What Trump is really after

With the rise of Donald Trump and the implementation of Trumpian policies, the global order is undergoing the most profound transformation since the end of World War II. 

Due to Trump’s unprecedented and repeated appeals across his three presidential campaigns to the sense of alienation felt by America’s lower classes — who believe they have been forgotten by elite politics — along with his calls to expose the “deep state” and “drain the Washington swamp”, his successful incitement of the Capitol Hill riots in early 2021 and his vows to bring manufacturing back to the US, political observers in the US generally characterise current American politics as defined by “populism”.

From a historical perspective, mob politics and populist aspects of American democratic practice were already deeply observed and analysed by late Qing dynasty reformer and Chinese expatriate Kwong Ki Chiu (1845–1891) in the late 19th century — this is not a novel observation. In Chinese academia, a new body of empirical research on the origins and social foundations of US populism has also emerged. 

One social science study that used extensive data and regression analysis (a statistical method that helps show how different factors influence each other) ultimately proved that the psychological motivations of Trump supporters in the US largely stemmed from a sense of crisis in several areas, including the economy, and especially a sense of identity crisis.

Indeed, the focus on US populism has significantly broadened the paradigm of American studies, shifting attention from high-level elite politics and policymaking, to social attitudes and grassroots political values as well as their influence on policy. However, I believe that “populism” itself as an analytical framework is unable to fully explain current US politics.

A notable example comes from my acquaintance, Professor Zhao Minghao from Fudan University, whose deep analysis meticulously revealed the rise and impact of American conservative populism. However, in a recent article, he accurately pointed out that Trump is not “an isolationist” but is aggressive, hence his administration wants to pursue “expansion” in Western hemisphere affairs.

There appears to be some perplexing disjunction in the author’s two judgments: if Trump’s primary option is to satisfy grassroots demands, revive domestic manufacturing, and thereby “make America great again”, then a comprehensive strategic retreat should be expected. But this cannot explain the Trump administration’s ambitions towards Greenland, Panama Canal, Canada and Venezuela, or even explorations of resuming nuclear testing, which Professor Zhao aptly pointed out are facets of “aggression”.

I believe that the seemingly contradictory coexistence of inward focus and external aggression can still only be explained by “American nationalism”. This nationalism has many “nativistic” characteristics that have long been analysed, such as white supremacy, Christian fundamentalism, patriarchy, absolute gun rights and anti-immigration. 

Meanwhile, it has evident features of regional expansion. While the US is drawing down its global strategic presence, Trump seems to be becoming more aggressive in the Western hemisphere, even forming a “Donroe (portmanteau of Donald Trump and Monroe) Doctrine”. However, I believe that the common goal is to maintain the hegemony and interests of the US as a nation-state — that is to say, the ultimate goal is still nationalism.

Hence, “populism” and “who elected Trump” should no longer be the focus, as populism itself is not a complete and coherent ideology with an ultimate direction, but rather a political logic or a method of discourse — a means rather than an end. Populism is broadly understood as a political approach centred on a binary opposition between “the pure people” and “the corrupt elites”, advocating that politics should fully reflect the will of the people and directly appeal to the grassroots. 

Here, a metaphor can be drawn: Zen Buddhism is also not a complete Buddhist ideological system, but it provides a path to enlightenment that most effectively brings one close to Buddhist truths without relying on scriptures or doctrines. In this sense, populism ultimately serves a higher goal, and in contemporary America, that goal is American nationalism, exemplified by “Make America Great Again”.

At the same time, because populism works by stirring up grassroots sentiment, whenever the interests of elites and ordinary people diverge — and especially when politicians deliberately exploit grassroots discontent to present themselves as saviours — it ultimately becomes difficult for the elites to genuinely empathise with the grassroots.

At present, grassroots Americans depend on Chinese cross-border e-commerce platforms like Temu to provide cheap goods and reduce living costs. However, the tariff war, especially the taxation on small parcels, has led to price increases of these small commodities, from which the grassroots have not benefited. Meanwhile, the wealthy have never relied on cheap goods to live. 

Additionally, the loss of essential healthcare benefits by grassroots white Americans and the loss of food assistance (SNAP) by over 42 million low-income people, which exceeds 10% of the total US population, also impacts the interests of the truly poor. This was even described by some observers as “robbing the poor to benefit the rich”. Thus, it remains uncertain whether populist strategies genuinely benefit the populace.

All of the above has clearly strayed from the real interests of those who are morally presumed to be “the pure people”. In other words, even if they were morally impeccable, they would still be at risk of being left with nothing.

However, viewing “nationalism” as the ultimate goal provides a better explanation: what Trump is truly trying to address is not the livelihood and development of the impoverished grassroots, but the strengthening of the US as a nation, in order to expand its financial power and concentrate on meeting the challenge from China.

To achieve this, he is determined to restore American dominance in the Western hemisphere, especially in Latin America, Canada and Greenland — it is impossible that Trump is unaware of China’s expanding influence in Latin America and the Arctic Circle. This is also why Trump called for the US to resume nuclear testing.

However, all this has nothing to do with the demands of the grassroots — “morally untainted” or not — or their alienation from the elite. It can even be argued that a more effective way to bridge domestic class divisions in the US is to guard against and contain an external “threat”, constantly emphasising it, rather than continually fueling populist conflict between the grassroots and the elites — which is precisely what true “nationalism” entails.

After all, in creating imaginary enemies and safeguarding American interests, the nationalist positions of the grassroots and the elite are not fundamentally opposed. 

With nationalism as the ultimate goal, it stirs up significant local racism and Christian fundamentalism internally, while projecting an “aggressive” posture with regional hegemonic ambitions externally (Donroeism); populism is used merely as a short-term electoral strategy. This is the essence of mainstream American politics today and provides the clearest framework for analysing the US.

The late renowned Harvard sinologist Benjamin Schwartz accurately pointed out as early as 1978 that, in the US, the religion of nationalism and the blending of nationalism with a faith in the virtue of a properly-led people has not completely disappeared as a strain, even in contemporary American culture. 

To this day, we can also say that American nationalism has not only not disappeared, it has intensified and deserves more attention than mere “populism”.

Related: Primal instincts: The true nature of global politics | Is sinophobia eroding American values?