eroding, forcing Japan to move towards strategic autonomy. How Japan manages its relationship with China would be a key test on this path.

A strategically autonomous Japan might lead to a revival of World War II-era imperialist militarism, which would be dangerous for China. At the same time, however, a strategically autonomous Japan would really consider its own long-term interests amid unprecedented global changes. Consequently, Japan may realise that its future development must be achieved through the building of a stable and sustainable strategic relationship with China.

Secondly, if one were to say that the Ukraine crisis highlighted to Japan the decline of US power to Japan, then the Middle East Gaza crisis demonstrated the erosion of US international moral leadership. The American response to these crises therefore indicates to Japan that following the US could make it a minority in the international community.

The Gaza conflict has lasted for over a year and resulted in over 40,000 deaths. It has also expanded to involve Lebanon and even Iran, among other countries. For Japan — highly dependent on the Middle East for oil and energy — the Gaza conflict has posed a significant risk. American support for Israel has made it a minority in multilateral diplomacy, particularly among global south countries, who are extremely resentful of American double standards when it comes to moral values. 

In the case of Japan, gaining the moral high ground in diplomacy cannot simply be achieved by following the US. Japan has thus increasingly emphasised a rules-based international order, rather than focusing solely on values like democracy and freedom (as they did in the past). The first step to establishing a rules-based international order is to put the United Nations at the centre and to be grounded in international law.

Furthermore, Trump’s intention to withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement will also pose a risk to Japan. Japan’s green transition policies are aligned with the US’s Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, which offered substantial subsidies. Policy changes could impact Japan, underscoring the risks of excessive alignment with the US in its economic development strategy. Strategic autonomy is hence also necessary for Japan’s economic development.

Thirdly, the development of an autonomous China-Japan relationship — influenced not by the US, but by its own internal momentum — has its roots in 2014. In 2010, relations between China and Japan deteriorated due to the collision incident near the Diaoyu islands. The US intervened and pledged that the Japan-US Security Treaty applied to the Diaoyu islands, and Japan subsequently released the detained Chinese captain. While American “mediation” seemingly resolved the China-Japan crisis, this US-dominated model is extremely fragile. 

From China’s perspective, the incident marked the US’s abandonment of its longstanding stance of ambiguity on territorial issues — they saw the US as openly favouring Japan and intervening in disputes. From Japan’s viewpoint, even if the US had pledged the treaty’s applicability, it should have recognised Japan’s territorial claims if it truly wanted to safeguard ally interests.

This dissatisfaction was exploited by then Tokyo governor Shintaro Ishihara in 2012, who announced Tokyo’s purchase of the Diaoyu Islands. This ultimately prompted the Japanese central government to intervene, and the Noda Cabinet announced the nationalisation of the islands. This incident caused China-Japan relations to plummet to their lowest point since the normalisation of diplomatic ties. 

In 2014, before the Beijing APEC meeting, both sides reached the four-point consensus between Yang Jiechi and Shotaro Yachi after multiple rounds of negotiations, marking an important effort to independently manage bilateral differences and disputes. In September this year, China and Japan reached a consensus on the discharge of nuclear-contaminated water from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, demonstrating their capability to handle bilateral issues independently. During the China-Japan summit in Lima, Xi Jinping expressed the need to translate important political common understandings into concrete policies and actions, which is evidence of the construction of an autonomous China-Japan relationship.

Trump 2.0 poses uncertainties for both China and Japan, but also presents opportunities at the same time. To build a relationship that meets the demands of a new era characterised by constructiveness and stability, both countries must move away from US-centric thinking in order to construct an autonomous China-Japan relationship.　　

This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as “特朗普2.0与自主性中日关系的构建”.

Related: A divided Japan faces a divided world: Ishiba’s dual challenge | Beyond Abe’s shadow: Ishiba and a new era in Japan-China relations?