How agriculture anchors Vietnam-China ties

Can agricultural cooperation help sustain the momentum of Vietnam-China trade? An agriculture export agreement between the two countries aims to do just that. 

On 27 November last year, Vietnam and China signed a protocol on the export of fresh Vietnamese jackfruit to the Chinese market during a working visit to China by Vietnam’s Ministry of Agriculture and Environment. Marking a milestone in their 75-year diplomatic relationship, the agreement builds on the signing of four bilateral agriculture agreements — for Vietnamese exports of chilli, passion fruit, rice bran and raw bird’s nests — earlier that year. 

A notice published on the website of the General Administration of Customs of China stated in December that China will accept fresh jackfruits exported from Vietnam starting 1 June 2026.  

Though full details are yet to be made public at the time of writing, the agreement aims to further expand agricultural trade between the two countries.

Two-way trade is booming. Vietnam is China’s largest trading partner in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its fourth-largest globally. China, in turn, has remained Vietnam’s largest trading partner for more than two decades, and leads in both the number and value of newly registered investment projects in Vietnam. 

In 2024, bilateral trade hit US$205.2 billion — a 19.3% year-on-year jump. The pace of growth accelerated further in 2025: between January and November, two-way trade exceeded US$267.7 billion, surpassing the total for the entire previous year. 

Agriculture has been a key driver of this growth. Since 2018, Vietnam’s exports of agricultural, forestry and fisheries products to China have increased by roughly 75%, while imports of related products from China have grown more than fivefold. This agricultural trade is mutually reinforcing. While Vietnam supplies China with tropical fruits and other food products, Vietnam imports agricultural machinery, fertilisers and raw materials from China to support local production. 

Fruit and vegetable exports have been particularly significant. In 2024, exports to China reached US$4.63 billion, accounting for nearly two-thirds of Vietnam’s total fruit and vegetable exports. Durian has been the standout product: in 2024, exports to China snapped up 97% of Vietnam’s total durian export volume and generated approximately US$3.2 billion in revenue.

Trade momentum has continued into 2025. In the first nine months of the year, total bilateral trade in agricultural, forestry and fisheries products approached US$14 billion. By the end of October, China had imported US$8.7 billion in Vietnamese agricultural products, underscoring the scale and importance of the sector within the broader trade relationship.

For Beijing, expanding agricultural trade with Vietnam supports China’s broader food import diversification strategy by reducing overreliance on any single country or region for key agricultural products and inputs. Diversifying supply sources enhances resilience against external shocks, market volatility and geopolitical disruptions, particularly as global food markets become more politicised.

The agreement benefits Hanoi too. Deeper access to China’s vast and growing market strengthens demand for Vietnamese agricultural exports, while Vietnam’s integration into regional processing, logistics and distribution hubs links Southeast Asia more closely with East Asian and global markets. This reinforces inter- and intra-Asian trade flows, supports supply-chain resilience, and embeds Vietnam more firmly within regional production networks centred on China.

Agriculture’s domestic importance in both economies further underscores the strategic value of cooperation. In Vietnam, the sector contributes roughly 12% of gross domestic product (GDP) and employs around one-third of the country’s nearly 53 million workers. In China, agriculture employs approximately 177 million people and accounts for over 16% of GDP. These structural realities explain why both governments attach political and economic significance to expanding agricultural ties as part of their long-term growth.

These agreements build on intensified bilateral engagement. In 2025, Vietnam and China signed more than 40 cooperation documents across key areas like agriculture, trade, infrastructure connectivity and emerging technologies. This momentum has been reinforced by frequent high-level visits, including Chinese Premier Li Qiang’s visit to Hanoi in October 2024 and President Xi Jinping’s visit to Vietnam in April last year, signalling sustained political commitment at the highest levels.

The timing of the agreement is significant. Concluded amid heightened global trade uncertainty, supply chain fragmentation, and escalating US — China trade tensions, it reflects deliberate efforts by Hanoi and Beijing to stabilise and deepen economic ties through agriculture — a sector widely viewed as politically manageable and less exposed to strategic confrontation. In doing so, both sides are using food trade as a buffer against external shocks and a foundation for broader economic cooperation.

More broadly, these recent developments are embedded within wider regional economic frameworks, notably the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA), implemented in 2010, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which entered into force in 2020. These frameworks have significantly reduced tariffs and non-tariff barriers: research indicates that both Vietnam and China have cut tariffs on agricultural products by more than 90%. They provide an institutional foundation for expanding agricultural trade while anchoring bilateral cooperation within Asia-centred supply chains.

Yet deepening interdependence also heightens exposure to structural risks. Climate change is already affecting agricultural productivity, while small-scale production, fragmented supply chains and infrastructure bottlenecks — including limited border logistics and insufficient cold-chain capacity — constrain scale, consistency and export reliability. 

Regulatory asymmetries present another challenge. Chinese sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) requirements for Vietnamese agricultural exports — particularly fresh fruits and vegetables — are more comprehensive than Vietnam’s checks on Chinese agricultural imports, creating an uneven regulatory burden. Vietnam’s SPS Office has acknowledged these challenges amid growing concerns from Vietnamese exporters seeking access not only to China but also to other regional markets.

The imbalance has tangible consequences. A 2021 report by Singapore’s ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute found that up to 90% of Vietnamese enterprises — predominantly small and medium-sized producers — had not updated practices to meet China’s evolving quarantine and quality standards. This resulted in technical barriers, prolonged risk assessments and periodic export restrictions. Research from 2024 similarly highlights Vietnam’s persistent vulnerabilities, despite its comparative advantage in agricultural exports.

These regulatory gaps are further reflected in compliance outcomes. Between 2021 and July 2023, Vietnam received 107 warnings from importing countries, including China, for violations such as excessive pesticide residues and spoiled shipments. In response, Vietnam’s Ministry of Agriculture has pushed for tighter domestic monitoring and inspections, signalling growing awareness of regulatory vulnerability.

Trade asymmetries compound these challenges. Vietnam remains heavily reliant on Chinese machinery, electronics and raw materials critical to both its agricultural and industrial sectors. Between January and July 2025, Vietnam’s exports to China exceeded US$35 billion, while imports surged past US$101 billion — an increase of US$21.71 billion compared to the same period last year. As a result, Vietnam’s trade deficit with China widened to US$66.5 billion, up 41.1%  year-on-year.

This widening gap highlights the structural nature of Vietnam’s reliance on Chinese intermediate inputs rather than a cyclical trade imbalance. Addressing it may require Vietnam, for instance, to move further up agricultural value chains and expand processed and higher-value exports.

Geopolitical implications also loom large. Ongoing grey-zone activities in the South China Sea — including repeated Chinese research vessel operations within Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone — risk maritime incidents or economic coercion that could disrupt cross-border agricultural flows. 

While Hanoi has managed these tensions more consistently than some regional peers like Manila, such dynamics underscore the potential for sudden policy shifts or border slowdowns to affect trade. Both Beijing and Hanoi will need to carefully manage such risks to maintain agricultural trade flows, even during periods of heightened tension.

Vietnam-China agricultural trade has become an anchor in a strategically complex relationship, offering mutual gains in food security and market access amid global uncertainty. Its durability, however, will depend on whether both sides can manage regulatory frictions, trade imbalances and geopolitical risks while shifting cooperation toward higher-value, more resilient supply chains.

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