Why Beijing can’t repeat America’s Maduro raid in Taiwan

On 4 December 2025, the Trump administration released the 2025 National Security Strategy. Subsequently, on 23 January 2026, the US Department of Defense published the 2026 National Defense Strategy, building upon the foundations laid by the National Security Strategy. 

A particularly striking feature of these documents was the emphasis on “America First” and a strategic pivot towards the western hemisphere. US President Donald Trump characterised this modern iteration of the Monroe Doctrine as the “Donroe Doctrine” (New Monroe Doctrine). On 3 January 2026, the US launched an offensive against Venezuela, where special operations forces detained Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, and subsequently transported them to the US.

How did the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) evaluate these US military operations, and what lessons did they derive from them? This article answers these questions based on editorials published in the PLA Daily, the official newspaper of the PLA. Furthermore, it examines the implications of these developments for a potential Taiwan contingency.

On 2 February 2026, the PLA Daily published several editorials analysing recent special operations, including the US military’s invasion of Venezuela.

An editorial by a researcher from the Academy of Military Sciences (AMS) pointed out that with the advancement of unmanned and intelligentised technologies, special operations have evolved towards greater precision, intelligence, unmanned and all-domain operation, encompassing physical spaces such as land, sea, air and space, as well as intangible spaces such as electromagnetic, cyber and cognitive domains. The editorial noted that the characteristic of being “a victory for system-of-systems support and elite forces” has become increasingly prominent. 

Furthermore, it assessed that the success or failure of special operations forces depends on the organic integration of information, command, firepower and logistics within an all-domain operational system-of-systems. The piece also emphasised the importance of cognitive warfare, asserting that through precise narrative framing, guidance of focus and psychological pressure, tactical actions can be transformed into shocks within the cognitive domain, thereby securing strategic initiative.

Another editorial by an AMS researcher pointed out that the form of warfare is rapidly evolving towards “intelligentisation”, and special operations are increasingly “winning through intelligence”. Specifically, it noted that new technologies — such as artificial intelligence, big data and cloud computing — have demonstrated superiority and potential in fields like battlefield situational awareness, operational command and control, and comprehensive logistics support. 

Consequently, special operations now require a foundation characterised by a “brain pool + cloud pool + arsenal” model. The author further asserted that special operations are not merely about destruction in the physical domain, but represent a contest within the information and cognitive domains.

A separate analysis by a researcher at the PLA National Defence University argued that, given the length of the planning period, the large number of participating units, and the high operational requirements, the special operations in Venezuela demonstrated many characteristics of a joint operation.

The researcher identified the following key features: (1) shaping the posture and seizing favourable operational opportunities; (2) achieving unilateral battlefield transparency through information-led initiatives; (3) neutralising power and communication networks through cyberattacks, while carving out infiltration routes via the coordination of electromagnetic and missile strikes; and (4) ensuring the execution of rapid attacks and withdrawals through multi-dimensional infiltration and lightning-fast arrests.

On 16 January 2026, when asked about concerns in Taiwan that China might conduct an invasion of Taiwan based on the US invasion of Venezuela, a spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of National Defense responded that “all options that can punish the ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces remain on the table”.

In fact, the PLA could attempt decapitation operations in a Taiwan contingency, similar to the one the US executed in Venezuela. Simulation training for decapitation operations was also conducted during the military exercises around Taiwan known as “Justice Mission 2025”, which the PLA carried out in late December 2025.

Meanwhile, doubts remain as to whether the PLA is capable of executing decapitation operations against Taiwan at this stage. First, while the US military possesses extensive experience from numerous past real-world combat operations, the PLA, despite conducting drills, lacks actual combat experience. 

Second, compared with Venezuela, Taiwan’s C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) capabilities and air defence capabilities are considered superior, making the difficulty of decapitation operations significantly higher.

Third, considering that the US military devoted substantial preparation time to the US operation in Venezuela and deployed various units in advance, it would be impossible for the PLA to execute decapitation operations without any tactical or strategic warnings. At the stage at which the PLA shows signs of a Taiwan invasion operation, the US military would likely deploy forces around Taiwan, making it improbable that the PLA could succeed in decapitation operations under US surveillance.

Taking these points into account, it can be assessed that the PLA does not currently possess the capability to successfully carry out decapitation operations against Taiwan. While the PLA aims to strengthen its special operations capabilities by incorporating lessons from the war in Ukraine, Israeli military actions and the invasion of Venezuela, it will most likely take more time before they acquire the capabilities necessary to make a Taiwan invasion operation feasible.

Related: Has Venezuela become a test of US power — and China’s resolve? | Venezuela exposes the limits of China’s global power