How China risks losing Honduras after winning it

President-elect Nasry Asfura of Honduras, a Central American country of around 10.7 million people bordered by Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua, will take the oath in late January 2026. During his election campaign, Asfura, who led the conservative National Party, had pledged to cut diplomatic relations with China and reestablish ties with Taiwan. If this occurs, it would be a significant diplomatic embarrassment for China.

Asfura was the only one among the three candidates in the November presidential race to gain US President Donald Trump’s endorsement. Trump branded Rixi Moncada, the second candidate, a “communist”, and Salvador Nasralla, the third candidate, a “borderline communist”. “I hope the people of Honduras vote for Freedom and Democracy, and elect Tito Asfura, President!” Trump said on Truth Social. Calling Asfura by his nickname “Tito” demonstrated Trump’s familiarity with Asfura’s local identity.

China and Taiwan reacted differently to Asfura’s success. In brief and cautious remarks, the spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China termed Honduras’s election an internal matter and expressed hope for continued relations under the one-China policy. The low-key response was intended to avoid amplifying a potential loss while still signalling a desire to maintain the relationship.

In contrast, Taiwan showed enthusiasm about a possible diplomatic breakthrough. The Taipei Times published front-page stories. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that it was in “direct contact” with Asfura, had congratulated him via “special channels”, and was looking forward to the establishment of diplomatic ties with US support. 

In 2023, Xiomara Castro, the incumbent president of Honduras (2022-2026), severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan after more than 80 years of relations. She argued that the decision would bring investment from China for a hydroelectric dam and infrastructure, as well as pave the way for a free trade agreement (FTA). Castro’s left-leaning foreign policy deepened ties with Cuba and Venezuela, and she continued to be a vocal critic of various US policies.

Asfura’s rival, Salvador Nasralla, who was just behind him in the final vote count, had also promised to switch diplomatic ties back to Taiwan.

Three factors — China’s underperformance on economic commitments, opposition revival and the role of the US — together explain the shift that could lead to the reestablishment of diplomatic ties with Taiwan.

First, after establishing diplomatic ties, China seemingly treated Honduras as a symbolic win in the poaching race with Taiwan. Beijing’s investment fell short of the expectations of the Honduran elite. Costa’s government terminated the FTA with Taiwan but could not finalise one with China. Negotiations for building a new dam Patuca II stalled on technological details. 

China’s hesitation to invest in a megaproject was part of its overall recalibration to focus on selective and economically feasible projects rather than rapid chequebook projects, as was the case at the beginning of the Belt and Road Initiative. Parallel with this, Honduras’s shrimp exports to Taiwan, accounted for nearly 40% of total exports in 2022. After the termination of diplomatic ties with Taiwan, Honduras’s shrimp exports plummeted by around 70%, while China did not emerge as an alternative.

Second, Honduras’s opposition, especially Asfura’s National Party, opposed cutting diplomatic ties with Taiwan from the beginning. Asfura stated in an interview that Honduras was “100 times better off” when it was allied with Taiwan, benefiting from increased trade and aid. Economic slowness also emboldened the opposition.

Third, the US signalled to the Honduran elite that restoring ties with Taipei would please Washington. The US introduced the United States-Taiwan Partnership in the Americas Act, which would create a structured framework to support Taiwan’s remaining diplomatic allies in Latin America and the Caribbean and counter China’s efforts to peel them away. The US has maintained a military presence at Soto Cano Air Base since the 1980s.

China’s influence was increasing at a time when Donald Trump was reviving the Monroe Doctrine or “Trump Corollary”, aimed at asserting US influence in the Caribbean and Latin America and bringing defiant countries into line with Washington’s strategic interests. The ongoing military operation against President Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela and pressure on Panama to cancel port deals with China are part of an assertive US policy.

Washington’s strategy worked. Asfura stated that after coming into power, “I have a clear triangle in mind: the United States, Israel, and Taiwan,” and he planned to cut ties with Venezuela. Unlike Xiomara’s criticism of Trump’s expelling migrants, Asfura found potential benefits in it, arguing that deportees would return with experience, skills and capital that could contribute to building Honduras.

Although the common trend is for countries to switch recognition from Taiwan to China, there have been rare cases of the opposite: for example, Nauru moved from Taiwan to China in 2002, back to Taiwan in 2005, and then again to China in 2024, while Vanuatu briefly switched from China to Taiwan in 2004 before quickly returning to Beijing. Out of 12 diplomatic allies of Taiwan, seven are from the Caribbean and Latin America.

Taiwan has lost most of its allies since the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)’s return to power in 2016. With the pro-independence DPP in power, Beijing ended the informal “diplomatic truce” it had with the Kuomintang (KMT), during which both sides refrained from poaching each other’s allies.

China intensified its efforts to persuade Taiwan’s allies to switch diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing, successfully convincing ten countries to make the change: São Tomé and Príncipe, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, El Salvador, the Solomon Islands, Kiribati, Nicaragua, Honduras and Nauru. The opposition KMT often accused the DPP of losing a significant number of Taiwan’s diplomatic partners.

Although Asfura’s eventual reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Taiwan would not overturn China’s overall Latin American policy, which is based on strong economic and investment ties, especially with Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Peru, it would still represent more than a symbolic loss: a rare reversal and a rebuff to Beijing’s use of economic leverage to poach Taiwan’s allies.

Honduras’s final decision regarding Taiwan is yet to be seen, but Asfura’s campaign pledges and strong US backing leave little doubt about his likely choice.

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