No seat at the table: Taiwan’s shrinking autonomy

The Taiwan issue has long been a source of tensions between the US and China. As US President Donald Trump plans to travel to Beijing in mid-May 2026, officials in Taiwan worry that the island will be “on the menu” of the talks between Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping. They fear that to strike a deal with Xi, Trump may yield to Beijing’s pressure to cut US arms sales to Taiwan and publicly oppose Taiwan independence, departing from the longstanding US policy that it “does not support Taiwan independence”.

Although the Taiwanese government insists that the future of Taiwan must be determined by the 23 million plus Taiwanese people, the reality is that Taiwan is stuck in great power competition and has little strategic autonomy. Taiwan’s lack of strategic autonomy is a result of complex history, great power competition and its own partisan politics.

Taiwan, especially the Kuomintang (KMT), has had a long and close relationship with the US. The Republic of China (ROC)’s founding father, Dr Sun Yat-sen, spent a few formative years in the US, primarily Hawaii. Sun attended the Punahou School in 1883, known as Oahu College then. Barack Obama graduated from the same school in 1979. 

During World War II, Chiang Kai-shek’s ROC government sought US aid against Japan. Madame Chiang (Soong Mei-ling) dazzled the American public and members of the US Congress with her passionate speeches in impeccable English during her US trips. After the Japanese surrendered in 1945, the Chinese Civil War between Chiang’s nationalist forces and Mao Zedong’s communist guerrillas resumed. The US continued to support Chiang even after Mao established the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland in 1949 and Chiang and his ROC government retreated to Taiwan.

The US finally decided to normalise relations with the PRC in the 1970s, with President Richard Nixon’s historic visit to China in February 1972 and establishment of diplomatic relations with Beijing in January 1979. US Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act in April 1979 to regulate “unofficial” US-Taiwan relations, including arms sales to help Taiwan defend itself. Under its “one China” policy, the US recognises the PRC as the only legitimate government of China and “acknowledges” the Chinese position that Taiwan is a part of China.

Taiwan’s democratisation in the 1980s witnessed the birth and growth of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The DPP unseated the KMT for the first time in 2000. Eight years later the KMT returned to power, with Ma Ying-jeou serving two terms as the ROC president (2008-2016). The DPP won the presidential election again in 2016 and has stayed in power since, with the KMT being the largest opposition party. The DPP rejects the historical concept of “one China” that includes both the Chinese mainland and Taiwan. It claims that Taiwan is already an independent sovereign nation. The current DPP leader Lai Ching-te called the Chinese mainland “a foreign hostile force”.

Meanwhile, the PRC views Taiwan as an integral part of China that needs to be reunified with the mainland, peacefully if possible, by force if necessary. Its rationale is simple: this is an issue concerning China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity that is left over from the unfinished Chinese Civil War. Even Taiwan’s own ROC Constitution and relevant laws stipulate that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are the same country.

The US has never been absent from this essentially “Chinese matter”. Now, with the US-China rivalry intensifying, Taiwan has become more important strategically and economically for both Washington and Beijing. Taiwan’s location in the middle of the so-called “first island chain” and its chip manufacturing power have enhanced its values. Although the US does not claim sovereignty over Taiwan, it is unlikely to abandon Taiwan and help Beijing achieve its national unification goals.

The DPP has completely revamped textbooks in an effort to sever Taiwan’s historical connections with China. As a result, most young people in Taiwan do not identify with China or consider themselves as Chinese anymore. In the ongoing US-China competition, the DPP has unconditionally sided with the US while erecting barriers for cross-Taiwan Strait exchanges. With all its eggs in the US basket, the DPP is not in a position to say no to the US, completely losing its strategic autonomy. Meanwhile, China’s Anti-Secession Law and its refusal to rule out the use of force against separatism means that the DPP is severely constrained in its pursuit of de jure Taiwan independence.

The KMT, officially named the Chinese Nationalist Party, still follows the ROC Constitution and pays lip service to Taiwan’s eventual unification with the mainland. However, the KMT is divided by the so-called pro-US camp and pro-China camp, leading to disagreements on major matters such as Taiwan’s defence budget and its mainland policy. 

KMT chair Cheng Li-wun visited the Chinese mainland and met with CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping in early April 2026, after a hiatus of ten years of such high-level talks. Cheng, a former DPP member and a non-traditional KMT leader, favours closer ties to the mainland through engagement over a massive defence buildup that she believes can hardly create peace across the Taiwan Strait. It is quite telling that Cheng visited the mainland first before her planned visit to the US in June. Cheng’s approach is reminiscent of former KMT senior official Fredrick Chien (钱复) who once argued that Taiwan’s mainland policy must take priority over its foreign relations.

However, Cheng’s mainland-friendly approach has not been fully embraced by all KMT party heavyweights, many of whom view Washington as more crucial than Beijing for Taiwan. Also notable is that the KMT is an old party compared with the DPP and the smaller opposition party Taiwan People’s Party (TPP). The DPP and TPP have their fervent young supporters, nicknamed “green birds” (青鸟) and “green grass” (小草) respectively. Even if the KMT returns to power in the future, its disunity and lack of broader support, especially from the youth, will restrict its ability to exercise limited strategic autonomy in navigating great power rivalry.

Lack of strategic autonomy may have a fateful and perhaps devastating impact on Taiwan. When Taiwan’s two largest political parties have their hands tied, it is hard to imagine that the future of the island will be determined by Taiwanese themselves.

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