Xi’s message on Taiwan: Confidence on a different level

On 12 April, following Kuomintang (KMT) chair Cheng Li-wun’s meeting with Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping, mainland China announced ten measures to deepen cross-strait exchanges, including plans to supply water and electricity from the Fujian coast to Kinmen and Matsu and to resume individual travel to Taiwan for residents of Shanghai and Fujian. 

The Taiwanese government strongly condemned the move, insisting that any exchange arrangements must not come with political conditions or be reduced to bargaining chips in partisan political deals.

Cheng returned to Taipei from Beijing on 12 April. Speaking to the media, she thanked the mainland for its “pro-Taiwan” policies and said she had instructed her vice-chairs to form a task force to follow up and liaise with mainland counterparts. Cheng said,“On youth exchanges, agriculture and fisheries and micro-enterprises, the KMT can provide concrete channels so that ordinary people can directly reap the dividends of peaceful cross-strait development.”

Academics interviewed noted that Xi’s language at the “Xi–Cheng meeting” was milder than in the past, but that his underlying demands and confidence were on an entirely different level. Against the backdrop of the US-Iran conflict, the meeting further highlighted Beijing’s desire to project a message of pursuing peace.

Cheng undertook a “journey of peace” to the mainland from 7 to 12 April, meeting Xi on 10 April. On 12 April, Song Tao, director of the CCP’s Taiwan Affairs Office, sent her off and said, “We will meet again.” 

A few hours before Cheng flew home, Beijing unveiled ten measures to promote cross-strait exchanges and cooperation. These included exploring the establishment of a regular communication mechanism between the CCP and KMT; creating an institutionalised platform for youth exchanges between the two parties; advancing projects to connect Fujian’s coastal areas with Kinmen and Matsu via water, electricity and bridges; and fully restoring normal direct passenger flights across the strait.

Beijing also proposed setting up communication mechanisms on the political basis of upholding the 1992 Consensus and opposing Taiwan independence; facilitating the entry of Taiwanese agricultural and fishery products into the mainland; improving access management for Taiwan-related fisheries; easing procedures for Taiwanese food imports; supporting Taiwanese micro, small and medium enterprises in expanding into the mainland market; allowing content-appropriate Taiwanese television dramas and other content to be broadcast on the mainland; as well as resuming pilot schemes for individual travel to Taiwan for residents of Shanghai and Fujian.

The Taiwan Presidential Office and Executive Yuan responded by stating that the Taiwanese government consistently supports healthy and orderly cross-strait exchanges, but they should not be subject to political preconditions or objectives, nor be reduced to tools for partisan manoeuvring or bargaining. 

Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council further criticised Beijing for bypassing the democratically elected government in an attempt to recast cross-strait relations under a “KMT-CCP” and “one China” framework, with economic concessions merely serving as sugarcoated poison disguised as generous packages, highlighting their true “trap-and-exploit” nature.

Yang Kai-Huang, director of Ming Chuan University’s Cross-Strait Research Center, told Lianhe Zaobao that Xi’s remarks must be interpreted in the context of the CCP’s “overall strategy for resolving the Taiwan issue in the new era”, rather than merely as a push for cross-strait peace and exchanges.

Yang argued, “While Xi’s tone is milder than before, the underlying demands and confidence are on an entirely different level; the current balance of power across both sides of the Taiwan Strait is incomparable to the past, and from a strategic perspective on resolving the Taiwan issue, the CCP takes the leading role.” 

He also noted that external interventions such as US hegemony and Japanese militarism are more pronounced than in 2005, and that China now stands on equal footing with the US.

He said, “Xi Jinping is telling the KMT under Cheng Li-wun that opposing Taiwan independence and foreign independence are the shared political foundation for cross-strait peace. One should remember Sun Yat-sen’s principle of ‘peace, struggle and save China’; for Chinese people today, it can be phrased as ‘peace, struggle and revitalise China’. 

“Cheng’s response also shows that the two parties share the same core principles: both are Chinese, oppose foreign intervention, and believe cross-strait issues should be resolved by the Chinese themselves.”

Meanwhile, Yen Chen-shen, a research fellow at National Chengchi University’s Institute of International Relations, assessed that the Xi-Cheng meeting could help ease cross-strait tensions. Although the KMT is not the current ruling party, many of its governed counties and cities can still implement initiatives in agriculture, fisheries, tourism and youth exchanges.

Yen thinks that Beijing has handled both the US-Iran conflict and the Xi-Cheng meeting very skilfully. He assessed, “On the issue of Iran, the US appears belligerent, while China is promoting peace — so much so that even US President Donald Trump acknowledged Beijing’s role in facilitating US-Iran negotiations. Xi first addressed Taiwan issues with Cheng, which will grant him greater leverage when he meets Trump later. Since the US also calls for cross-strait peace, a fourth communique is unlikely, although statements opposing ‘Taiwan independence’ cannot be ruled out.”

This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as “中国大陆发布对台10项措施 赖政府批不应沦为特定政党交易筹码”.

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