Broken trust: Why the West struggles to influence Russia

The first 100 days of the US presidency of Donald Trump, characterised by US Vice-President JD Vance as having a “new sheriff in town”, would certainly be remembered for its hands-on cowboy-style approach to both domestic and international issues. In tandem with making bold moves on Canada, Panama and Denmark (the latter with respect to the future ownership of Greenland), the 47^th US president has turned his attention to the ongoing war in Ukraine.

Stopping this war was one of Trump’s major foreign policy promises during the presidential election campaign. He has wasted no time in diving into the issue.

On 12 February, Trump broke Washington’s self-imposed curfew and spent 90 minutes on the phone with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin. On the same day, US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth stunned European and Ukrainian allies by boldly stating that “we must start by recognising that returning to Ukraine’s pre-2014 borders is an unrealistic objective”, admitting by default the failure of a military solution, which the West had rigorously pursued over the past three years in the interests of Ukraine. 

A week later, Trump called Putin again, this time spending over two hours on the phone with Russia’s president.

At the same time, the US president shocked many by admitting that he was prepared to welcome Russia back to the G7 format. More recently, his administration acknowledged that it was prepared to entertain the thought of easing some sanctions imposed on Russia in return for a temporary ceasefire in the Black Sea.

This rapid departure from Joe Biden’s confrontational approach with Moscow stunned many in the West, just like an abandonment of the established strategic narrative “nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine”. 

However, what has become clear since Washington and Moscow resumed dialogue is that the war in Ukraine is not by far the dominant topic of strategic conversations between the two nuclear superpowers.

For Trump and his administration, the tragedy in Eastern Europe is not so much a clash between Moscow and Kyiv over territory and people. It is a proxy conflict between the US and Russia, as was openly acknowledged by the US Secretary of State Marco Rubio back in early March. Trump does not consider this war as his war but the one of Biden’s making, a war in which Russia maintains strategic initiative across the frontline. Hence, he wants to end it, even at the cost of making some concessions to the Kremlin. For some, it looks that Putin is “getting far too much”, as expressed by the UK’s right-wing Nigel Farage.

But for Trump, restoring ties with Moscow goes well beyond Ukraine. In fact, the ongoing bloody conflict is an obstacle to engaging Russia in a broader strategic conversation, which is already underway. 

So, what are the key discussion points besides Ukraine? These range from elementary yet pivotal questions concerning diplomatic property and the full reinvogoration of diplomatic ties to economic cooperation and competition; the export of energy resources; space, cybersecurity and artificial intelligence cooperation; counterterrorism and law enforcement collaboration; release of imprisoned nationals; and human rights. More regional-focused questions include the Arctic, security dynamic in Northeast Asia and the Middle East. And last but not the least, the two nuclear superpowers have to discuss strategic stability and strategic nuclear arms limitations, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and nuclear ambitions of some rogue states. 

Concerning the latter, Trump already discussed with Putin Iran’s nuclear ambitions, seeking consensus on this matter from the Russian head of state. Russia has a degree of influence over Tehran, particularly after the two countries signed a strategic partnership agreement earlier this year, thus Trump is seeking Putin’s support.

While exploring avenues of potential collaboration with Russia, as well as areas over which both powers would agree to disagree, the Trump administration has a standalone strategic end in mind: containing China’s global rise.

It seems that Washington lacks the appetite to challenge China militarily, either in a similar way it tried it with Russia in Ukraine, or by means of an open confrontation. This is not to say that military deterrence and containment, or possible escalation and open confrontation, is off the table. Not at all.

Trump’s initial approach to contain China’s economic growth — and, by extension, its strategic rise — seems feasible. But to defeat China, one would need to isolate it and deprive it of natural resource supplies.

Furthermore, driving Russia away from China would ultimately weaken Beijing’s ongoing strategic posturing for years to come. The latter seems to be one of Trump’s principal goals of his current rapprochement with Moscow.

There is no guarantee that Trump’s bold negotiating tactics will work with Putin, and that the White House administration could recreate Richard Nixon’s 1970s approach, this time though playing Russia against China.

The first major obstacle is that Russia has lost trust in Western ruling elites. Over the past few years, Putin admitted that his confidence in negotiating with the West and committing to major agreements and expecting that they would be honoured has been shaken. 

“I hope we won’t make any more mistakes based on trust in our so-called Western partners”, he said recently. It is doubtful that his personal chemistry with Trump would somehow make him change his stance on this delicate matter.

The second major obstacle is the China factor in Russia’s strategic calculus. The near alliance state of military-strategic relations allows the Russians to act with confidence in eastern Europe. China has become Russia’s pivotal economic partner with a strong degree of reciprocity. Hence, no matter what Trump may offer, retaining close ties with Beijing would be way more important to the Russians than being readmitted to the G7, the lifting of some sanctions or making gains in Ukraine.

Hence, there are significant ongoing risks involved in attempting to implement ceasefires or effecting a permanent suspension of military action. The Russians may not be interested in suspending hostilities at a time when their forces are advancing on a daily basis. For the Ukrainian side, the end of combat means an effective loss of territory, which in turn may trigger internal instability and unrest. Consequently, the Ukraine factor alone may jeopardise Trump’s ambition to claim the Russia card in his game with China.

But for now, one can only hope that efforts to bring the bloody conflict to its end would succeed. What comes after that, only time will tell.

Related: How a US-Russia rapprochement could reshape global power politics | The US-Russia partnership: An attempt to contain China? | A shared humiliation? How the Chinese see themselves in Ukraine