Is Trump a disrupter or a stabiliser in US-China relations?
In US-China relations, US President Trump in his second term is an asset. Whether the May visit to China yields concrete objectives, the process of ongoing plans for meetings and summitry helps to stabilise the relationship, says US academic Zhiqun Zhu.
Assuming there is no need to reschedule his trip again, US President Donald Trump will spend 14-15 May in China for a summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping.
Is this visit significant? How do we evaluate Trump’s role in US-China relations?
This will be Trump’s second official trip to China. His first presidential visit took place in November 2017 during his first term. He and first lady Melania were warmly welcomed in Beijing, including having an afternoon tea inside the Forbidden City with Xi and Madame Peng Liyuan.
Despite the seemingly successful and pleasant visit, Trump initiated a trade war with China shortly after returning to Washington. In January 2018, as part of its “America First” policy, the Trump administration imposed tariffs on imported washing machines and solar panels, including those from China. By late 2019, the US had imposed tariffs on roughly US$350 billion of Chinese imports, and China had retaliated on US$100 billion US exports. The US-China relationship nose-dived to the lowest point in history during the latter half of the Trump administration and much of the Biden administration.
Chinese analysts skeptical of Trump’s visit
With a fresh memory of Trump’s first visit and his surprising about-face, many observers view him as a person of little credibility and wonder what might happen after his May trip. Many Chinese have strong reservations about Trump’s visit. Some analysts in China even suggest that with Trump’s recent military actions in Venezuela and Iran, he has “blood on his hands”, how can China still welcome him as if nothing has happened? And how can China justify this visit to Global South countries that look up to China for global leadership?
... even if no major agreements are reached during Trump’s May visit to Beijing, the trip will still be significant.
Indeed, most observers do not have high expectations for this visit. The purpose of Trump’s trip is not entirely clear, and he is likely to seek a “big deal” with China, but the two sides disagree on what such a deal looks like. For China, Taiwan is always a priority issue to be addressed, especially since the two leaders skipped it during their Busan meeting in October 2025; however, Taiwan is not on the top of the US agenda. For Trump, if China promises to purchase more US products such as soybeans, aircraft, oil and gas, then the visit will be a great success. He is unlikely to drastically change America’s longstanding Taiwan policy in favour of Beijing. Beijing should have no illusions about this either.
Despite low expectations, both China and the US value highest-level diplomacy now. The Chinese view such summits as opportunities to provide top-level guidance for managing the complex bilateral relationship, while Trump believes he could single-handedly strike trade deals with China. Beijing considers a steady US-China relationship critical to the realisation of its core national goals, while the Trump administration needs a good relationship with China to boost the Republican Party’s performance in the November 2026 mid-term elections and to prove to naysayers that Trump could manage the difficult relationship with China peacefully.
Process of meetings and visits a stabiliser in itself
Trump and Xi are likely to meet several times in 2026, with Xi being invited to Washington for a return visit and both leaders possibly attending APEC and G20 summits. Typically, the two sides will refrain from doing or saying something offensive that may damage the political atmosphere before such summits. Therefore, the summits themselves and the preparations in the months leading up to the meetings help stabilise bilateral relations. In this sense, even if no major agreements are reached during Trump’s May visit to Beijing, the trip will still be significant.
The Chinese are unquestionably among the best hosts in diplomacy. Trump will likely receive all the pageantry associated with a “state plus” visit in Beijing. In Trump’s words: it is going to be a “monumental event”.
However, it will be naïve to believe the relationship will be hunky dory. The US-China relationship is likely to experience some tough challenges in the second half of 2026.
A US$14 billion US arms sale to Taiwan was temporarily withheld by the Trump administration, but few doubt that the sale will proceed shortly after Trump’s China visit. When that happens, the Chinese leadership may feel betrayed and will be compelled to respond, such as dialing up military activities around Taiwan.
And if the Republican Party loses in the mid-term elections later this year, it is not inconceivable that Trump may blame China for contributing to America’s economic woes that might have turned away his traditional supporters.
Trump’s adjustment of America’s China policy is designed to make America great again, but it is also partially driven by his respect for China’s achievements.
Trump is arguably a big disrupter of the rules-based international order. His aggressive military actions in Iran and Venezuela have been widely condemned, and the damage he has caused to US global reputation and US alliances (perhaps with the exception of Japan) will be long-lasting.
However, on US-China relations, Trump has somehow played a stabilising role so far during his second term. Trump’s China policy today is conspicuously different from that of his first term.
Trump: a certain respect for China
Trump seems to be his own “China desk officer” now, emphasising the importance of a good relationship with China and its leadership. His key cabinet members, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent and Secretary of War Pete Hegseth, all seem moderate on China. No longer are top US officials advocating a “whole of government” and “whole of society” approach to confronting China. Neither is the US pressuring its allies to counter China together. Trump’s adjustment of America’s China policy is designed to make America great again, but it is also partially driven by his respect for China’s achievements.
Strong anti-China rhetoric in American politics will not disappear anytime soon, but rational public debates about China and US-China relations appear more frequently in American society today. For example, some American scholars are publicly calling upon US leaders, especially members of Congress, to travel to China to learn about China first-hand.
Trump is also helping shape this emerging new “Washington Consensus” that the US must treat China as an equal and formidable competitor and will pragmatically seek ways to co-exist with China peacefully.
He may be having poor global approval ratings, but in the vital US-China relationship, Trump is an asset now.
Even American public opinion toward China has become more positive now. According to a recent Gallup poll, the percentage of Americans surveyed who view China favourably rose from 15% in February 2023 to 34% in February 2026, and those who view China unfavourably dropped from 84% to 61% during the same period.
Trump will decidedly be a highly controversial American president and world leader. He may be having poor global approval ratings, but in the vital US-China relationship, Trump is an asset now. Since returning to the White House in January 2025, he has tried to avoid a major power showdown through summit diplomacy and active engagement, contributing to the stabilisation and improvement of the difficult bilateral relationship.
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