Japanese academic: What the 1972 Japan-China Joint Communique really means

China has long adhered to the “one China” principle and asks countries around the world to do so too. However, developed countries have not necessarily accepted the “one China” principle outright, and each has its own “one China” policy. In contrast, many countries in the Global South accept China’s “one China” principle. 

Japan and China normalised diplomatic relations based on the Japan-China Joint Communique of 29 September 1972. In the agreement, the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) reiterated its “one China” principle, while the government of Japan expressed its own position on the matter. 

Specifically, Japan stated that it “fully understands and respects” the PRC’s stance that Taiwan is an inalienable part of its territory. In other words, Japan does not simply accept the PRC’s stance.

Furthermore, immediately after the part which says that Japan “fully understands and respects” the PRC’s position on Taiwan, the statement goes on to add that Japan “firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration”, which mandates that “the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out”. The Cairo Declaration, in turn, provides that “Formosa [Taiwan] and the Pescadores [Penghu Islands] shall be restored to the Republic of China”. Although Japan did not participate in the 1943 Cairo Conference, it accepted the Potsdam Declaration in 1945 and surrendered unconditionally, and therefore cannot ignore the Cairo Declaration.

In other words, while the Japanese government acknowledges that “Formosa and the Pescadores shall be restored to the Republic of China”, it does not fully accept China’s “one China” principle, which states that “Taiwan is an inalienable part” of the PRC. What does this mean? 

The definitive text on Japan’s understanding of this statement is written by Takakazu Kuriyama, who was director of the Treaty Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time of the September 1972 Japan-China Joint Communique. He clearly states the following points: one, when he says that the Japanese government “fully understands and respects” China’s position, he does not mean that Japan fully accepts the “one China” principle. 

Two, he points out that, in the Cairo Declaration, the term “Republic of China” should be interpreted as referring to the PRC, not the current government of the Republic of China [meaning Taiwan]. In other words, it should read, “Formosa and the Pescadores shall be restored to the People’s Republic of China.” 

Three, although the second point is taken into consideration, the reality is that the PRC does not govern Taiwan; therefore, the return of Formosa and the Pescadores is incomplete. In other words, although the Japanese government firmly maintains its position under Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration, the declaration’s terms have not yet been realised. This is why it is important to state that the Japanese government “fully understands and respects” the PRC’s position.

Four, the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco also stipulates that Japan renounces Formosa, the Pescadores and other islands. As a defeated nation, Japan cannot specify to which country these islands belong.

Kuriyama further states that while Japan’s position regarding Taiwan is that it should be decided by the parties involved between China and Taiwan, and that Japan will not interfere if this is done peacefully, if unification is carried out unilaterally using force, Japan will have no choice but to reserve its position. This aligns with the Japan-US Security Treaty, which prioritises “peace and security in the Far East”.

Of course, China will have its own position and interpretation. The Japan-China Joint Communique, which forms the basis of Japan-China relations, was compiled in a very short period of time in 1972 and contains contradictory content. If Japan-China relations deteriorate, these contradictions may become problematic. Our predecessors have always maintained relationships while taking these contradictions into account, by constantly checking for common ground and seeking consensus to prevent problems from arising. For the sake of peace and stability in East Asia, this kind of maintenance work will likely need to continue.

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