The seas are no longer free: Pirate kings and the emerging maritime order
With the Strait of Hormuz held hostage by players like Iran and the US, the notion of “state piracy” has returned to the debate, alongside rising scrutiny of countries along key waterways such as the Strait of Malacca. US academic Ma Haiyun argues that these “strait powers” may be able to convert control over maritime chokepoints into geopolitical leverage.
The recent US-Israeli assault on Iran has, whether unexpectedly or predictably, led to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz (SOH), one of the most critical chokepoints in global energy transit. The emerging geopolitical reality, as articulated by Iranian officials, is that Iran has demonstrated its leverage over one of the world’s most vital economic arteries. By effectively linking global energy security with Iranian national security, Tehran has signalled that any infringement upon its territorial integrity may carry direct consequences for the economic stability of industrialised nations and the functioning of global governance.
New pirate kings?
Unable — or unwilling — to reopen the SOH through direct military confrontation, and wary of the broader consequences of escalation, the Trump administration has instead adopted a paradoxical approach: restricting maritime traffic in and around the strait, including the seizure or interdiction of vessels linked to Iranian ports, in an apparent attempt to compel reopening by means of closure.
In this context, Iran has accused the US of engaging in acts tantamount to piracy, arguing that the world’s most powerful navy has assumed practices traditionally associated with non-state actors. Ironically, US officials have likewise characterised Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a “pirate-like” force operating under a national flag.
The emergence of competing discourses of “state piracy” in and around the SOH invites a broader reconsideration of classical maritime theory, particularly Alfred Thayer Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783. Mahan’s framework, while foundational, did not anticipate a world in which narrow maritime chokepoints would become decisive nodes of global energy and economic flows, nor one in which littoral states could deploy asymmetric capabilities — such as fast attack craft, missiles, and drones — to exert effective control over them. This conceptual gap has contributed to a persistent overestimation of conventional naval supremacy and strategic mastery at sea.
... the logic of great power naval warfare is being reshaped by the geography and militarisation of the world’s most consequential chokepoints.
In or near critical straits, traditional maritime doctrines of dominance encounter structural limitations. The strategic challenge is no longer primarily the defeat of opposing fleets (as Trump has stated that the Iranian army — including navy — is gone), but rather the ability — or inability — to break, manage or prevent the closure of narrow and highly vulnerable maritime passages. In this sense, the logic of great power naval warfare is being reshaped by the geography and militarisation of the world’s most consequential chokepoints.
From Hormuz to Malacca and beyond
Following Iran’s effective weaponisation of the SOH — and Washington’s apparent inability or unwillingness to reopen it — strategic attention has increasingly shifted to the Strait of Malacca (SOM). This passage, arguably more critical than Hormuz in terms of global trade volume, links the Indian Ocean and the Pacific and sits at the core of the US Indo-Pacific strategy.
Almost in parallel with the emergence of Iran and the US as competing “pirate kings”, Washington and Indonesia — a key littoral state of the Malacca Strait — have moved to elevate their strategic coordination. In a sudden and notable development, the two countries announced a Major Defense Cooperation Partnership on 13 April, signalling a qualitative shift in their security relationship.
While the joint statement highlights three formal pillars — (1) military modernisation and capacity building; (2) training and professional military education; and (3) joint exercises and operational cooperation — reports suggest that the US is also seeking expanded access to Indonesian airspace, including areas adjacent to the Malacca Strait. According to multiple media accounts, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto has approved elements of this proposal, though the scope and implementation remain unclear.
At the same time, remarks by Indonesia’s finance minister regarding the possibility of imposing transit fees on the Malacca Strait triggered immediate concern in Malaysia and Singapore, both of which are co-stakeholders in the strait’s governance. Indonesia’s foreign minister, Sugiono, subsequently downplayed the comments, characterising them as speculative or even “joking”. The speed of the clarification, like that of the US overflight in Indonesian airspace, however, underscores the sensitivity of any attempt to redefine the legal and economic regime of one of the world’s busiest maritime corridors.
A similar “trial balloon” — whether rhetorical or strategic — has appeared elsewhere. The Houthis have suggested imposing fees on vessels transiting the Bab el-Mandab Strait. Taken together, these developments — from Southeast Asia to the Red Sea — point to a broader pattern: regional actors are increasingly testing the boundaries of control over critical chokepoints.
What is emerging is not merely opportunistic behaviour, but the early contours of what might be termed “strait power”: the capacity to translate control over critical maritime corridors into geopolitical influence.
These moves are not occurring in isolation. They are, at least in part, informed by the precedent set by Iran, which has demonstrated that control — or even the credible threat of control — over strategic straits can translate into geopolitical leverage. The implications go beyond revenue generation. What is emerging is a gradual shift towards the conditionalisation of passage: from a norm of open navigation towards a more contested, securitised, and potentially transactional regime — especially in times of crisis or conflict.
From offensive sea power to defensive strait power?
The weaponisation of chokepoints such as the SOH can be seen as a direct response to US and Israeli strikes on Iran. Yet framing it purely as a reactive measure obscures a deeper structural shift. The strategic value of maritime chokepoints is being reappraised in a global environment increasingly shaped by global dependence on energy and the shipping industry, the gradual erosion of liberal international norms, and the development and proliferation of low-cost yet effective defence technologies such as drones, missiles and fast-attack boats.
Major littoral states — including Turkey, Iran, Malaysia and Indonesia — have all, to varying degrees, recognised the latent leverage embedded in their geographic positions. What is emerging is not merely opportunistic behaviour, but the early contours of what might be termed “strait power”: the capacity to translate control over critical maritime corridors into geopolitical influence.
This awareness was already visible several years ago. In 2019, former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad convened the Kuala Lumpur Summit, which brought together leaders or representatives from Turkey, Qatar, Pakistan and Indonesia — though Pakistan and Indonesia ultimately scaled back participation due to sensitivities regarding their relations with Saudi Arabia. While much commentary at the time focused on the summit’s potential to rival the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, less attention was paid to Mahathir’s repeated emphasis on the Muslim world’s control over strategic resources — particularly key maritime chokepoints.
His framing — linking the Bosporus, the SOH and the SOM — anticipated a shift that is now becoming increasingly visible: the politicisation and securitisation of global transit routes under conditions of conflict and invasion. A comparable line of reasoning was advanced in Doha by Pakistan’s foreign minister at a ministerial session of the Kuala Lumpur Summit, who noted that countries situated near key maritime chokepoints — such as the SOM, the Gulf of Oman, the SOH and the Bosporus — possess significant potential for collective development and shared prosperity.
If this pattern persists, a reinforcing logic may emerge: the more conflicts, attacks, and even invasions directly involve weak littoral states, the greater the likelihood that adjacent straits become sites of disruption or conditional access.
Muslim ‘strait power’ could be a strong complement to traditional sea power
As Rais Hussin Mohamed Ariff has observed, while Mahathir did not articulate a formal blueprint for a unified bloc, the underlying idea of closer coordination among Muslim-majority states carries the potential to reshape elements of the global order. In strategic terms, such coordination — if ever realised — would place several critical maritime chokepoints under the influence of states across the Muslim world, including passages around the SOM, the Gulf of Oman, the SOH and the Bosporus.
The significance of this configuration lies less in formal alliance structures than in the latent leverage it represents. Given that maritime transport remains substantially more cost-efficient than overland alternatives, even marginal disruptions or policy shifts in these corridors can exert disproportionate effects on global trade flows.
Recent developments illustrate this dynamic. Israel’s massacring of the Palestinians in Gaza, the Houthis’ rapid disruption of shipping through the Bab el-Mandab Strait — particularly targeting Israel-affiliated vessels — and the US and Israel’s unlawful attack on Iran in the SOH all point to a broader pattern: for weaker defenders, chokepoints are increasingly treated as instruments of strategic pressure rather than neutral transit routes.
If this pattern persists, a reinforcing logic may emerge: the more conflicts, attacks, and even invasions directly involve weak littoral states, the greater the likelihood that adjacent straits become sites of disruption or conditional access. This, in turn, suggests an evolution in the conduct of modern naval warfare — one in which the control of narrow maritime passages becomes as consequential as dominance on the open sea.
Western maritime dominance is no longer determined by fleet strength alone.
At the operational level, recent cases highlight the growing effectiveness of asymmetric capabilities. While the relatively weak Houthis and Iran cannot match the conventional strength of Western naval powers, the use of missiles, drones and fast-attack craft has proven sufficient to disrupt, deter, and at times constrain passage through critical waterways. This does not negate the continued relevance of classical sea power, as articulated by Alfred Thayer Mahan, but it does qualify it. Western maritime dominance is no longer determined by fleet strength alone.
In this context, Muslim “strait power” emerges as a complementary force to traditional sea power. If sea power denotes the ability to project and sustain dominance across open waters, strait power lies in the capacity to restrict, condition, or selectively deny access at key chokepoints. The implication is not the eclipse of the superpower’s naval supremacy, but its constraint: control of global maritime flows increasingly depends on the interaction between blue-water capabilities and the strategic agency of states that command the world’s narrowest — and most critical — passages.
