Embracing Xi’s ‘Asian family’ while keeping US ties: Southeast Asia’s tightrope

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s first overseas trip in 2025 to Vietnam, Malaysia and Cambodia showed Beijing standing with the three Southeast Asian countries after they were slapped with high US tariffs of 46%, 24% and 49% respectively before the 90-day reprieve was announced.

For a while now, China has considered Southeast Asia an integral part of its neighbourhood diplomacy, and the region’s importance has grown with US-China competition intensifying. Trump’s tariffs provide an opening for China to draw Southeast Asia closer. The three Southeast Asian countries appear keen to strengthen ties with China while trying to cut a trade deal with America.

China has long regarded Southeast Asia as an integral part of its neighbourhood diplomacy to create a conducive environment for its development goals. Xi convened China’s first high-level Central Conference on Work Relating to Neighburing Countries in October 2013, the same year he became president. Xi said then that doing a good job in neighbourhood diplomacy is necessary to achieve China’s “two centenary goals” and realise the Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. In fact, just before this event, Xi visited Kazakhstan in September 2013 and Indonesia in October 2013 to unveil his signature Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Road, respectively.

Most recently, Xi presided over the second Central Conference on Work Relating to Neighbouring Countries from 8-9 April 2025, just days before his Southeast Asia tour. At this latest gathering, Xi called on China to deepen development integration, build a high-level connectivity network, and strengthen cooperation in industrial and supply chains with its neighbours.

Xi’s visit to Southeast Asia serves a number of objectives. One objective is for China to show its solidarity with the region and explore ways to ameliorate the negative impact of Trump’s tariffs. Without specifically mentioning America, Xi implicitly criticised the US at every stop of his three-nation tour.

In Vietnam, Xi called for joint action to oppose unilateral bullying and ensure the stability of global industrial and supply chains. In Malaysia, Xi affirmed China’s commitment to stand with Malaysia and the region to combat unilateralism and protectionism and “safeguard the bright prospects of our Asian family”. The term “Asian family” connotes an exclusive region without the US. In Cambodia, Xi reiterated that unilateralism and hegemonism have no support, and that trade wars undermine the multilateral trading system and disrupt global economic order.

Inversely, China presented itself as a stable, predictable and reliable partner that Southeast Asia and ASEAN can rely on. Beijing further tried to burnish its credentials as a champion of an open, liberal and rules-based multilateral trading order. And not singling out America reinforces the Chinese narrative that Beijing’s relations with Southeast Asia and ASEAN have their own inherent momentum and are not driven by the actions of the US.

Another objective of Xi’s visit was to emphasise that China and Southeast Asia, as well as ASEAN, ought to press ahead with practical areas of cooperation for mutual benefit, especially in these troubled times. It is worth noting that Cambodia, and most recently in 2023, Malaysia and Vietnam have signed on to China’s vision of a community of shared future. Hence, it was pertinent for China to stand with and affirm its commitment to deepen and broaden ties with these three countries.

In turn, Vietnam, Malaysia and Cambodia went out of their way to make Xi feel welcomed. Apart from the elaborate head-of-state welcome ceremonies and banquets, Xi was received and sent off at the international airports of the three countries by Vietnamese President Luong Cuong (upon arrival), Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh (upon departure), Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim (upon arrival and departure) and Cambodian King Norodom Sihamoni and Senate President Hun Sen (upon arrival) and Senate President Hun Sen (upon departure).

With reference to Cambodia, this is apparently the first time the Cambodian king has received a visiting foreign dignitary at the airport. Xi’s higher protocol treatment this time round compared to his earlier visits to Vietnam in 2023, Malaysia in 2013 and Cambodia in 2016, indicated the importance these countries viewed Xi’s visit amid the worsening international environment.

On cooperation matters, China and the three Southeast Asian countries were eager to show that much was achieved. In Vietnam, Xi witnessed the signing of 45 agreements (exceeding the 36 agreements signed in 2023), ranging from connectivity, artificial intelligence (AI), customs inspection and quarantine, agricultural products, culture and sports, human resource development and the media.

Among these agreements, two stand out. One is on promoting railway connectivity with both sides agreeing to proceed with a feasibility study for the Lao Cai — Hanoi — Haiphong railway that was delayed for some time, as well as to accelerate the study of a railway plan linking Lao Cai to Hekou in Yunnan. The other is the agreement to put commercial aircraft manufactured by China’s Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China, Ltd. (COMAC) into operation on certain routes in Vietnam, boosting COMAC’s international expansion plans.

In Malaysia, 31 agreements were signed in many areas including the possible application of China’s Beidou Navigation Satellite System (in sectors such as agriculture, logistics, financial services and smart manufacturing), potential cooperation in the semiconductor industrial chain, Chinese enterprises participating in Malaysia’s 5G network construction and support for Malaysian airline operators to buy and operate COMAC’s aircrafts.

In Cambodia, China’s only ironclad partner in Southeast Asia, Xi witnessed the signing of 37 agreements, more than the 31 agreements signed during his 2016 visit.

Overall, the agreements reached between China and the three Southeast Asian countries were wide ranging, covering politics, economics, sociocultural and even defence-security matters. They provided further affirmation of China’s three global initiatives, namely, the Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative and Global Civilisation Initiative.

Addressing the challenges posed by Trump’s tariffs, there was a conscious effort to boost cooperation in trade and investment, physical and digital connectivity, customs procedures and clearance, and emerging industries such as AI, green and digital economies, as well as renewable and clean energy.

However, it would take time for these agreements to bear fruit. A highlight of such high-level visits is often the signing ceremonies and the number of agreements signed. The challenging part is to see these agreements through to achieve substantive outcomes that could help to ameliorate the uncertainties caused by Trump’s tariffs.

While Vietnam, Malaysia and Cambodia are prepared to step up cooperation with China, they are simultaneously keen to make a trade deal with America due to their heavy reliance on the US markets. The US makes up approximately 40% of Cambodia’s total exports, 30% of Vietnam’s total exports and 14% of Malaysia’s total exports.

Among them, Vietnam has been the most proactive, dispatching a deputy prime minister to the US well before Xi’s arrival in Hanoi, followed by Cambodia, whose deputy prime minister held a virtual meeting with the US trade representative a day before Xi’s arrival in Phnom Penh. ASEAN has also indicated its preference for a “frank and constructive dialogue” with the US to address trade-related concerns. Such actions show that they regard the US market as critical for their economic growth.

Xi’s three-day stay in Malaysia, as opposed to two days each in Vietnam and Cambodia, showed China attached importance not only to China-Malaysia relations but also to Malaysia’s role as coordinator of ASEAN-China relations. Beijing would expect Malaysia to promote ASEAN-China relations while deftly managing differences between China and some ASEAN claimant states over the South China Sea.

Setting the tone, Malaysia and China agreed to resolve disputes in the South China Sea by peaceful means through friendly consultations and negotiations. Nevertheless, Malaysia and, in particular, Vietnam are likely to welcome a continued US security presence in the region to balance China’s heft on this issue.

Beijing is likely to press ahead to strengthen all-round relations, especially economic ties, with Southeast Asia and ASEAN. Another Chinese diplomatic outreach to the region can be expected with the upcoming ASEAN-Gulf Cooperation Council plus China Summit hosted by Malaysia. Southeast Asian countries and ASEAN, while keen to deepen existing ties and even explore cooperation with China in new areas, will want to simultaneously engage other key partners.

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