From moonshots to market share: China’s Space+ strategy

When China talks about its future industries, it is increasingly looking beyond Earth. 

At the Commercial Spacecraft and Applications Industry Chain Co-Chain Action Conference in Shanghai on 29 January 2026, the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) highlighted its “Space+” (太空+) strategy — an ambitious five-year roadmap to cultivate new space future industries during the 15th Five-Year Plan period (2026-2030).

Jointly hosted by CASC — the designated “chain leader” for the national commercial spacecraft and applications industry chain — and the Chinese Academy of Astronautics, and guided by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) and the China National Space Administration (CNSA), the event underscored Beijing’s push to accelerate commercialisation, strengthen upstream-to-downstream coordination, encourage coordination and foster ecosystem-level growth in the space sector.

At the time of writing, detailed implementation plans for Space+ remain limited in the public domain. However, it aligns closely with the CNSA’s Action Plan for Promoting High-Quality and Safe Development of Commercial Space (2025-2027), released in November last year.

The Space+ plan seeks to integrate China’s fragmented space activities into a unified national ecosystem, covering civil and commercial exploration, astronaut training, satellite constellations, space-based digital infrastructure, artificial intelligence (AI), space data collection, and orbital debris monitoring. It also addresses longer-term ambitions such as including lunar bases, space mining, energy production beyond Earth and space tourism.

The initiative extends into strategically significant domains. It includes feasibility studies and technology development for space resource utilisation — such as asteroid/small-body prospecting, autonomous extraction, in-orbit processing and low-cost transfer systems — signalling long-term ambitions for off-Earth resources, though commercial feasibility remains forward-looking. Additionally, space tourism has advanced to concrete planning, with commitments to develop/test suborbital and orbital vehicles, complete verification flights and establish operational/regulatory frameworks, aiming for regular suborbital flights within the 2026-2030 period.

Space+ reflects a policy evolution: from primarily mission-specific exploration to industrialisation and ecosystem building. Lunar and deep-space missions are framed as enablers of sustained economic activity, with China aiming to expand its orbital/cislunar presence while contributing to (and shaping) future standards and governance.

China’s space ambitions date to the 1950s and are codified in successive State Council white papers (2000, 2006, 2011, 2016, and 2022), framing space as central to economic modernisation, national defence and scientific progress.  

This continuity has intensified under Xi Jinping. In speeches and directives, he has described building China into a “space power” as an enduring national dream and goal. By the early 2020s, the space sector was designated a strategic pillar, with long-term visions targeting world-leading status by mid-century.

Flagship state-led achievements — including Zhurong Mars rover (2021), Tiangong station completion (2022) and Chang’e-6’s historic return of samples from the far-side of the moon (2024) — symbolised sovereignty and self-reliance. Upcoming missions like Chang’e-7 (planned 2026) and Chang’e-8 (2028) advance toward sustained lunar presence and resource utilisation testing. These were driven mainly by central entities like CASC, prioritising breakthroughs for global standing and strategic capability over immediate commercial returns.

Space+ represents an inflection point: national objectives remain, but the emphasis now includes ecosystem competitiveness and commercial viability, with private firms expected to play greater roles in the commercial space industry. It draws lessons from Western reusable models (such as reusable launch cost reductions) while retaining state coordination — creating a hybrid approach to compete globally.

The Space+ emphasis extends implications beyond space, positioning it as a pillar of China’s economic, industrial and strategic rise. It directs policy and funding toward a rapidly growing commercial sector — expected to become a trillion-RMB-scale commercial space industry by the late 2020s — while also bolstering self-reliance and industrial resilience.

By embedding space capabilities within China’s broader innovation system during the 15th Five-Year Plan period (2026-2030), Space+ advances the pursuit of “new quality productive forces” (新质生产力), linking satellite systems, digital infrastructure, and advanced manufacturing to wider economic upgrading.

Regionally and globally, Space+ can help strengthen international engagement pathways, especially with developing countries. By extending satellite communications, navigation and Earth-observation via Belt and Road-linked frameworks — often termed a “Space Silk Road”, China can provide satellite infrastructure and space-based services to partner nations, particularly in the Global South. Doing so can strengthen China’s economic ties with and soft power in other countries, particularly in the Global South, while also expanding Beijing’s technological footprint on and beyond Earth. 

These outward-facing initiatives are closely tied to a broader strategic shift in how China views its role in the global space order. Rather than framing space primarily as an arena for catching up with the US, Space+ reflects a shift in China’s assessment of its role, indicating its role in shaping markets, standards and institutions. This ambition is evident in initiatives such as China’s International Lunar Research Station (ILRS), launched in 2017, which has attracted growing international participation and complements expanding space partnerships across Africa, Latin America, and Asia. These efforts signal Beijing’s intent to offer alternative governance models and norms which may challenge Western-dominated frameworks and limit Washington’s unilateral influence.

The most consequential implication of this trajectory is the accelerating bifurcation of the international (space) order. Space+ intensifies US-China strategic competition in orbit, where rivalry increasingly centres on control over technology, infrastructure, standards and long-term presence in cislunar space. As commercial activity expands faster than existing legal and governance frameworks, Beijing is actively positioning itself to shape the rules, norms and institutional architecture that will govern space access, utilisation and regulation in the decades ahead — underscoring its ambition to emerge not only as a leading space power, but also as a rule setter in the evolving global space economy.

Beyond technological and financial pressures as well as concerns of the structural limits of the state-led model that China is pursuing, other concerns must be noted too. 

Expanding commercial activity raises complex questions around technology transfer, data governance, hidden military applications and strategic dependence. While affordable satellite connectivity and remote-sensing services may appeal to Global South partners, in particular, concerns over dependence, data sovereignty and dual-use technologies could limit uptake or trigger pushback from Washington and allied countries.

Geopolitically, Space+ unfolds in an increasingly contested environment. Intensifying competition with the US and its allies heightens the risk of export controls, technology restrictions and regulatory fragmentation, potentially constraining China’s access to critical components and overseas markets. 

The Space+ strategy signals China’s evolution from prestige-driven milestones to commercial-strategic influence in space. By blending technology, industry and partnerships, Beijing seeks to bolster domestic strengths and help define the rules of the emerging space economy. Success hinges on harmonising state guidance with market agility, navigating geopolitical tensions and embedding Chinese standards in orbit — while managing risks in an increasingly competitive domain.

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