Trump-Xi summit: Why China scored the bigger strategic win

19 May 2026
politics
Dylan Loh
Associate Professor, School of Social Sciences, Nanyang Technological University
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s “constructive strategic stability” framework and carefully choreographed optics defined the Trump-Xi summit, yielding modest gains for both sides, but a broader strategic advantage for China in setting the terms of future US-China relations. Academic Dylan Loh examines the details.
US President Donald Trump speaks with Chinese President Xi Jinping while leaving after a visit to the Zhongnanhai Garden in Beijing, China, 15 May 2026. (Evan Vucci/Pool/Reuters)
US President Donald Trump speaks with Chinese President Xi Jinping while leaving after a visit to the Zhongnanhai Garden in Beijing, China, 15 May 2026. (Evan Vucci/Pool/Reuters)

“Constructive strategic stability” — this is the latest political formulation introduced by Chinese President Xi Jinping on the first day of the Xi-Trump summit in Beijing to denote the next phase of US-China relations. 

The phrase quickly found a receptive audience in Washington. In a White House factsheet released on 17 May 2026, the very first point explicitly echoed Beijing’s language, acknowledging that both leaders “agreed that the United States and China should build a constructive relationship of strategic stability…”

For US President Donald Trump, accepting this framework is a natural extension of the personalised diplomacy displayed throughout his visit, where he repeatedly praised Xi as a “great leader” and a friend. For Beijing, the summit marks the culmination of a highly structured effort to steady a volatile relationship. Yet, strip away the carefully choreographed pomp, and a familiar pattern emerges: the summit yielded outsized optics but distinctly modest gains. Nevertheless, in many ways, the optics matter as much as, if not more than, the substantive outcomes.

By securing Trump’s acceptance of “constructive strategic stability”, Beijing has effectively set the terms and the bounds of the US-China relationship. 

Head-of-state diplomacy: conceptual over pragmatic?

Beijing left nothing to chance, rolling out the literal red-carpet treatment to bridge the nine-year gap since Trump last visited the Chinese capital in 2017. The political choreography was evident from the moment Air Force One touched down at Beijing Capital International Airport. China upgraded its welcome delegation, dispatching Vice-President Han Zheng to the tarmac — an elevation in status compared to 2017, when Trump was received by Yang Jiechi, then a state councillor and the country’s top diplomat. 

US President Donald Trump walks with Chinese Vice-President Han Zheng during an arrival ceremony at Beijing Capital International Airport, in Beijing, China, 13 May 2026. (Evan Vucci/Reuters)

Beyond the formal banquets, Xi feted Trump with personalised gestures, including a visit to the Temple of Heaven and a rare, private tour inside the grounds of Zhongnanhai. This high-level pageantry illustrates Beijing’s turn towards “head-of-state diplomacy”, as it has been clear for some time now that Xi and Trump alone dictate the overall tone and shape of US-China relations. 

“Head-of-state diplomacy”, much like “constructive strategic stability”, follows a long-standing practice of introducing conceptual frameworks to underpin new diplomatic initiatives and manage major-power relations. While Western observers sometimes dismiss these phrases as vague, ambiguous sloganeering, doing so misreads Chinese foreign policy. 

In Chinese political culture, establishing a shared conceptual framework is a necessary prerequisite for institutional action. By securing Trump’s acceptance of “constructive strategic stability”, Beijing has effectively set the terms and the bounds of the US-China relationship. Fortunately, it tells the rest of the world that even if structural rivalries persist, both capitals recognise the need for a predictable framework to prevent competition from spiralling into kinetic conflict.

While Trump walked away with commodity orders, Xi leveraged the summit’s optics. 

Modest gains for both sides

Despite the grand declarations, achieving deep structural breakthroughs on the fundamental frictions dividing Washington and Beijing — such as technology decoupling, industrial overcapacity, trade tariffs and regional security — was always a distant prospect. Instead, the summit yielded transactional, modest gains tailored to meet the domestic requirements of both leaders. Put differently, it allows each leader to report a “win” to their domestic constituents.

China's President Xi Jinping (C), US President Donald Trump (L) and Eric Trump (R) visit the Temple of Heaven in Beijing on 14 May 2026. (Brendan Smialowski/Pool/AFP)

For Trump, he can point to a series of concrete economic gains tailored for his political base, including an agreement for China to purchase 200 Boeing aircraft — Beijing’s first such commitment since 2017. The meeting also yielded at least US$17 billion in annual US agricultural purchases through 2028 and restored market access for US beef and poultry. Furthermore, newly established institutional frameworks such as the bilateral board of trade and board of investment are outcomes that carry Trump’s clear signature, even as it was light on the specific composition and its mechanism. 

Xi’s gains, by contrast, were primarily strategic and rooted in the power of these very optics. While Trump walked away with commodity orders, Xi leveraged the summit’s optics. By locking the US into a “stabilising framework”, Xi is calming the geopolitical delta of its most consequential bilateral relationship — allowing Xi to focus his energies on the 2027 party congress where China will select its leader for the next five years. 

Furthermore, the spectacle of an effusive Trump largely sticking to the script gave Xi a potent domestic and global narrative: it demonstrated to internal stakeholders and international actors alike that he can successfully manage and restrain a mercurial American president, cementing China’s image as an equal, steady superpower on the world stage.

By striking a positive tone at the top, both leaders have cleared a path for their respective bureaucracies at the bottom — enabling a degree of predictability that has been missing for years.

Setting the floor and hedging its bets

Ultimately, the summit achieved two major objectives for the immediate future of US-China ties. First, it injected an element of certainty into an increasingly volatile global environment. While there remains a rigid ceiling on how “good” US-China relations can realistically get owing to persistent structural competition and mistrust, the floor for how “bad” they can devolve has been conspicuously absent. By re-engaging at the highest level, the two leaders took a meaningful step towards cementing that floor. 

US President Donald Trump participates in events at the Great Hall of the People and does a greeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, in Beijing, China, 14 May 2026. (Kenny Holston/Pool via Reuters)

Second, the summit sends an unequivocal signal down the bureaucratic chain. In both systems, top-down authority dictates the boundaries of policy execution. By personalising their rapport and endorsing a shared framework, Xi and Trump have indicated to their respective working-level officials that managed stabilisation is the current directive. By striking a positive tone at the top, both leaders have cleared a path for their respective bureaucracies at the bottom — enabling a degree of predictability that has been missing for years.

Yet, even as Beijing engages Washington, it continues to hedge. China finds itself in the enviable position of being wooed from many sides; hot on the heels of the historic Xi-Trump summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin is slated to visit Beijing, capping off a quick succession of visits by major Western leaders. For Xi, the strategy is clear: pocket the stabilising gains with the US, consolidate its leadership position of the Global South, while continuing to tout its responsible, non-martial and “non-hegemonic” model of global governance in contrast to the US.