With Japan less than welcoming, where do the Chinese ‘run’ to?

Over the past year, former Chinese criminal defence lawyer Wu Lei (pseudonym), who now lives in Japan, has clearly felt that life is getting harder for Chinese residents there. He told Lianhe Zaobao: “Whenever you handle any procedures, you run into endless trouble, with things dragged out for no reason. There’s no reasonable explanation for this bureaucracy… the only conclusion is that it’s targeted at the Chinese.”

In 2019, Wu had his licence revoked after being accused of making inappropriate remarks online in China. He moved to Japan in 2022, and in the following year, he founded the “Tokyo People’s Forum”, a platform for overseas Chinese to discuss China-related issues. As China-Japan tensions worsened last year, he gradually felt that anxiety was spreading even in this relatively free environment.

He admitted: “There is a lot of panic among the Chinese community in Japan. Some have left, while others are getting ready to leave.”

His words reflected a turning point in the circumstances of many Chinese living in Japan. Since 2022, Chinese migration to Japan has surged, with many urban families relocating with their children and assets, following the onset of the pandemic in 2020. This wave of migration is known as “run to Japan” (run ri, 润日) with “run” (润) being the internet expression for escaping China and moving overseas.

By mid-2025, there were over 900,000 Chinese residents in Japan. As their numbers have risen, backlash against Chinese immigrants has become more visible in Japanese society. After Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s “Taiwan contingency” remarks in November 2025, China-Japan relations sank to a new low, with no sign of easing.

These changes have cast a pall over the prospects of hundreds of thousands of “run to Japan” migrants: can they continue to stay in this country, once seen as a safe haven, and is it worth staying?

The profile of Chinese migrants to Japan in recent years is diverse. In his book Run Ri, Following the Footsteps of Elite Chinese Escaping to Japan published last year, Masutomo Takehiro, a research fellow at Waseda University’s Institute of Japanese Global Economy, noted that these migrants include wealthy people living in luxury apartments, parents who want their children to escape China’s hypercompetitive education system, middle class families in search of a modest but contented life, as well as intellectuals seeking freedom of expression.

In Masutomo’s view, what they have in common is that “all of them want to escape oppression”. Japan became that “sweet spot to run to” because even as immigration policies in Europe and the US were tightening, Japan, in previous years, had in fact relaxed its long-term stay visas.

He noted that, unlike the Chinese who moved to Japan in the 1980s to make a living after the reform and opening up, this new wave of migrants places greater emphasis on quality of life, seeking a freer and more comfortable lifestyle.

Several Chinese who moved to Japan post-2022 said when interviewed that they were satisfied with life there, with the most cited reasons such as “security is good”, “it’s not as involuted” and “it’s close to China”.

However, 2025 was a turning point for the “run to Japan” community. As controversies have grown over Chinese nationals running unlicensed guesthouses, snapping up property and driving up housing prices as well as the influx of Chinese students into Japanese universities, Japan’s immigration policy has tightened in response.

One of the most consequential policy changes so far has been the tightening of the Business Manager Visa (BMV) last October. This visa category, open to foreign entrepreneurs and once seen as a “golden route” to Japan, has seen its threshold raised significantly. Applicants were required to have more than 30 million yen (US$189,279) in capital, up from 5 million yen previously, and must now employ at least one full-time Japanese employee.

Jack, who moved to Japan with his family in 2024 on a BMV and now runs an export business, commented when interviewed that the higher threshold has had an obvious impact on less wealthy sole proprietors. “These are people who might have run a small shop in China, and have some business skills but not a lot of money… After coming to Japan, they open a modest, down-to-earth establishment like a steamed bun shop or something along those lines. They are the ones most likely to be eliminated.”

Based on his conversations with the Chinese community in Japan, Wu estimated that roughly half of the BMV holders now have thoughts of leaving. “The cost from increasing investment and hiring Japanese staff is simply too high. They might turn to countries like Thailand, Indonesia or Malaysia.”

With China-Japan relations plunging to freezing point, the number of tourists travelling to Japan has plummeted, dealing another blow to Chinese business owners there who rely on Chinese customers.

Liu Bin (pseudonym), who runs an immigration consultancy in Tokyo, said in an interview that since last November, the number of Chinese clients enquiring about housing and visas has dropped from dozens a month to zero. Meanwhile, Chen Lei (pseudonym), a Chinese restaurant owner in Osaka, revealed that visitor numbers have fallen by 60% since late last year, significantly affecting his business.

Beyond the impact on their livelihoods, Chinese residents in Japan are also increasingly sensing a shift in the social atmosphere. When asked whether he had faced unfriendly treatment, Liu sighed and said, “In daily life, the friendliness of Japanese people towards Chinese hasn’t changed much — they’re quite tolerant. But in business, they’re reluctant to work with Chinese… I wanted to rent a shop, and as soon as they heard I was Chinese, they refused.”

At present, the appeal of “running to Japan” among China’s middle class has waned. Masutomo noted when interviewed that among the three groups relocating to Japan — the ultra-wealthy, the upper-middle class, and the middle class — the latter has been most affected by the tightening of BMV requirements, adding that “Japan’s appeal to the (Chinese) middle class has declined very noticeably”.

By contrast, Masutomo noted that other proposed restrictions on property and land purchases currently under consideration by the Japanese government appear less stringent, and are likely to have a relatively limited impact on wealthier Chinese migrants to Japan.

The current climate has left those who once looked to Japan with yearning feeling somewhat unwelcome. They either choose to leave or attempt to find new ways to establish themselves.

Immigration agent Liu has expanded his business beyond mainland China to overseas Chinese communities, while restaurateur Chen has shifted his focus towards the Japanese market, noting that “with China-Japan relations so tense, relying solely on tourist business is too passive”.

After Takaichi’s Liberal Democratic Party won a landslide victory at the lower house elections in February, many Chinese in Japan knew that tough policies towards foreigners would not ease. During her campaign, Takaichi had indicated plans to tighten scrutiny over naturalisation and permanent residency applications, as well as to more strictly review foreign land purchases.

Masutomo pointed out that the Japanese government’s approach to foreigners has undergone a clear shift — from an earlier emphasis on “coexistence” to one of “orderly coexistence”. “Parties in the National Diet that are more friendly towards foreigners have seen their influence decline,” he added.

As for the future of China-Japan relations, former Chinese lawyer Wu spoke pessimistically, “I don’t see any hope in the short term.” He lamented that a major obstacle at present is the mutual distrust between the two peoples. “The more one advocates opposing the other side, the more support one gains… The increasingly strident rhetoric of mutual hostility between the two countries truly breaks my heart.”

Wu thinks that populism and far-right rhetoric are irresponsible. “In reality, no matter how fiercely the two countries condemn each other, neither can do without the other.”

He noted from a historical perspective that China and Japan share irreplaceable historical and cultural ties. “There have of course been wars between them, but there has been far more interaction… The evolution of Japan’s society and political structure serves as a mirror for China,” he explained.

During the late Qing and early Republican periods, Chinese thinkers and intellectuals such as Lu Xun and Liang Qichao once lived in Japan, where they encountered and absorbed Western ideas; some commentators have drawn parallels between this history and the current trend of “running to Japan”.

At present, some Chinese migrants are choosing to remain in Japan and wait things out, particularly those who, for political reasons, are not considering returning home. Liu said, “Immigration policy was previously too lax, and now it has become too strict. I expect that within six months to a year, the Japanese government will find a balance. After all, no developed country can survive without relying on manpower from other developing countries.”

Liu does not regret choosing Japan. He said, “Change is normal — it often happens in China too; not every year is good… For Chinese people, this isn’t a problem. If you can’t even handle this, how do you succeed overseas?”

This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as “避风港生变 “润日族”日本梦遇冷何处归？”.

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