A war, a postponed summit and a wider US-China rift

That the Iran conflict casts a shadow over US-China relations has perhaps already been illustrated most recently by the postponement of the summit meeting between presidents Donald Trump and Xi Jinping.

Originally scheduled for the end of March, the summit was to be the first in a series of up to four meetings that the two leaders could have this year. As it stands, the postponement was necessitated by President Trump’s preoccupation with “Operation Epic Fury” in Iran which (at the time of writing) still shows no signs of winding down. It also serves as a reminder that the evolving situation in the Middle East adds a further layer of complication to an already complex US-China relationship defined by a curious combination of strategic competition and deep interdependence.

When the US launched Operation Epic Fury against Iran on 28 February alongside Israel and in the midst of negotiations over Tehran’s nuclear enrichment activities, the move was met with disapproval from Beijing: all the more so when Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was deliberately targeted and killed.

Soon after hostilities began, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson cited Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s comments and maintained: “It is unacceptable for the US and Israel to launch attacks against Iran in the process of the ongoing Iran-US negotiations, still less to blatantly attack and kill the leader of a sovereign country and instigate government change. These actions have violated international law and basic norms of international relations.”

Beyond this, however, China’s response has been noticeably measured. No doubt, Chinese leaders continue to express the standard refrain of support for Iranian sovereignty, security and territorial integrity, and calls for all parties to immediately discuss cessation of hostilities are being made. Given its heavy reliance on energy coming from the Persian Gulf, the disruption to global supply resulting from the closure of the Straits of Hormuz by Iran in response to US-Israeli attacks has also caused consternation in Beijing.

But China has stopped short of outrightly condemning the US and Israeli strikes; at least not so in official statements. Furthermore, while there was speculation when hostilities began that China might help arm Iran, the evidence is inconclusive. There have been no overt arms transfers taking place. Chinese dual-use technology may be another matter. Reports have surfaced that Chinese commercial satellite operator MizarVision has released high-resolution imagery that has been used by the Iranian military to enhance situational awareness (of targets), and BeiDou navigation systems have purportedly allowed the military to restore ballistic-missile accuracy degraded by GPS jamming.

China’s studied distance is the result of careful strategic calculation on at least three counts. First, while Beijing has good relations with Tehran, with which they signed a strategic partnership in 2021, they too have close ties with the Gulf states that have found themselves at the receiving end of retaliatory attacks from Iran. In fact, China’s relations with Gulf states are arguably deeper and more substantive, ranging from investments in port infrastructure, renewable technology and smart city technologies in addition to trade and the crucial matter of access to energy supply. To illustrate, China’s bilateral trade with Iran in 2024 stood at US$13.4 billion. In comparison over the same period, trade with Saudi Arabia was US$107.5 billion, US$101.8 billion with the UAE and US$24.2 billion with Qatar.

Neither do Iran’s escalatory actions such as the closure of the Straits of Hormuz and the attacks on critical infrastructure in the Gulf states sit well with China.

At the same time, Beijing is taking care not to entirely isolate Iran. For instance, it abstained from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)-sponsored United Nations Security Council resolution to condemn the Iranian attacks in the Gulf on grounds that “does not fully reflect the root cause and the overall picture of the conflict in a balanced manner”.

Second, with an eye to the larger global geopolitical landscape, the Iran conflict is being seen in Beijing as just the repeat of a familiar pattern of events that has bedevilled US commitment in the Indo-Pacific: where American intent to make the latter a region of strategic priority are obstructed by their security commitments in the former. Put simply, the Iran conflict is the latest Middle East distraction that draws US attention and resources away from the Indo-Pacific. 

Third, China will doubtless have bilateral relations with the US in mind as it treads carefully on the Iran situation. To that end, the ambiguity in its early response was likely shaped by the more pressing objective not to place at risk a crucial summit meeting that will attempt to set a new tone for relations between the two foremost powers in the world.

Even though the summit was eventually postponed — President Trump took care to correct his initial statement which implied that a postponement would be tied to Chinese agreement to participate in an international effort to keep the Straits of Hormuz open — Beijing’s objectives remain the same.

This is not to say however, that things will be smooth sailing if and when the leaders of the two great powers meet. On the contrary, considerable challenges remain, foremost being a trust deficit between Washington and Beijing that has only grown wider.

Nevertheless, as far as the present Middle East crisis is concerned, China is not about to let that detract from their prioritisation of the need to manage relations with the US, which for them is a long game. But it does imply that for Iran, who though unjustly attacked, have subsequently alienated themselves by unjustly attacking others, there are clear limits as to how far their “comprehensive strategic partner” is prepared to go to assist them. 

Related: The costs of quick power: America’s Iran strike | Strategic patience: How China navigates the Iran war