Not distracted: Southeast Asia remains firmly in China’s diplomatic orbit

At first glance, Southeast Asia appears to have slipped in importance on Beijing’s agenda in 2026. One reason is the expected slowdown in high-level exchanges compared with 2025, when Chinese President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Qiang visited Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam. That said, engagement has not disappeared entirely: Foreign Minister Wang Yi still visited Cambodia, Thailand and Myanmar in May 2026.

Another reason is China’s preoccupation with hosting the upcoming Trump-Xi summit, which Wang Yi has described as a big year in China-US relations. Moreover, China, like many other countries, is grappling with the fallout from the conflict in the Middle East.

Despite these preoccupations, this piece argues that Southeast Asia remains very much on China’s radar by highlighting recent developments in China-Vietnam and China-Philippine relations as well as Beijing’s push for enhanced connectivity with the region.

Beijing has moved to strengthen ties with Vietnam while playing up their socialist credentials. It hosted To Lam, concurrently general secretary, on his first trip abroad as president in April 2026. Chinese state media portrayed the visit as evidence of the importance Vietnam places on developing party and government ties with China. A total of 32 agreements were signed, a significant jump from the 14 agreements reached during To Lam’s 2024 China visit.

The two countries are stepping up practical cooperation, including in areas where Vietnam had previously expressed concerns. In 2025, under To Lam’s watch as general secretary, Chinese telecommunication companies Huawei and ZTE secured bids to supply 5G equipment for Vietnam’s telecommunications infrastructure. While these are small contracts, they reflect a growing receptiveness to work with China in non-core 5G infrastructure. However, it is unclear how Vietnam intends to integrate more Chinese components while ensuring the security of its 5G network.

China is also playing a bigger role in building Vietnam’s physical infrastructure. Not long after the two countries established a joint committee on railway cooperation, Vietnam started construction on the 419-kilometre-long Lao Cai-Hanoi-Haiphong Railway to boost economic ties between China’s Yunnan province and northern Vietnam. Two other lines, i.e. the Mong Cai-Halong-Haiphong and Dong Dang-Hanoi Railways, that will link China’s Guangxi province, are in the works and if completed, will further bind China and northern Vietnam more closely economically. Furthermore, the three railway lines will be of the standard gauge type used in China, making for more seamless connectivity between the two countries.

Before To Lam’s China visit, the two countries convened the 3+3 ministerial dialogue on diplomacy, defence and public security in March 2026, the first such platform of its kind jointly established by China and Vietnam. This 3+3 ministerial dialogue, proposed during President Xi’s visit to Vietnam in April 2025, is an upgrade from the 3+3 vice-ministerial dialogue held in December 2024. Beijing sees the ministerial dialogue as an example of China and Vietnam revitalising the global socialist cause through practical cooperation, and as a bulwark against “colour revolutions”, a term it uses to describe foreign-backed attempts at political change. The latter has assumed greater significance given America’s penchant to remove regimes through military means.

The 3+3 ministerial dialogue provides strategic oversight and direction to bilateral cooperation. On diplomacy, there is a Steering Committee for Bilateral Cooperation (in its 17th iteration since the first meeting in 2006). On defence, the two sides have exchanges involving their land border forces. They also conduct regular joint naval patrols (in its 40th iteration since 2006) and held their first joint naval training in March 2026 in the Beibu Gulf/Tonkin Gulf. On public security, they cooperate on crime prevention and control (in its ninth iteration) and have agreed to explore cooperation on counterterrorism in March 2026.

Beijing could hold up the 3+3 ministerial dialogue with Vietnam as a “pioneering platform” to pursue similar cooperation with other Southeast Asian countries. Already, it has pressed ahead to hold 2+2 ministerial cooperation mechanisms with Indonesia last year and more recently with Cambodia, and has agreed to establish one with Malaysia.

Although China-Philippine relations are affected by the South China Sea issue and Manila’s close defence and security ties with the US, there are signs that Beijing is trying to improve ties with Manila to not only stabilise bilateral relations but also to influence the China-ASEAN agenda, as the Philippines is the current ASEAN chair. 

One indication is the announcement by the Chinese embassy in Manila that the Chinese ambassador Jing Quan met Philippine Energy Secretary Sharon Garin to discuss energy sector cooperation in March 2026. This suggests that China and the Philippines are exploring ways to ameliorate the negative impact of rising oil and gas prices on the local Philippine population. A Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson subsequently said that China was ready to strengthen coordination and collaboration with Southeast Asian countries and jointly address energy security issues.

After Philippine President Bambang Marcos declared a state of national energy emergency and made a call for very serious restructuring of relations with China in March 2026, two Chinese tankers delivered 260,000 barrels of diesel to the Philippines in the same month. However, this aid was more symbolic than substantial, amounting to roughly 1.3 days of diesel demand in the Philippines. At the same time, Manila has been stepping up energy supplies from other countries.

Another indication that Beijing is trying to improve ties with Manila was Philippine Agriculture Secretary Francisco ​Tiu Laurel’s remarks, following a meeting with the Chinese ambassador in March 2026, that China has ​assured the ‌Philippines it would not ​restrict fertiliser ​exports to the ⁠country. This assurance is important as China is a major fertiliser supplier, with implications for local food production and prices, although the Philippines has been concurrently importing from other countries and is also ramping up alternatives such as liquid fertilisers and biofertilisers.

Beyond individual sectoral cooperation, the Chinese embassy said that its ambassador and Philippine Executive Secretary Ralph Recto, who oversees the Office of the President, have engaged in a broader discussion on bilateral relations and a range of issues including the South China Sea, law enforcement cooperation, economic and trade ties, as well as people-to-people exchanges. Separately, Recto elaborated that the two sides had discussed increasing tourism flows and flights between the two countries. He added that the Chinese ambassador had called for more exchanges of official visits in 2026 to send positive signals about bilateral relations.

The Philippines further announced that there had been initial exchanges on potential oil and gas cooperation (in the South China Sea) when officials from both countries met in Fujian in March 2026. However, the Chinese side did not publicly acknowledge this. Even on the Philippine side, there was wariness about prospects for cooperation as earlier efforts did not produce fruitful results.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Southeast Asia will hit another milestone when Malaysia’s East Coast Railway Line (ECRL), connecting Gombak in Selangor (on the West Coast of Peninsular Malaysia) to Kuantan Port (on the East Coast) and then northwards to Kota Bahru, is completed by the end of 2026.

The project began with much fanfare in 2017 but soon ran into difficulties. It was relaunched after taking into consideration Malaysia’s concerns over issues including costs, route, railway operations and maintenance, as well as local participation. China hailed this as a mutually beneficial outcome and one that upheld the larger picture of China-Malaysia relations.          

Given its importance, Beijing will likely send a high-level representative to mark ECRL’s start of commercial operation in early 2027. It had adopted the same approach to commemorate key stages of ECRL’s development. In 2017, Chinese State Councillor Wang Yong attended the ceremony to kickstart ECRL’s construction. Premier Li Qiang officiated at the groundbreaking ceremony of ECRL’s Gombak Integrated Terminal Station, a multimodal interchange hub, in Selangor in 2024. 

Amid global uncertainties, ECRL’s commercial launch will serve to reinforce Beijing’s message that it is committed to working with other countries for overall peace, progress and development since the ECRL will not only reduce travel time but also drive employment and growth in the areas it passes through. 

In Beijing’s eyes, the significance of ECRL goes beyond Malaysia. China has stated its willingness to actively work with Malaysia to explore connecting ECRL with the China-Laos and China-Thailand Railways, to enhance the new International Land-Sea Trade Corridor, which links western China, via a series of railways, highways and ports, to Southeast Asia and other parts of the world. In other words, China wants to build a network of connectivity to bring countries closer to China, especially in economic terms. This thrust is likely to be more important considering the disruption caused by US policies and actions.

However, for ECRL to be viable, it will need to show that both freight and passenger travel can, over time, help to defray the cost of loan repayment as well as the burden of operating and maintaining the line. Related projects like the China-Laos Railway and the Jakarta-Bandung Railway, while experiencing rising ridership, show that this will not be an easy task. More importantly, the onus is on Malaysia to integrate ECRL into the country’s overall economic development strategy to drive long-term growth and development.

Beijing’s overtures to Southeast Asia are ongoing, but the results have been mixed. While Vietnam appears to have veered closer to China, it is still predominantly guided by its multidirectional foreign policy of engaging other key actors. Despite signs of rapprochement, China-Philippine relations remain saddled by maritime and security issues. It is also unclear if the Philippines, as ASEAN chair, can conclude talks on a Code of Conduct this year despite more regular meetings on this matter. Although ECRL’s impending completion will be a milestone, its full potential requires Malaysia to play a critical role. Notwithstanding the above, one thing is certain, which is that Southeast Asia remains an integral part of China’s neighbourhood diplomacy.

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