The Philippines’ ASEAN chairmanship comes at a perilous time
As the Philippines’ ASEAN chairmanship kicks off, all eyes are on its approach to three major issues: the South China Sea dispute, the situation in Myanmar and the volatile peace along the Thailand-Cambodia border. Manila-based analyst Don McLain Gill gives his assessment.
On 29 January, the Philippines hosted the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Retreat in Cebu City. This meeting was the first significant regional engagement this year under the Philippine chairmanship. The retreat also served as an important opportunity for the representatives of ASEAN member countries to discuss and assess the contemporary state of regional affairs under the bloc’s Political-Security Community pillar.
Among the various security challenges in the region, three stand out — the South China Sea dispute, the situation in Myanmar and the volatile peace along the Thailand-Cambodia border. How the Philippines would handle these evolving issues would eventually characterise the nature of its chairmanship.
These variations have allowed Beijing to pursue a “divide-and-conquer” strategy at sea by pursuing a more escalatory approach towards certain regional countries, while managing its relations with others.
The elusive Code of Conduct in the South China Sea
The South China Sea dispute is one of the most contentious security challenges in the region. One reason for this complexity is the highly asymmetric power dynamics between China and the four Southeast Asian claimant countries — Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. The second reason is the divergent security calculations of all four neighbouring nations towards China. These variations have allowed Beijing to pursue a “divide-and-conquer” strategy at sea by pursuing a more escalatory approach towards certain regional countries, while managing its relations with others.
This ensures that China can impede a unified position among Southeast Asian countries while continuously altering the regional status quo to its advantage. This constant alternation makes it challenging to hold all parties accountable through a binding Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC), as negotiations have already stretched on for over two decades.
However, under its chairmanship, the Philippines is determined to conclude negotiations for the COC. According to Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Theresa Lazaro, her ASEAN counterparts have agreed to hold monthly in-person meetings to expedite negotiations on the COC. In line with these efforts, the Philippines also resumed its bilateral political dialogue with China on 28 January, after a hiatus of more than one year. For Manila, maintaining and opening these dialogue mechanisms with both its immediate neighbours and China would help facilitate the conditions needed to fast-track dialogue on the South China Sea.
Nevertheless, while communication is crucial, the most important determinants of a successful COC are whether all parties involved align their claims and activities with the principles of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. A more pressing concern is whether all parties can agree on the code’s geographic scope and accept the framework’s binding nature. Particularly in the Philippines, the past few months have witnessed considerable escalatory activities by China in the Southeast Asian country’s 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone.
... the challenge is to ensure that the COC is not reduced to political rhetoric but functions as a strict guideline that all parties, especially China, must adhere to.
Among such activities are China’s unilateral declaration of a nature reserve in the Scarborough Shoal, water cannon attacks directed at Filipino fishermen around the Sabina Shoal, and a considerable increase in China Coast Guard (CCG) and People’s Liberation Army Navy vessels in Philippine waters just two weeks into the new year. Additionally, according to the Philippine Coast Guard’s 2025 annual review, CCG ships have been patrolling closer to the shores of the Philippine island of Luzon, with the closest record approach on 8 April 2025, less than 30 nautical miles from the coast of Dasol, Pangasinan. Therefore, the challenge is to ensure that the COC is not reduced to political rhetoric but functions as a strict guideline that all parties, especially China, must adhere to.
Volatile Myanmar
While the maritime domain is a more immediate concern for the Philippines, it must also oversee other critical security concerns in the region as ASEAN chair. Among these issues is the uncertain future of Myanmar under the junta.
Accordingly, Myanmar has just concluded its month-long election, which was primarily believed to be rigged in favour of the junta-backed party. The Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) dominated the total votes, winning an overwhelming majority in both legislative chambers in Myanmar. The parliament of Myanmar is now expected to convene in March to elect a new administration, which would take charge of the nation in April.
While the Philippines is expected to continue its active dialogue and engagement with all parties concerned, it has traditionally had limited influence over Myanmar due to a lack of historical, political and economic engagement.
Amid these developments, the Philippine government extended Lazaro’s portfolio by assigning her as the country’s special envoy to Myanmar. As her first major mission, Lazaro met Senior General Min Aung Hlaing and other junta leaders in Naypyidaw on 6 January. While the visit raised concerns about sending the wrong signals to the junta and legitimising their rule amid the elections, it was merely a step to develop lines of communication with the country’s various stakeholders.
Consequently, following this trip, Lazaro held her first Myanmar stakeholders meeting with various political and ethnic groups on 22 January. Moreover, to dispel concerns about legitimising the junta, Lazaro announced that ASEAN will not recognise the elections held in Myanmar. This statement was made immediately after the closed-door session in Cebu.
While the Philippines is expected to continue its active dialogue and engagement with all parties concerned, it has traditionally had limited influence over Myanmar due to a lack of historical, political and economic engagement. Additionally, the junta will remain unfazed by ASEAN’s pressure, given its growing ties with extra-regional powers such as China and Russia. Thus, while the junta is unlikely to reach a significant compromise with ASEAN under the Philippines chairmanship, the least Manila would need to ensure is that the status quo is maintained and that domestic conditions do not worsen further.
Cambodia, Thailand and the limits of ASEAN
Another notable challenge under the current chairmanship would be to navigate the fragile peace between Cambodia and Thailand following a string of tensions stemming from the limited five-day border skirmish in July 2025. Since then, two ceasefires have been established, with the latest in December. For the Philippines, it would need to come to terms with three realities.
First, while Malaysia, during its chairmanship, played an active role in facilitating the ceasefires, it was clearly overshadowed by the participation of the US and China. This provided a sobering evaluation of the bloc’s limitations in managing intra-regional conflict, thereby diluting the enigma surrounding ASEAN centrality.
Second, while the December ceasefire stands, it remains fragile due to the historic, unresolved and sensitive nature of the dispute. Additionally, the absence of a mutually accepted institutional mechanism increases the risk of escalation and extra-regional intervention.
Third, Cambodia and Thailand have different approaches to addressing their border dispute. While Cambodia intends to internationalise the issue, Thailand has insisted on bilateral negotiations. This is understandable given Thailand’s material advantage over Cambodia.
This means that while the Philippines will ensure active dialogue with both parties through an ASEAN approach, it may decide to pass the buck to larger extra-regional powers to stabilise the situation.
Against this backdrop, the Philippines will need to carefully navigate the volatile situation along the border and constantly engage with both parties. While Manila and Bangkok have relatively good political relations, it is only recently that the Philippines and Cambodia have begun reciprocating interactions at the highest level. In February 2025, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet visited Manila for the first time, and Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr reciprocated the visit during his first official trip to Phnom Penh seven months later.
Political rapport is vital in pursuing mediation roles; therefore, Manila must continue to cultivate closer relations with both nations at the highest level. However, if border tensions escalate again, the Philippines will have limited options. In this regard, Manila will likely use Malaysia’s experience as a precedent for its actions.
This means that while the Philippines will ensure active dialogue with both parties through an ASEAN approach, it may decide to pass the buck to larger extra-regional powers to stabilise the situation. Doing so, however, will have considerable and long-lasting implications for the bloc’s image and role in the region.
Ultimately, the Philippines’ chairmanship of ASEAN comes at a critical juncture amid the varied security challenges that plague the region. While it is unlikely that these issues will be solved in a year, the Philippines will need to take the lead through a pragmatic, calculated, rules-based assessment.
