Post-election Bangladesh: How China prepared while India lost ground

Bangladesh’s latest parliamentary election delivered a decisive verdict — and a strategic signal beyond its borders. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) secured a landslide mandate in the country’s first vote since the 2024 student-led uprising that ended the long rule of Sheikh Hasina. The result elevates BNP leader Tarique Rahman to the centre of Bangladesh’s political leadership, as he is the new prime minister of the country.

The election’s strategic meaning, however, is being shaped less in Dhaka than abroad. In New Delhi, where Hasina has been living in exile since her removal, the BNP’s return is widely read as the end of a period of strategic closeness and familiarity — and the start of diplomatic uncertainty. In Beijing, the same outcome has prompted a cooler assessment: not rupture, but adjustment within Bangladesh’s pursuit of stability and autonomy in foreign affairs matters.

Beijing moved swiftly after Bangladesh’s election to signal continuity rather than recalibration. Soon after the results were announced, the Chinese embassy in Dhaka congratulated the Bangladeshi people on “smooth and successful” polls and expressed readiness to “write new chapters” in bilateral relations. Days later, the message was reinforced by China’s foreign ministry, which highlighted support for Bangladesh’s development agenda, deeper high-quality Belt and Road cooperation, and the strengthening of the China-Bangladesh comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership.

This emphasis was deliberate. Rather than dwelling on political winners, Beijing focused on process, stability and forward momentum. From China’s perspective, the election represents political adjustment rather than strategic disruption. That reading is reflected in Beijing’s sustained outreach to a broad range of post-2024 political actors well before the February 2026 outcome was settled.

Engagement with opposition forces has been particularly telling. In November 2024, a four-member delegation from the BNP travelled to China at the invitation of the Communist Party of China. This was followed in February by a 22-member, multi-party delegation that spent nearly two weeks in China. Parallel meetings between China’s ambassador in Dhaka and Bangladeshi leaders before and after the election further underscored Beijing’s early investment in the post-Hasina political landscape.

Economic interests anchor this approach. Between October 2016 and June 2025, Chinese companies invested more than US$11 billion in Bangladesh across power generation, transport infrastructure, water supply, textiles and manufacturing. This sizeable footprint gives Beijing a strong incentive to prioritise policy continuity and project implementation regardless of leadership change.

That priority was evident during interim leader Muhammad Yunus’s March 2025 visit to attend the Boao Forum for Asia, which yielded an agreement on economic and technical cooperation. The two sides additionally agreed to advance high-quality Belt and Road projects, expand cooperation in media, cultural heritage, sports and health, and reaffirm the framework of their comprehensive strategic partnership. Yunus also secured US$2.1 billion in investments, loans and grant commitments from Chinese government-linked and private entities.

China’s leverage extends beyond investment. It is Bangladesh’s fourth-largest lender after Japan, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, with cumulative lending of about US$7.5 billion since 1975. During the interim period, Dhaka sought more favourable Chinese terms, including lower interest rates, fee waivers and extended repayment schedules — requests shaped in part by Bangladesh’s impending graduation from Least Developed Country status later this year.

Beijing’s relevance is likely to grow further under a BNP-led government. The party’s election manifesto prioritises rapid economic growth, industrialisation, foreign direct investment and the development of a “Made in Bangladesh” defence industry alongside stronger air and naval capabilities. China has long been central to these ambitions, supplying military hardware since a 2002 defence cooperation agreement and providing technical support for domestic manufacturing. This trajectory was reinforced recently when China Electronics Technology Group Corporation agreed to establish a drone manufacturing and assembly plant in Bogra, including technology transfer and capacity building — further embedding Beijing in Bangladesh’s evolving strategic calculus.

For India, the BNP’s victory signals not renewal but strategic regression. The previous government under Sheikh Hasina offered New Delhi a rare asset in South Asia: political predictability, close security cooperation and alignment on sensitive regional issues. Her removal — and the BNP’s subsequent mandate — effectively closes what many in India viewed as a “golden period” in bilateral ties.

India’s initial response combined courtesy with caution. Prime Minister Narendra Modi promptly congratulated BNP leader Tarique Rahman, spoke with him directly and reaffirmed India’s commitment to bilateral relations. New Delhi also signalled openness to a reset by sending senior representatives to the swearing-in ceremony. While BNP leaders publicly suggested that Modi be invited as a gesture of goodwill, India ultimately opted for calibrated representation: Lok Sabha Speaker Om Birla and Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri attended on Modi’s behalf. Birla delivered a personal letter from Modi inviting Rahman and his family to New Delhi. 

India’s reading of the election is shaped by a mix of history, security and regional geopolitics. For more than a decade, New Delhi had relied on Hasina’s government as a stabilising anchor in its eastern neighbourhood, aligning with India’s broader regional calculus. Bangladesh featured centrally in India’s Act East Policy and Neighbourhood First initiatives, supporting connectivity to Southeast Asia, counter-insurgency cooperation, and regional economic integration. That strategic comfort has now been disrupted.

Hasina’s exile in New Delhi following the 2024 upheaval has further complicated the relationship. India and Bangladesh share a long and sensitive border, with enduring issues ranging from irregular migration and transboundary water management to insurgency and mutual perceptions. Under the previous government, these frictions were largely managed to prevent spillover into the broader relationship. A BNP-led government reopens questions in New Delhi about whether that delicate balance can be sustained.

Economic considerations deepen India’s stake. Bangladesh is an important trading partner, with Indian exports valued at roughly US$13.5 billion. Its ports, energy corridors and transport infrastructure are critical to India’s access to Southeast Asia and to improving connectivity for its landlocked northeastern states. From New Delhi’s perspective, any geopolitical realignment in Dhaka carries implications not only for diplomacy and security but also for India’s regional trade competitiveness.

Against this backdrop, India has adopted a posture of cautious recalibration. Anticipating the BNP’s return, New Delhi has combined guarded optimism about pragmatic cooperation with efforts to broaden its political outreach. On the sidelines of the swearing-in ceremony. Misri met Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami chief Shafiqur Rahman, signalling India’s intent to engage beyond a single political camp. Still, Indian policymakers will likely remain wary that Dhaka may assign India diminished strategic priority under the new government — an anxiety shaped by shifting regional power balances and Bangladesh’s growing external options.

Where Beijing sees continuity, New Delhi confronts uncertainty. The BNP’s manifesto foregrounds “Bangladesh Before All”, economic diplomacy and diversified strategic partnerships, signalling a foreign policy that resists exclusive alignment. How the new government balances relations with China and India will therefore shape not only Dhaka’s trajectory but the wider geopolitics of South Asia.

For now, Beijing holds a relative advantage. It has insulated its position through sustained political outreach and deep economic and defence linkages that span governments. India, while still indispensable to Bangladesh because of geography, trade, and security interdependence, may face a more fluid and less predictable relationship. Dhaka’s next moves will determine whether this gap narrows — or becomes a defining feature of the region’s evolving balance.

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