A short-lived catch: China’s AI lobster frenzy
Despite the nationwide frenzy over AI agent OpenClaw, fuelled by strong public enthusiasm and support from local governments, the central Chinese government was quick to issue warnings about security risks. Lianhe Zaobao associate China news editor Chen Jing takes a look at the craze that came and went.
China’s artificial intelligence (AI) boom is like waves in a typhoon — before one surge has receded, the next is already crashing in.
During the Spring Festival, WeChat group chats were abuzz with discussions on how to cash in on digital red envelopes from major tech companies, and how to use the newly launched Seedance 2.0 to make short videos. Less than a month later, social media feeds were completely taken over by discussions on “raising lobsters”.
Support from public and local governments
AI agent OpenClaw, created by Austrian software engineer Peter Steinberger, took China by storm recently. As the software’s logo features a lobster, Chinese netizens playfully describe installing and using OpenClaw as “raising a lobster”.
Unlike most generative AI tools that have largely been confined to chat interfaces, OpenClaw can do more than converse with users — it can also execute tasks. From replying to emails to booking travel tickets, from procuring supplies to trading stocks, it can even manage social media accounts and help content creators grow their following.
Who would want to miss out on a boom where you can supposedly make money in your sleep? For a time, people across all walks of life plunged into the “lobster fever”, even driving computer system units temporarily out of stock at one point.
In early March, Tencent organised a free OpenClaw installation event at its headquarters in Shenzhen, drawing nearly a thousand attendees and resembling the AI era’s version of “queuing up for free eggs”. Tech firms such as ByteDance and Baidu have also jumped on the bandwagon, rolling out their own “lobster” applications.
... high-tech zones in Wuxi (Jiangsu), Changshu (Suzhou) and Hefei (Anhui) rolled out similar policies soon after, offering financial support ranging from 5 million RMB (US$726,021) to 10 million RMB for OpenClaw-related projects and companies.
As the lobster fever spread, local governments moved quickly to follow suit. After Shenzhen’s Longgang district took the lead by introducing support measures nicknamed “Lobster 10” on 7 March, high-tech zones in Wuxi (Jiangsu), Changshu (Suzhou) and Hefei (Anhui) rolled out similar policies soon after, offering financial support ranging from 5 million RMB (US$726,021) to 10 million RMB for OpenClaw-related projects and companies.
Central government’s cautious approach
In contrast to the fervent public participation and strong backing from local governments, Beijing has taken a far more cautious stance towards the lobster fever.
In recent weeks, China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and its affiliated bodies have issued three warnings about risks associated with OpenClaw, including system overreach, cyberattacks and data leaks. The national network and information security information centre under the Ministry of Public Security also released a security alert on 13 March, noting that there are currently around 23,000 active OpenClaw-related internet assets in the country, concentrated in regions such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Zhejiang, Sichuan and Jiangsu. These assets pose significant security risks and are highly likely to become prime targets for cyberattacks.
Also, several universities in Jiangsu, Anhui and Guangdong have issued notices restricting or banning students from using OpenClaw on campus. There are also reports that state-owned enterprises and government bodies, including major banks, have been barred from installing OpenClaw on office devices.
With the slew of warnings, local governments have stopped overtly promoting lobster fever and the first batch of “lobster farmers” is beginning to give up. Some users complain that OpenClaw is too costly to use, with even simple tasks consuming large amounts of computing power. Others have encountered security issues, reporting that the AI agent deleted files from their computers without warning.
OpenClaw’s rapid virality among the Chinese public, despite being in an experimental phase, was largely driven by FOMO (fear of missing out) in the AI era.
Because installing and uninstalling OpenClaw requires a certain level of technical skill, advertisements offering “OpenClaw installation services for 299 RMB” on platforms such as RedNote and Goofish (闲鱼) were replaced by those offering uninstallation services for 199 RMB less than a week later.
Some speculated the lobster fever may be coming to an end just like that, while others wondered why local and central authorities had such vastly different attitudes towards it.
Another flash in the pan in tech
OpenClaw’s rapid virality among the Chinese public, despite being in an experimental phase, was largely driven by FOMO (fear of missing out) in the AI era. Coupled with narratives from content creators portraying OpenClaw as an “AI worker”, people fear that if they do not seize the opportunity, they may miss out on earning potential at best, or risk being left behind by society at worst.
As public enthusiasm cools and returns to rationality, the waning lobster fever is hardly surprising — but the development of AI agents will not halt as a result. Beyond followers who dabbled only briefly, many developers will take this opportunity to explore further technological and commercial breakthroughs. The opportunities it holds are exactly what the central and local governments are betting on.
Amid growing external uncertainties and persistently weak domestic demand, this year’s Chinese government work report, for the first time, proposes creating “new forms of smart economy” and fostering “new forms and models of AI-native business”. For local governments, AI agents and the resulting “one-person company” model are increasingly seen as potential new economic growth engines.
From internet finance and autonomous driving to generative AI, each typically begins with a surge of grassroots and investor enthusiasm, followed by stronger backing from local governments, and ultimately regulation from central authorities.
The differing attitudes across levels in China towards “raising lobsters” follow a familiar pattern seen in previous waves of technology. From internet finance and autonomous driving to generative AI, each typically begins with a surge of grassroots and investor enthusiasm, followed by stronger backing from local governments, and ultimately regulation from central authorities. Thus, many advanced technologies tend to be implemented earlier and adopted more rapidly in China.
What sets this wave apart is the speed at which the craze has spread and the risks that have surfaced, prompting central ministries to step in early with warnings, which gave rise to the current, seemingly contradictory sharp divergence.
As AI evolves from generating content to acting autonomously, such sharp disconnects may become more frequent. Finding a more stable balance between encouraging innovation and mitigating risks will be a key challenge for China on its path to becoming a leading AI power.
This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as “养龙虾的温度差”.
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