Between distrust and engagement: Manila’s China paradox

From collisions and water cannon incidents at sea, Sino-Philippine hostility has spilled over into other policy domains, so much so that sister-city partnerships and military-to-military exchanges have been suspended, espionage incidents have increased, and word wars on social media have intensified. As such, 74% of Filipinos see China as the country’s “greatest threat”. 

Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr has been widely touted to be “anti-China” and “pro-US” due to his administration’s expanded joint military posturing with Washington, assertive policy on the South China Sea, and sidelining of economic opportunities with China. These perceptions endure because policies are primarily judged through the optics of media coverage and the rhetoric of government officials. Indeed, absent incidents, there would be nothing for the media to cover or sensationalise to begin with. 

During the administration of then President Rodrigo Duterte, his statements of favouritism toward China and President Xi Jinping — accompanied by statements of defeatism — fuelled perceptions that he was “pro-China” and overly dependent on Beijing.

However, the Philippines-US Bilateral Strategic Dialogue (BSD) continued as a regular institutional mechanism throughout the Duterte administration, with the 7th to 9th meetings held in 2017, 2019 and 2021. It was also under Duterte’s watch that the Philippines-US Maritime Dialogue was inaugurated, and Japan remained the Philippines’ largest source of Official Development Assistance (ODA). This is analogous to then President Gloria Arroyo, who, despite her known closeness to China, passed the Maritime Baselines Law. 

Under Marcos, notwithstanding the seeming decoupling or Cold War, it is important to note that diplomatic, economic and social relations with China continue to ensue, with diplomacy serving as the administration’s main line of effort. The Bilateral Consultation Mechanism (BCM), Foreign Ministry Consultations (FMC) and Joint Consular Consultation (JCC) all remain in force, which is a sharp contrast to the 2012 Scarborough Shoal Standoff when no such mechanisms were in place.

Moreover, bilateral trade volume, which stood at US$39.2 billion in Duterte’s final year (2022), increased to US$47.52 billion in 2025, although Manila continues to run a trade deficit, warranting a correction of the structural imbalance. 

Similarly, approved Chinese investments rose sharply from US$26 million in 2022 to US$178 million in 2025. Marcos even urged the Filipino-Chinese business community to further strengthen economic relations with China.

Chinese tourism to the Philippines continues to rebound as well. In 2022, immediately following the Covid-19 pandemic, the Philippines only received 39,600 Chinese tourists; in 2024, arrivals had jumped to 313,856, but still fell short of pre-pandemic levels. Growth is likely to continue with the implementation of visa-free policy for Chinese nationals and more direct flights launched between China and the Philippines. Non-political factors, particularly public safety risks and poor infrastructure, are prominent reasons why the Philippines is way behind other Southeast Asian countries in drawing Chinese tourists and investments.  

Among the popular notions about China in the Philippines is that it offers mainly promises of aid and investment, and that Chinese projects are “debt traps” and pose risks to national security. Such narratives put China in a “damn if you do and damn if you don’t” situation.

Yet an AidData report finds that China committed US$9 billion in development financing to the Philippines over a 12-year period, which is higher than that of the US but lower than that of Japan. Still, China could temper expectations by not overpromising so as to avoid risks of underperformance.

During Duterte’s presidency, several Chinese projects were realised, including two China-aid bridges in Metro Manila, the Chico River Pump Irrigation Project, China Telecom’s entry as a telecommunications provider, and the Davao River Bucana Bridge. Other Chinese-funded projects, such as the Kaliwa Dam, Samal Island–Davao City Connector Bridge, and Panhua integrated steel manufacturing plant in Sarangani, are still underway. 

Project delays are not unique to Chinese financing as according to the Department of Economy, Planning, and Development (DEPDEV), projects funded by the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, Japan, Korea and France have all experienced implementation delays. 

Presently, China is among the top investors in the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA). And if projects financed by the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) are considered, they include the US$350-million Bataan-Cavite Interlink Bridge, US$188-million Laguna Lakeshore Road Network Project, US$400-million First Digital Transformation Development Policy Financing, US$207-million Metro Manila Flood Management Project Phase I and the US$537-million MRT Line 4 Project.

Beyond state-level interaction, private Chinese firms remain engaged. Huawei, for instance, offers a Seeds for the Future programme, which aims to train Filipino students in ICT, AI and 5G. In spite of the cancellations of several Chinese rail projects in 2022, Marcos renewed the Philippines’ memorandum of understanding on the Belt and Road Initiative with China in 2023. More specifically, the Digital Silk Road (DSR) is visible through the provision of telecommunications hardware by Huawei and ZTE to major Philippine telecom providers such as Globe Telecom, Converge ICT Solutions and PLDT. 

Philippine universities, for their part, have entered into partnerships with Chinese counterparts.

Notably, while most Filipinos distrust China, consumer behaviour reveals a conflicted public attitude. Filipinos continue to patronise Chinese goods — from e-bikes and products sold on local online platforms to major consumer brands such as BYD, Geely, MG, Xiaomi, Oppo — as well as digital services, namely Mobile Legends and TikTok.

As the broader Philippine security establishment steadfastly safeguards national security interests, the foreign affairs department and the country’s economic managers have sustained lines of communication and vectors of cooperation with Beijing. 

These mutual engagements demonstrate that compartmentalisation is happening at the state and sub-state levels. Marcos himself recently said that a “reset” in relations with China is “certainly going to happen”, underscoring that the Philippines has always disaggregated “territorial disputes from trade arrangements”, and hinted at a possible “impetus” for joint development of gas resources in the South China Sea.

While this is easier said than done, energy security cooperation could nevertheless scale up — amid supply pressures linked to the war in the Middle East — given China’s position as the world’s largest investor and producer of renewables.  

At the same time, the Marcos administration has signalled an assertion of strategic autonomy — for instance, by indicating that no additional Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) sites will be opened, declining a US proposal to escort Philippine resupply missions to Second Thomas Shoal, and maintaining that the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) will be the primary frontliners in the South China Sea.

It should also be emphasised that the Philippines’ security posture goes beyond the US and includes a deepening web of defence partnerships with countries such as Australia, France, the UK, Canada, as well as Asian partners including South Korea, Japan and India — states that likewise manage complex relations with China, as evidenced by their recent summit-level meetings with Xi Jinping.

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