Trump’s bluster, Xi’s subtlety: Reading the G2 call

The presidents of China and the US spoke by phone on 4 February. Chinese President Xi Jinping has held numerous calls and video conferences with multiple US presidents, leaving many observers somewhat jaded. This time, however, the frankness and optimism of the Xi-Trump conversation stood out. The call was intended to pave the way for US President Donald Trump’s visit to China in April, heightening expectations for the trip.

In his characteristically boastful “Trumpian style,” Trump took to social media to hail the call as “excellent”, saying they had a “long and thorough call” and that their discussion of a range of important issues was “all very positive!” Trump even provided specific figures, revealing that China was considering increasing its soybean purchases from the US — from the original 12 million tonnes for the current season to 20 million tonnes, with a commitment of 25 million tonnes for next season. Following this announcement, international soybean futures prices rose accordingly.

Unlike Trump’s blunt proclamations, China’s statements were layered and nuanced, with much left unsaid but clearly implied between the lines. According to Xinhua, Xi told Trump that he was willing to “work with you to steer the giant ship of China-US relations steadily forward through winds and storms, and accomplish more big things and good things”; “Just as the US has its concerns, China for its part also has concerns. China always means what it says and matches its words with actions and results.” This is likely a reference to China’s fulfilment of its promises to purchase soybeans and to allow rare earths exports to the US. Xi also said that 2026 should be made a year in which China and the US move towards win-win cooperation.

On the subject of Taiwan, Xi’s tone shifted as he stressed that “the Taiwan question is the most important issue in China-US relations. Taiwan is China’s territory. China must safeguard its own sovereignty and territorial integrity, and will never allow Taiwan to be separated. The US must handle the issue of arms sales to Taiwan with prudence.“ The wording was stern, moving beyond applying pressure to carrying a word of warning and was pointedly referring to US arms sales to Taiwan.

The last time the two leaders spoke was on 24 November 2025. Before that, they had met on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Busan, South Korea on 30 October. The Busan meeting produced concrete results: a one-year technical truce in the tariff war and rare earths dispute, as well as an invitation for Trump to visit China. The Busan meeting also marked the establishment of a G2 (Group of Two) status in which China and the US are equals.

China achieved this on the strength of its trio of bargaining chips — rare earths, soybeans and fentanyl — as well as Chinese exports holding up in the face of high US tariffs. Before the talks, Trump had proactively announced on social media that “THE G2 WILL BE CONVENING SHORTLY!”, and China now appears to have quietly accepted this concept — one which it had previously opposed.

The biggest mystery of the Xi-Trump Busan meeting was that they did not discuss Taiwan, and the alleged “grand deal” between China and the US was nowhere to be seen. It was not until 24 November 2025, against the backdrop of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s “Taiwan contingency” remarks, that Taiwan once more became the focus of a Xi-Trump phone call. At that time, Xi said that “Taiwan’s return to China is an integral part of the post-war international order”. Now, this language has grown even tougher, signalling that the so-called “most important” Taiwan question would definitely be one of the focal points of Trump’s visit to China.

China and the US may already be engaged in delicate behind-the-scenes bargaining over the Taiwan issue. It is unlikely that Washington will make any major concessions at this stage, so rumours of a fourth China-US joint communique are premature. Since the “Taiwan card” is such a useful lever, the US will not exhaust it easily. Also, Trump will not make statements that encourage or tolerate Taiwan independence, as any drastic change to the status quo would also diminish the value of that card. He has in fact been consistently cautious in this regard, as reflected in the fact that Taiwan President Lai Ching-te has yet to carry out the traditional form of “transit diplomacy” in the US since taking office in 2024.

Trump said on social media that he had discussed with Xi a wide range of issues, including “trade, military, the April trip that I will be making to China… Taiwan, the war between Russia/Ukraine, the current situation with Iran, the purchase of oil and gas by China from the United States, the consideration by China of the purchase of additional agricultural products including lifting the soybean count to 20 million tons for the current season… airplane engine deliveries”, adding that they were “all very positive”. Given the length of this list, it is reasonable to assume that these will form the agenda for his April visit to China, and the scope is broad enough to amount to a potential “grand bargain”.

Trump 2.0 prioritises the US homeland and the western hemisphere, no longer treating the containment of China as its foremost task, providing the logical basis for a potential China-US “grand bargain”. In fact, some Chinese scholars floated the feasibility of such a deal. Professor Wu Xinbo of Fudan University published an article on the topic in Foreign Affairs late last year, arguing that Beijing needs to overcome its hesitancy and commit more resources to mediating global conflicts and providing public goods, while both sides should clarify their respective roles and division of labour within the international order.

Xi’s remark that China and the US should “accomplish more big things and good things” has also invited speculation. On the issue Trump cares most about — soybeans — market observers note that US soybeans are currently about 70% more expensive than Brazilian ones, so increasing purchases from the US would make little commercial sense, yet would be sufficient to signal China’s goodwill in striking a deal.

Meanwhile, on the same day that Xi spoke with Trump on the phone, he also held a video call with Russian President Vladimir Putin, underscoring China’s role among the major powers and its ability to navigate between them with ease.

In conclusion, if China and the US can find a way to coexist peacefully, it would undoubtedly be beneficial for global stability and for peace across the Taiwan Strait. For small and medium-sized countries, however, the outcome may be mixed. Judging from the current discourse, the “multipolar world” envisaged by the major powers appears in practice to focus on just three poles — China, the US and Russia — with little regard for the interests of smaller states. 

In today’s complex international environment, small and medium-sized countries can only shed nostalgia and their reliance on great powers. As Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney has put it, not choosing sides, building flexible frameworks for cooperation and staying clear-eyed are the only viable ways forward.

This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as “中美元首通话：大豆外交与台湾红线”.

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