ASEAN vs GCC: Why one embraces China, the other hesitates

The inaugural ASEAN-GCC-China Summit, held in Kuala Lumpur from 26-28 May, marks a noteworthy development in cross-regional diplomacy. While its long-term impact will take time to evaluate, the summit brought together key actors from Southeast Asia, the Gulf and China, which together represent some of the most vibrant engines of global economic growth today.

In an increasingly multipolar world, the summit signalled an interest in building a pragmatic model of global south cooperation that blends political flexibility, economic complementarity and cultural dialogue. With the US struggling to articulate a consistent Middle East policy and the Western-led international order facing growing skepticism, the gathering offers a glimpse into alternative frameworks that prioritise development over ideology, mutual interest over hierarchy, and connectivity over confrontation. 

Politically, the summit illustrated the value placed on regional stability, dialogue and mutual respect, even among states with very different political systems and governance traditions. ASEAN, China and the GCC all face common pressures for policy reform, governance resilience and regional autonomy in an era of complex global challenges. 

The joint statement’s expression of concern over the Middle East situation shows an alignment among all three parties over the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Gaza, in sharp contrast to US President Donald Trump’s avoidance of the issue during his Gulf visit. This alignment reflects not only shared humanitarian values but also a growing confidence among global south actors to speak with a more unified stance on international affairs. 

Economically, the summit leverages complementary strengths: ASEAN’s resources and youthful population, China’s industrial capacity and the GCC’s energy wealth and capital. Chinese media and academic commentary describe the summit as laying the groundwork for a “triangular platform”, a potential new growth driver amid global economic fragmentation.

As Premier Li Qiang noted, “If we draw a line between China, ASEAN and the GCC, we get a big triangle — and triangle is the most stable structure.” This metaphor underscores Beijing’s view of the trilateral framework not only as geographically coherent, but also as a structurally resilient basis for long-term cooperation.

As the global economy reels from trade tensions and fragmented supply chains, such partnerships may help buffer shocks. Areas such as clean energy, the digital economy and infrastructure development offer space for practical collaboration. These are areas where real progress is already visible, from Belt and Road infrastructure projects to burgeoning tech investments in the Gulf and Southeast Asia.

Culturally, the summit highlights the importance of people-to-people exchanges, leveraging ASEAN-GCC Islamic ties and centuries of trade and religious interactions. Premier Li Qiang emphasised the value of mutual learning between civilisations, framing ASEAN, GCC and China as regions rich in historical ties and cultural diversity. These civilisational linkages can underpin new forms of soft power engagement, from tourism promotion, youth collaboration to educational exchange. 

In a tangible step to support these aspirations, China announced a one-year visa-free policy for four Gulf countries: Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait and Bahrain, effective from 9 June. With the UAE and Qatar already enjoying mutual visa exemption agreements, this move completes China’s visa-free coverage of all GCC member states.

Malaysia’s proposal for a Confucian-Islamic civilisational dialogue received support from China, signalling Beijing’s interest in positioning itself as a culturally resonant actor in Muslim-majority societies. Yet the impact of such cultural diplomacy remains limited and largely symbolic at this stage.

Nevertheless, China’s high-level attention to the summit reflects its aspiration to shape a model of cooperation and development for global south countries. China has long emphasised its identity as part of the global south. The summit’s narrative fits neatly into Beijing’s broader diplomatic playbook, which includes the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Global Initiatives, and south-south institutional outreach. 

From China’s perspective, trilateral cooperation offers a complementary, non-exclusive and development-oriented model of multilateral collaboration for global south countries. This model focuses on comparative advantages of each party, rather than ideological confrontation, and draws on China’s framing of a non-zero-sum global order. China hopes the framework will attract broader participation from global south countries and contribute to a more connected south-south cooperation network. 

That said, whether this narrative will be genuinely embraced by the Gulf countries remains to be seen. Unlike ASEAN, which is widely recognised as part of the global south due to its postcolonial legacy, developmental status, and active role in south-south cooperation, the GCC countries occupy a more complex position. In classifications by the United Nations, Human Development Reports and the World Bank, they are often listed as “high-income developing countries” or “non-OECD high-income countries”, reflecting a hybrid or peripheral global south identity. 

From a strategic and diplomatic standpoint, however, the GCC states frequently advocate for south-south cooperation and align themselves with developing countries on key issues such as climate justice, decolonisation, and global governance reform.

For instance, the UAE has positioned itself as a strategic partner of the global south through BRICS engagements and climate-related efforts, including the establishment of the “loss and damage” fund at COP-28. Qatar has launched public health and education initiatives specifically targeting developing nations, with officials explicitly aligning these programs with “the priorities of the global south”. Kuwait, too, reaffirmed its commitment to south-south cooperation in a 2022 UN statement, expressing its “constant readiness to support initiatives that improve the living conditions of the peoples of the south”. 

Despite these strategic alignments and aid-based initiatives, tangible outcomes of the GCC’s engagement with the global south have remained limited.

For example, the GCC-Mercosur Framework Agreement, signed in 2005 to enhance economic cooperation with Latin American countries, has achieved little substantive progress. A study analysing this agreement found that the narrow scope and lack of substantive follow-through have hindered the development of meaningful economic spaces between the GCC and other global south regions.

A similar pattern is evident in GCC–ASEAN relations. Despite multiple ministerial meetings and joint declarations, especially since the early 2000s, no institutional frameworks comparable to ASEAN+3 or ASEAN–EU have been established. 

Within this “golden triangle” of the global south, cooperation has followed distinct trajectories shaped by differing priorities and geopolitical realities. In particular, Gulf engagement has been constrained by strategic concerns.

Take free trade negotiations as an example: the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA), established in 2010, has seen robust development, with trade reaching $911.7 billion in 2023. The ACFTA 3.0 upgrade, substantively concluded in October 2024, expands cooperation in digital economy, green energy, and supply chains, covering 90% of tariff lines at zero for core ASEAN members.

In contrast, China-GCC FTA talks, launched in 2004, have progressed slowly. Although 90% of the terms were reportedly settled by 2024, negotiations have been hampered by geopolitical issues and the GCC’s close ties with the US. Talks were suspended in 2009 due to China’s protection of its domestic petrochemical industry. Further delays were caused by disagreements over Syria and internal divisions within the GCC. Although negotiations resumed in 2016, a final deal remains elusive after 11 rounds, casting doubt on whether an agreement is truly within reach.

Ultimately, one of the key questions following the summit is whether the trilateral framework can evolve into a more structured mechanism for cooperation. Unlike the more developed China–ASEAN partnership or the China–GCC strategic dialogue, this trilateral platform is still in its early stages. Without regular follow-up meetings, working groups, or investment coordination mechanisms, its full potential remains to be realised. As such, it may be best viewed as a starting point, rather than a milestone.

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