China’s power in the Middle East has hard limits
China is becoming harder to ignore in the Middle East. Yet the gap between economic presence and strategic power remains wide, even as American policy swings, argues US academic John Calabrese.
China’s engagement with the Middle East has expanded rapidly across trade, energy, infrastructure and diplomacy, but this growing presence remains constrained by enduring political and security limits. Analyses often overstate Beijing’s influence, casting it as displacing the US or reshaping regional order. Moving beyond this hype requires separating economic presence from strategic influence and narrative appeal from operational capacity.
China has built access and commercial depth across the region, but these gains have yet to translate into decisive leverage, revealing an influence that is real, consequential and fundamentally bounded.
Misperception and delayed reckoning
Over the past decade, Western discourse has shifted sharply from viewing China as a potential stakeholder to framing it as a systemic challenger. Initiatives like the Belt and Road are increasingly depicted as components of a coordinated geopolitical offensive, with the Middle East cast as a zero-sum arena where Chinese gains necessarily represent American losses.
This threat-centric framing reflects less a change in Chinese behaviour than a delayed Western reckoning with Beijing’s economic persistence. Having long underestimated the scale and persistence of China’s engagement, US observers and officials responded belatedly — and with alarm — once its presence became undeniable.
Coinciding with Washington’s broader pivot to great power competition, this late recognition encouraged inflated readings of Chinese intent. Commercially driven engagements were recast as strategic “inroads”, while the agency of regional states seeking diversification was often minimised.
Most critically, this narrative obscures how US policy inconsistencies created the openings China exploited, a causal chain essential to understanding Beijing’s gains.
American volatility as strategic opportunity
China’s advances in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) cannot be understood without examining the US demand side. Cycles of American intervention and retrenchment — the Iraq War’s chaotic aftermath, Libya’s post-Arab Spring collapse, the abrupt Afghanistan withdrawal, and the strategic “pivot to Asia” signalling diminished regional commitment — systematically eroded confidence in Washington as a security guarantor.
Bipartisan missteps reinforced perceptions of US unpredictability. The first Trump administration’s withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, endorsement of the Saudi-UAE blockade of Qatar, and initial hesitation after the September 2019 drone and missile attacks on Saudi and Emirati energy facilities, signalled that American commitments could be conditional and reversible.
The Biden administration’s approach to the Gaza war — providing military support to Israel while failing to secure humanitarian access or a meaningful ceasefire — revealed limited leverage and eroded US moral authority, particularly among Arab partners.
The second Trump administration’s military strikes in Iran, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, Syria, Nigeria and Venezuela, and threats towards Greenland and neighbours such as Canada, Panama and Mexico have undercut claims of success in ending global conflicts and reinforced perceptions of US policy as transactional and coercive.
China has advanced not through security provision or enforcement, but by offering continuity.
These perceptions have been reinforced by Washington’s withdrawal from more than 65 international organisations and United Nations (UN) agencies, including most recently the World Health Organization and key development and human rights bodies, hollowing out institutions where US leadership once shaped global governance. This retreat has reduced American influence over rule-making and weakened forums that historically amplified US diplomatic leverage. At the same time, efforts to reassert leadership, such as the “Board of Peace” within a 20-point Gaza stabilisation plan, have been undermined by vague mandates and uncertain funding, limiting their credibility even among partners.
China has long capitalised on openings such as these. Beijing has projected consistency where Washington delivered volatility, offered commercial engagement where the US imposed sanctions or conditionality, and emphasised rhetorical non-interference where American policy oscillated between democracy promotion and authoritarian accommodation.
Regional states have not been choosing China over the US; even Iran looks to Beijing as a predictable economic lifeline while the broader region hedges against American unreliability. China has advanced not through security provision or enforcement, but by offering continuity.
Yet economic presence has proven difficult for Beijing to convert into strategic alignment. Middle Eastern states have cultivated partnerships as part of deliberate diversification strategies.
Economic engagement: scale without conversion
China’s influence in the Middle East is strongest in economic domains. It is the Gulf’s largest oil buyer, an expanding liquefied natural gas (LNG) customer, and a major investor in construction, ports, industrial parks, logistics corridors and digital infrastructure. In 2024, the Middle East received US$39 billion in Belt and Road investments, a 102% year-on-year increase.
Yet economic presence has proven difficult for Beijing to convert into strategic alignment. Middle Eastern states have cultivated partnerships as part of deliberate diversification strategies. Gulf monarchies pursue infrastructure and technological modernisation aligned with Vision 2030 initiatives, while North African states seek industrial development and connectivity. These partnerships reflect compatibility between Chinese offerings — capital, technology transfer and infrastructure expertise without political conditionality — and regional priorities that American partnerships have inadequately addressed.
Much of China’s engagement remains transactional. Energy trade is mutually beneficial but does not create loyalty, infrastructure contracts are reversible and subject to renegotiation, and Chinese firms face regulatory, political and sanctions risks, particularly where projects touch sensitive sectors.
Regional hedging further constrains Beijing. Gulf states have expanded economic and technological ties with China while retaining US security, defence integration and intelligence relationships. Israel has curtailed Chinese involvement in ports, research and development, and telecommunications under US pressure to preserve access to American defence technology, while Egypt balances Chinese investment against Western financial support.
Fiscal pressures and strategic selectivity
China confronts mounting domestic economic headwinds — slower growth projected at around 5% in 2025, property sector stress, deflationary pressures and rising debt — prompting selective adjustments abroad. Beijing has recalibrated the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), shifting away from debt-heavy mega-projects towards more targeted, commercially viable investments in core partners: Egypt, the Gulf Arab states and Iraq. Fiscal constraints apply selectively, with China retrenching from marginal BRI partners while doubling down where returns justify continued investment.
To be sure, the current Trump administration is pursuing advanced technology deals with Gulf partners in semiconductors and AI. These initiatives demonstrate recognition that influence increasingly depends on enabling technological modernisation rather than security provision alone.
China’s energy engagement with the Middle East remains deep and durable. Domestic electric vehicle (EV) adoption and high-speed rail expansion have modestly tempered oil demand growth, but China continues as the Gulf’s largest crude oil customer and an increasingly important LNG buyer.
Energy ties are becoming structurally embedded. Chinese state-owned enterprises hold equity stakes in upstream Gulf assets, while Gulf sovereign wealth funds invest in Chinese refining, petrochemicals and storage infrastructure. Saudi Aramco’s downstream investments and joint ventures with Sinopec exemplify how ties transcend short-term market fluctuations.
Technology competition: the real arena
The consequential shift is towards renewable energy and advanced technology partnerships, where China-US competition is most intense and will ultimately determine influence in the region. Chinese firms invest heavily in solar manufacturing, battery production, EV assembly, green hydrogen, AI development, cloud computing infrastructure and semiconductor-related activities. Gotion High-Tech’s US$6.3 billion investment to build Morocco’s first EV gigafactory exemplifies this opportunity.
Gulf states pursuing Vision 2030-style modernisation are seeking partners that provide access to advanced technology, knowledge transfer and indigenous innovation capacity. China’s positioning in these sectors aligns with regional priorities. UAE-China collaborations on artificial intelligence (AI), Saudi renewable energy projects, and expanding data centre investments show how technological engagement is replacing oil trade as the foundation of Sino-Middle Eastern relations.
To be sure, the current Trump administration is pursuing advanced technology deals with Gulf partners in semiconductors and AI. These initiatives demonstrate recognition that influence increasingly depends on enabling technological modernisation rather than security provision alone. Yet whether this proves sustainable remains uncertain. US policy focusing narrowly on countering Chinese infrastructure while neglecting emerging technology risks fighting yesterday’s battle while ceding tomorrow’s landscape.
Security constraints: the sharpest limits
The clearest limits on China’s role in the Middle East are in security. The US maintains a dense regional architecture of bases, forward deployments, alliances and defence partnerships underpinning deterrence, maritime security, and integrated air and missile defence. American forces provide intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, logistics and escalation management — public goods regional states continue to rely on.
China may seek a Gulf military foothold, but US opposition and Gulf states’ reluctance to jeopardise Western ties constrain it.
China maintains only a modest hard-power footprint: a single base in Djibouti and episodic naval deployments for anti-piracy operations. Beijing has expanded naval diplomacy — most recently through Blue Sword 2025 with Saudi Arabia — but these activities carry no enduring responsibilities or security guarantees. China accounted for just 1.2% of Middle Eastern arms imports between 2020 and 2024. It lacks formal alliances, integrated command structures, and standing security commitments. Its blue-water capabilities are insufficient to secure chokepoints such as the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandab, Hormuz and the Eastern Mediterranean.
Speculation about potential facilities in Oman or expanded Gulf access has not materialised. China may seek a Gulf military foothold, but US opposition and Gulf states’ reluctance to jeopardise Western ties constrain it. Chinese strategists appear aware of these limits.
Crisis responses: limits in practice
Recent crises reveal the gap between China’s perceived power and actual behaviour. During the Gaza war, Beijing adopted a vocal diplomatic posture, criticising Israel and US policy while positioning itself as a defender of Palestinian rights. Yet it exerted little tangible influence — no sustained mediation backed by pressure, no security guarantees, no enforcement capacity.
Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping further exposed constraints. Chinese trade and energy flows were affected, yet Beijing relied largely on US and allied naval forces, highlighting dependence on US-backed freedom of navigation.
Beijing offered no guarantees, mobilised no allies, and its diplomatic proposals lacked enforceable mechanisms.
The collapse of the Assad regime, the 12-day Israel-Iran war, and subsequent US strikes all confirmed China’s limits. Beijing offered no guarantees, mobilised no allies, and its diplomatic proposals lacked enforceable mechanisms. Even the Saudi-Iran rapprochement China facilitated has not translated into ongoing guarantor responsibilities. Across these crises, presence did not equate to power.
Escalating US threats towards Iran and renewed Israel-Iran tensions offer the clearest stress test of these constraints. Despite Iran’s importance to China’s energy security and its role as a sanctioned economic partner, Beijing neither shaped escalation dynamics nor acted as a guarantor of restraint. Instead, it reverted to familiar patterns: calls for de-escalation, rhetorical opposition to unilateralism, and diplomatic positioning unsupported by enforcement capacity.
As US military signalling intensified and Israel-Iran exchanges raised regional risk, China avoided commitments that might entangle it in security responsibilities, underscoring the limits of its role when core regional fault lines are activated.
Narrative influence: symbolism without enforcement
China has proven more successful in shaping narratives than exercising operational leadership. Emphasising neutrality, non-interference and opposition to Western double standards, Beijing has cultivated a reputation for restraint that resonates across the Global South. As the US withdraws from international agreements and organisations, China leverages this space by championing multilateral engagement focused on sovereign equality and development cooperation.
In the Middle East, this appeals to states valuing economic engagement without political conditionality and Gulf monarchies wary of overdependence on US security frameworks. China’s narrative influence operates through diplomatic signalling in forums like the Arab League and the UN, platforms including the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum and the China-Gulf Cooperation Council Dialogue, and public diplomacy highlighting shared norms. By offering predictability, investment and rhetorical support grounded in sovereign equality, China strengthens presence without contesting US primacy.
However, narrative power cannot substitute for material and institutional capacity when crises erupt. Symbolic influence proves fragile when tested by violence, instability and demands for enforcement.
Gap between perception and reality
Beyond the hype of threat narratives and hegemonic ambitions lies a more constrained reality. China’s engagement in the Middle East is consequential but bounded by structural limits that prevent economic presence from translating into strategic dominance. Its footprint across energy, infrastructure, technology and trade has allowed Beijing to build access and predictability amid US policy volatility, but not decisive leverage.
That economic and narrative reach coexists with clear operational limits: China cannot enforce commitments, guarantee security or resolve crises independently, and its hard-power capabilities remain modest relative to enduring US advantages. Regional states therefore hedge deliberately, welcoming Chinese investment while retaining US security and technological ties, which is a reminder that influence is shaped as much by partner agency as by Beijing’s ambitions.
This gap between perception and reality carries real policy consequences. Threat inflation obscures China’s true role, which has been to fill gaps left by inconsistent US engagement through non-conditional economic ties and a narrative of restraint. As competition shifts from hydrocarbons to technology, renewables and AI, China may gain leverage in areas aligned with regional priorities. Sober assessment reveals not a rising hegemon, rather a powerful yet constrained actor, limited by risk aversion, Western technological advantages, and the agency of states determined to preserve strategic manoeuvrability.
