How Israel’s Somaliland gambit helps Taiwan box in China

“We reject all forms of external interference aimed at dividing Somalia, and we condemn any action that undermines its sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity.” The African Union’s Peace and Security Council recently reiterated harsh words to condemn Israel’s decision to diplomatically recognise the self-proclaimed republic of Somaliland as an independent nation in December.

Echoing China’s concerns, it is likely the African bloc’s cutting remarks had another target in sight: Taiwan.

Somaliland is a breakaway state in the Horn of Africa and was part of Somalia until 1991. Just like Taiwan, it has a functioning government and substantial requirements of statehood despite lacking full international recognition.

Such a similarity has prompted the two sides to nurture close ties. Taipei and Hargeisa established representative offices in each other’s capitals in 2020 and since then have deepened economic and security cooperation.

That is why Taiwan welcomed Israel’s recognition of Somaliland’s statehood. It could help Taipei reinforce its network of formal alliances and informal partnerships. Indeed, Taipei said it was ready to enhance trilateral cooperation with the two governments.

For its part, China cannot but look with suspicion at the island’s interactions with Somaliland and a potential three-way collaboration that includes Israel.

The Israeli diplomatic overture to Somaliland, if accepted by the international community, would set a legal precedent in support of the de-facto independent status of Taiwan, which Beijing sees as a rebel province to reunify – with force, if needed. In the same way, Somalia considers Somaliland as part of its territory, a position that the Chinese leadership has always endorsed.

It is not by chance that the Chinese foreign ministry lambasted the Israeli move by saying that “no country should encourage or support other countries’ internal separatist forces for its own selfish interests”.

Against this backdrop, Taiwan could bank on its links with Israel and Somaliland to improve its security situation. Taipei could use Somaliland’s port and airport infrastructure as conduits for triangulating arms acquisitions from Israel.

The Taiwanese government is working on the construction of a multi-layered air and missile defence system called “T-Dome” and has not hidden its interest in Israel’s know-how. Covert and quiet shipments via Somaliland’s facilities — so as to offer plausible deniability in the face of China’s recriminations — could also include items such as electronic warfare platforms, radar communication and drone equipment.

Another potential field of security cooperation between Taiwan, Israel and Somaliland is maritime security. Taipei and Hargeisa have already launched an initiative to jointly protect navigation in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. Such a scheme could be propped up with Israeli participation, bolstering the island’s international presence and laying the groundwork to protect a possible Taiwan-Somaliland maritime logistics corridor.

Expect China’s vocal opposition to all this, but Taiwan’s Coast Guard has already conducted joint patrols with Japanese and Philippine counterparts in the far more sensitive waters off the self-governed island.

And much to China’s chagrin, the Taiwan-Israel-Somaliland entente could also extend to other regional actors. Somaliland is indeed a potential linchpin to expand Taipei’s relations with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which has growing interests in the African breakaway entity and has not joined other Arab and Islamic governments’ condemnation of Israel’s declaration of recognition.

The UAE’s DP World operates Berbera port in Somaliland and Abu Dhabi’s abstention from condemning Israel’s move signals some sort of alignment with the Israeli strategic aims across the Horn of Africa-Red Sea region.

From Taiwan’s perspective, the UAE-Israel convergence of interests in Somaliland might open up new opportunities for its tech sector.

The UAE and Israel both participate in the US-led Pax Silica scheme to secure supply chains for AI-critical minerals, while Taiwan has been invited by Washington as a key contributor to the initiative. Taipei plans to help Somaliland develop its mineral industry, including lithium extraction, which is critical for the development of AI technology.

The downside for Taiwan is that a trilateral entente with Somaliland and Israel risks dragging it into a broader geopolitical mess. It could weaken Taiwanese dialogue with Arab and Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which contest Somaliland’s sovereign status while supporting Somalia’s territorial integrity.

Israel-UAE’s apparent alignment may redraw the balance of power in a vast area of chokepoints stretching from the Strait of Hormuz to the Horn of Africa and includes the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the southern Red Sea basin, a development that inevitably will worry Riyadh and Doha.

It is worth noting that Saudi Arabia is Taiwan’s largest trading partner in the Middle East, with an annual combined trade exceeding US$12 billion.

Still, Taiwan’s inclusion in the Israel-Somaliland equation could mar the economic exchanges with Qatar, which accounts for 30% of the island’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports. Last year, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies think tank warned that Doha could be pushed by China to halt LNG shipments to Taiwan in the event of a crisis.

The reality is that Taipei should be able to leverage US influence in the Middle East to hedge itself against potential retaliations from Persian Gulf partners opposing diplomatic outreach to Somaliland. All the more so, if this is in connection with Israel.

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