Could Iran be the next Venezuela?
With mass protests and US threats mounting — after Washington’s dramatic overthrow of Venezuela’s Maduro — Chinese academic Fan Hongda asks if Iran’s unrest will end its regime or reshape ties with China and global power balances.
Following the US’s abrupt capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro on 3 January 2026, Iran — already experiencing a new wave of political protests and facing harsh rhetoric from both the US president and the Israeli prime minister — immediately became the focus of international attention. Will the US replicate the Venezuela playbook in Iran? Is the current situation in Iran already on the brink?
I recently gathered much information about Iran from various media outlets and groups. Frankly, the Iran that emerges from this information is deeply contradictory. Those seeking to overthrow the current regime are elated, believing that the moment is close at hand; meanwhile, Iranians who simply hope for a stable life feel anxious and despondent, as there are still no clear signs for optimism.
Triggers for unrest
The most direct trigger for Iran’s recent social instability was the sharp depreciation of its currency in a short period and inflation reaching new highs, which prompted Tehran’s Grand Bazaar merchants to shut their shops and take to the streets in protest. Against this backdrop, the lack of proactive action by Iranian decision makers after the 12-day war in June 2025, coupled with a severe drought and the resulting water crisis, reignited long-accumulated public discontent, with the merchants’ protests gaining support from university students and other segments of society.
The close interaction between internal and external forces is the defining feature of this latest round of unrest in Iran.
The positions taken by Israel and the US have further complicated Iran’s already fragile situation. Amid growing internal instability in Iran, Israel — which has long sought to overthrow the Islamic Republic — has stepped up its involvement in Iran’s domestic unrest, with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu repeatedly urging the Iranian public to overthrow the current regime through revolution.
Israel’s security agency, Mossad, has even publicly claimed that its personnel were protesting on the ground alongside the Iranian people, while US President Donald Trump has asserted more than once that Washington would intervene if the Iranian government were to kill protesters.
The close interaction between internal and external forces is the defining feature of this latest round of unrest in Iran. Protests initially erupted due to domestic factors, after which Israel and the US moved in swiftly. Trump’s declaration of intervention prompted some protesters to launch fierce attacks on public facilities, triggering escalating disorder. Such a clear link has been rare in previous episodes of unrest in Iran.
Protests allowed, but regime cannot fall
Since 2009, public protests within Iran have become commonplace, with the government being relatively tolerant towards them. Since 2016, I have witnessed several street protests in Iran, and the authorities have allowed people to take to the streets to demonstrate. Following the latest protests, Iran’s president, parliament speaker, chief justice and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei have all insisted that Iranians have the legal right to protest and that government bodies should actively listen to public demands.
However, what the authorities will not tolerate is a demonstration aimed at overthrowing the current regime. Thus, the aforementioned officials and the Supreme Leader have also stressed that those who accept external funding to sow chaos in Iran are not legitimate protesters, but rioters who should be dealt with harshly.
... people inside Iran are more eager to see improvements in government effectiveness and a more measured approach to guiding the country onto a healthy development path.
Meanwhile, street demonstrations in support of the current government, opposing or condemning the unrest, have also surfaced in Iran in recent days. While such rallies inevitably raise suspicions of official orchestration, most Iranians genuinely hope to prevent their country from descending into chaos. Unlike the insignificant so-called Iranian opposition abroad, which calls for the immediate and violent overthrow of the regime, people inside Iran are more eager to see improvements in government effectiveness and a more measured approach to guiding the country onto a healthy development path.
Nevertheless, the predicament facing the country is obvious. After Israel launched a war against Iran on 13 June 2025, and especially after the US bombed Iran’s nuclear facilities on 22 June, Iranians — particularly ordinary citizens — have been torn between fears of a prolonged and escalating conflict and hopes that the war might serve as a catalyst for profound national change. Yet, what has disappointed the public is that, even after the humiliation of the country being attacked, Iran’s decision makers have yet to pursue any clear or proactive reforms, further widening the rift between the state and society.
Why ‘Venezuela‑style’ playbook unlikely
Internal political struggles and social divisions have clearly worsened the already extremely challenging conditions for Iran’s development. In truth, though Israel and the US often claim that Iran’s conservatives/hardliners are their greatest enemies, it is actually Iran’s so‑called reformists who have suffered the heaviest blows from the actions of these two countries in recent years.
... given the sensitive geopolitical factors, the likelihood of the US replicating its Venezuela playbook in Iran remains low for now.
The main cause of Iran’s internal turmoil is undoubtedly its domestic factors, but it is undeniable that the behaviour of Israel and the US has also been a factor in the continual spread and even escalation of the street protests in Iran. After the US took action against Venezuela’s Maduro, some have suggested that the US and Israel might move against Iran’s Khamenei.
However, given the sensitive geopolitical factors, the likelihood of the US replicating its Venezuela playbook in Iran remains low for now. Moreover, Khamenei is different from Maduro: behind Khamenei stands a complete system which can continue to operate without him, whereas Maduro’s removal would essentially bring about regime change in Venezuela.
Internal and external crises
Thus far, the scale of this round of unrest in Iran remains relatively limited, far less than in 2022. Though the present protests are not yet enough to topple the Islamic Republic immediately, there is no denying that the Islamic Republic is in crisis. Iran is getting closer and closer to a moment of change, be it one actively sought or one forced upon it. For Iran, which has long suffered from fragmented and competing centres of power, the most likely outcome would be the emergence within the current regime of a powerful figure or faction capable of unifying control over the entire country.
In fact, Tehran is currently more worried about external security. Israel and Iran are on the brink of a major confrontation. What is particularly worrying is that both sides may be tempted to launch a pre-emptive strike for fear that the other side would take action first.
As Trump has repeatedly stated recently, US military action against Iran is an option. Should that happen, Israel would find it hard to stay out of the conflict, and once war breaks out between the US and Iran, Iran would inevitably strike Israel. Of course, given the current needs of both Trump and Tehran, the possibility of negotiations between the US and Iran moving forward cannot be ruled out.
Chinese reliance on Iranian oil will only grow.
Maintaining ties with China
Short of a military overthrow by external powers like the US, Iran is likely to continue deepening its cooperation with China. The painful legacy of a past “pro‑US tilt” has pushed Tehran toward a more diversified foreign policy; even if ties with the US or other Western nations improve, Iran is unlikely to abandon its partnership with China.
On the other hand, judging from US actions against Venezuela, there is a clear element of targeting China. The US has openly demanded that Venezuela’s interim government expel the influence of China, Russia, Iran and Cuba from the country; Washington has also forcibly diverted the oil that Venezuela had originally planned to ship to China to the US.
The most likely scenario moving forward is that Venezuela’s oil supply to China would face problems, and imports of Russian oil will also face greater US obstruction. Against this backdrop, Chinese reliance on Iranian oil will only grow.
No matter how much Iran’s power and influence are weakened, it remains a major and powerful state in the Middle East, especially in West Asia. It still holds an indispensable role in any peace or political settlement in the region, and it is still a country that can work with and even support China in the international arena. Therefore, whether from the perspective of geopolitics or from the standpoint of energy supply security — which directly affects national security — China should actively respond to Iran’s goodwill and further deepen its relations with Iran.
